



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

US Army Criminal Investigation Command
Fort Stewart CID Office
460 West Bultman Ave
Fort Stewart, Georgia, 31314-4914

CIRC-FFS

2020/01/28

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Law Enforcement Report - SIR (Category 2)/Final/Joint - 00540-2019-
CID093-019779-5H8

1. Offense: Accidental Death (None - No Criminal act)
2. Dates/Times/Locations of Occurrences: 0200, 20 Oct 19 - 0300, 20 Oct 19; Training Area F-5, Bridge 11, Fort Stewart, GA, 31314
3. Date/Time Reported: 0432, 20 Oct 19
4. Investigated By: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
5. Subjects/Suspects: NONE; [Accidental Death]
6. Victims:
 - a. Jenkins, Bryan Andrew (Deceased); SFC; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Age 41; Male; White; A Company, 2nd Battalion 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA, 31314; FC; [Accidental Death]
 - b. Walker, Thomas Cole (Deceased); SPC; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Age 22; Male; White; A Company, 2nd Battalion 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA, 31314; FC; [Accidental Death]

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c. Garcia, Antonio Gilberto (Deceased); PFC; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Age 21; Male; Unknown; A Company, 2nd Battalion 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st Amored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Divison, Fort Stewart, GA, 31314; FC; [Accidental Death]

7. Report Summary:

This office was notified by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Military Police (MP) Desk, Directorate of Emergency Services (DES), Fort Stewart, GA 31314 (FSGA), that a Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) overturned into a creek and multiple Soldiers were deceased.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Traffic Accident Instigations (TAI), DES, FSGA, stated A Company, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, Fort Stewart, GA 31314 was conducting convoy operations when the BFV went off a bridge, overturned, and became submerged in a creek.

The BFV was up righted and the Soldiers were extracted from the vehicle and pronounced deceased on scene by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Chief of EMS as follows: SFC Jenkins was pronounced deceased at 0341; SPC Walker was pronounced deceased at 0435; and PFC Garcia was pronounced deceased at 0650. The remains of SFC Jenkins, SPC Walker, and PFC Garcia were transported to Winn Army Community Hospital, FSGA.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DoD ID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CDR, A Co, 2-7 IN, 1ABCT, 3 ID, Fort Stewart, GA 31314, stated his company was conducting convoy operations when one of their BFV rolled off of a bridge and into the water. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SFC Jenkins was the Vehicle Commander and PFC Garcia was the driver. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the convoy was operating in black out drive and utilizing night vision devices.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DoD ID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A Co, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA, stated moments prior to the incident the convoy was directed to switch their vehicles from white light to black out drive. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated it is common to travel in black out drive in designated areas.

The U.S. Army Safety Office conducted a complete inspection of the BFV and no mechanical errors were identified.

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The Armed Forces Medical Examiner's System autopsy and toxicology reports for SFC Jenkins, SPC Walker and PFC Garcia listed the cause of death for SFC Jenkins, SPC Walker and PFC Garcia as drowning, and the manner of death as accidental. The toxicology reports of SFC Jenkins, SPC Walker and PFC Garcia were negative for any controlled substances.

Exhibits:

a. Attached:

- 1) Agent's Investigative Report (AIR) of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 20 Oct 19.
- 2) Photographic Packet (death scene), 20 Oct 19.
- 3) Disc containing all originals associated with Exhibit 2. (USACRC, AFMES and file copy only)
- 4) Copy of Weather Condition Report, 20 Oct 19.
- 5) Final Disposition Evidence Property Custody Document (EPCD), 21 Oct 19.
- 6) EPCD, Document Number (DN): 488-19.
- 7) Photographic Packet (BFV)
- 8) Disc containing all originals associated with Exhibit 7.
- 9) Copy of Army Motor Vehicle Operators ID card of PFC Garcia.
- 10) Final Disposition EPCD, 21 Oct 19.
- 11) EPCD, DN: 486-19.
- 12) AIR of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 30 Oct 19.

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- 13) Sworn Statement of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 21 Oct 19.
- 14) Disc containing canvass interview worksheets.
- 15) Disc containing field training exercise documentation.
- 16) Sworn Statement of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 25 Oct 19.
- 17) Sworn Statement of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 25 Oct 19.
- 18) Sworn Statement of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 25 Oct 19.
- 19) Sworn Statement of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 30 Oct 19.
- 20) AIR of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 25 Nov 19.
- 21) Disc containing autopsy photographs of SFC Jenkins, SPC Walker and PFC Garcia.
(USACRC, AFMES and file copy only)
- 22) Copy of Autopsy Report: ME19-0256, pertaining to SFC Jenkins, 12 Nov 19.
- 23) Copy of Toxicology Report: 194402, pertaining to SFC Jenkins, 5 Nov 19.
- 24) Copy of Autopsy Report: ME19-0257, pertaining to SPC Walker, 12 Nov 19.
- 25) Copy of Toxicology Report: 194401, pertaining to SPC Walker, 29 Oct 19.
- 26) Copy of Autopsy Report: ME19-0258, pertaining to PFC Garcia, 12 Nov 19.
- 27) Copy of Toxicology Report: 194400, pertaining to PFC Garcia, 30 Oct 19.
- 28) Disc containing unit risk assessment and BFV inspection worksheet.
- 29) Copy of TAI Final LER: 00617-2019-TAI093.

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30) Disc containing TAI death scene photographs.

31) Copy of TAI Death Scene Sketch.

32) AIR of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 11 Dec 19.

33) Copy of Army Safety Material Factors Investigation Report: 20191020001.

34) Disc containing Army Safety investigative documents.

b. Not Attached: None

The copies of originals retained at the USACRC become the original exhibits of record when the final disposition of the originals retained by this office occurs IAW AR 25-400-2.

CID law enforcement reports may be subject to a Quality Assurance Review by CID higher headquarters.

8. Unique Circumstances:

N/A

Commanders are reminded of the provisions of AR 600-8-2 pertaining to suspension of favorable personnel actions and AR 380-67 for the suspension of security clearances of persons under investigation. Army Law Enforcement reports are exempt from automatic termination of protective markings IAW Chapter 3, AR 25-55. IAW AR 25-22, AR190-45, and DODM 5400.07, information contained in this report is law enforcement sensitive, confidential and private in nature, and any further distribution (forwarding to unauthorized personnel) without the authorization of the Provost Marshal General will be in violation of the UCMJ and USC.

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Report Prepared By

Report Approved By

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Signature Authority

DISTRIBUTION:

USAG / DES (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DES, FSGA (email only)

USAG / CASUALTY Chief, Casualty Affairs Office, FSGA (email only)

USAG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CDR, USAG, FSGA (email only)

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USACIDC / 3 MP GRP CDR, 3d MP GRP (CID), 2182 South Perimeter Road, Building
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USACIDC - CIOP-COP HQ, USACIDC, ATTN: CIOP-COP, 27130 Telegraph Road,
Quantico, VA 22134

SJA / FSGA OSJA, ATTN: Criminal Law Division, FSGA

ARMED FORCES MEDICAL EXAMINER, DOVER AFB, MD Office of the Armed Forces
Medical Examiner, 115 Purple Heart Drive, Dover AFB, DE 19902

3ID / PM (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DIV PM, 3ID, FSGA (Email Only)

3ID / DCG-M Deputy Commanding General-Maneuver, 3ID, FSGA

3ID / CHIEF OF STAFF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Chief of Staff, 3ID, FSGA (Email Only)

3ID / CG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Commanding General, 3ID, FSGA (e-mail only)

1BCT / 2-7 IN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CDR, 2-7 IN, 1BCT, FSGA

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1BCT (COL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) CDR, 1BCT, 3ID, FSGA

CASE HISTORY:

00540-2019-CID093-019779

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AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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CID Regulation 195-1

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DETAILS

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION: About 0432, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) this office, was notified by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Military Police Desk, Directorate of Emergency Services (DES), Fort Stewart, GA 31314 (FSGA), of a training accident in which a Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) transporting six service members went off a bridge, capsized into a river, and one service member was deceased.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Traffic Accident Investigations (TAI), DES, FSGA, was on scene and could provide additional details. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the unit involved was A Company (A CO), 2nd Battalion 7th Infantry Regiment (2-7 IN), 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (1 ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division (3 ID), FSGA.

About 0456, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) coordinated with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who stated two services members were now deceased, three service members were being medically transported to Wynn Army Community Hospital (WACH), FSGA, and one service member was still trapped within the BFV. INV

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the unit planned to move the BFV in an attempt to extract the service member. INV

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he secured the scene and obtained photographs of the BFV before it was moved.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) identified the service members involved as follows:

SFC Bryan A. Jenkins, DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A CO, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA (Deceased)

SPC Thomas C. Walker's, DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A CO, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA (Deceased)

PFC Antonio G. Garcia, DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A CO, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA (Still trapped inside vehicle)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A CO, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A CO, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA; and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A CO, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

About 0645, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Commander (CDR), A CO, 2-7 IR, 1 ABCT, 3 ID), Fort Stewart, GA 31314, on scene who stated his company was conducting convoy operations when one of their BFVs hit one side of a bridge, overcorrected and then capsized into the water. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the convoy movement included the majority of A Co, minus about three crews and a few mechanics that stayed behind. He stated they were in the process of movement from METZ training mount site to Area 256. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the company switched from white light to black out light prior to the incident. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SFC

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Fort Stewart CID Office
460 West Bultman Avenue
Fort Stewart, GA 31314

SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DATE

20 Oct 19

EXHIBIT

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DETAILS

Jenkins, was the TC, PFC Garcia, was the driver and he was unsure of SPC Walker's position in the BFV.

About 0650, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DoDID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A CO, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA, on scene who stated he was in the vehicle behind A13, but doesn't know if he saw anything. He stated the unit received guidance to put their Night Vision Devices (NVDs) on, and switched from white light to black out light right before the incident. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated their BDE policy states while traveling on certain roads it is mandatory to travel in black out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated there were six other individuals in his vehicle. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was informed this office would schedule a time for him to come in and provide a sworn statement. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then made the comment, "had we been in white light this wouldn't have happened".

About 0720, 20 Oct 19 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made observations of the death scene and exposed photographs.

Agents Observations of the Death Scene:

Lighting: It was dark, the scene was illuminated by flood lights and emergency vehicles.

Weather: It was around 70 Degrees Fahrenheit, dark, cloud cover, no rain, however, it was clearly raining early that morning and most of the previous evening.

Terrain: The roads around the scene were extremely ruff, muddy, and difficult to navigate though. There were multiple track marks which made it difficult to determine the path of the BFV involved.

Equipment: A wooden guard rail on Bridge 11 was severely damaged on the same side the BFV appeared to go over. The BFV was partly underwater while the rescue team was still attempting to extract PFC Garcia from the driver's compartment. Personal equipment and sensitive items alike were observed in the river and were being collected by the unit.

Personal: Fire rescue personal and unit service members were on scene conducting rescue procedures. Emergency Medical Service (EMS) were on scene providing aid and evaluating unit personal. TAI secured the Death Scene and had personal guarding the two soldiers who were pronounced deceased (See Photographic Packet, Death Scene Photographs, and Weather Report).

Agents Comments: During the rescues process, unit personal collected sensitive items such a weapons and NVGs and placed equipment pulled from the creek back into the BFV for safe keeping.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Fort Stewart CID Office 460 West Bultman Avenue Fort Stewart, GA 31314	
SIGNATURE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE 20 Oct 19	EXHIBIT 1	

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DETAILS

About 0726, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A Co, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA, who stated he believed there were five or six Soldiers in the vehicle. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he heard (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A Co, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA, screamed over the radio that a BFV was upside down. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they couldn't travel fast due to low visibility and road conditions but was uncertain of the speed of the convoy. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was in a vehicle ahead of the BFV that turned over in the convoy. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they had completed the mission at "METZ Village" and were headed back to "AA".

About 0851, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) coordinated with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) FSGA, who stated he was called out by Central at 0259 and responded at 0317. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided the following times as when he contacted (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) WACH, FSGA, who authorized to discontinue the life saving measures:

- 0341 – SFC Jenkins
- 0435 – SPC Walker
- 0650 – PFC Garcia.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated range control could not be contacted and the 911 call was placed by the unit. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he contacted range control at 0304. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated when he arrived soldiers were in the water working to get other soldiers out of the vehicle. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated CPR had been performed on SFC Jenkins and SPC Walker was in an up armored medical vehicle enroute to the Ambulance exchange point. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated upon his arrival the BFV was still over turned with its track out of the water and the rear hatch was open. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Initial SJA Brief: About 0855, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) briefed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Military Justice Advisor (MJA), Office of Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA), FSGA, on all aspects of this investigation. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was briefed that the deceased were transported to WACH and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). She was further briefed the BFV was being transported to a motor pool to be secured pending inspection by safety investigators. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was further briefed photographs of the scene were exposed on scene; however, no death scene examination was completed do to the BFV being under water and the remains of the deceased already removed from the scene. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) requested concurrence to release the scene to which she agreed.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		Fort Stewart CID Office 460 West Bultman Avenue Fort Stewart, GA 31314	
SIGNATURE	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE	EXHIBIT
		20 Oct 19	1

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DETAILS

About 0912, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at WACH. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they were returning from a "lane" when he heard a loud "pop" and the BFV began to flip. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the BFV went into the water and he was (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) opened the hatch and pulled himself and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) out of the BFV. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was in the back of the BFV sitting by the gunner. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated everyone was wearing full kit however those in the back were not wearing safety harnesses. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated by the time he was out of the BFV it was completely filled with water.

About 0919, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at WACH. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the unit had finished their mission, loaded up in the BFV, and began moving back to their site. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he heard a loud "bang" and it felt like the driver slammed on the brakes and the BFV skidded. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the next thing he remembered was being upside down wherein he found the hatch and opened it. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he believed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and that he pulled (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) out of the BFV first. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he then pulled (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from the BFV. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated it felt like they hit the dip in front of the bridge. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he tried to get back in however he couldn't get the hatch opened to get the commander or gunner out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he started communicating with an NCO who got Soldiers to help get the gunner out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was sitting in the woods (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he had (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sit down near the bridge. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated SPC Walker was loaded into a vehicle and SFC Jenkins was having CPR performed on him. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated then the Medics and fire department showed up.

About 1116, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exposed photographs of PFC Garcia's remains. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAI, FSGA, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAI, FSGA, conducted a search of PFC Garcia's pockets which revealed:

Night Vision Goggles – NSN: 5855014320524; SN: 74186792 (located within left waist pocket)

Skill craft Flashlight. (Located within right waist pocket)

Camel Snus Frost, containing approximately eight pouches. (Located within right waist pocket)

About 1140, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exposed photographs of SPC Walker's remains. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted a search of SPC Walker's pockets revealed:

Cellular phone (Located within right waist pocket)

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Fort Stewart CID Office 460 West Bultman Avenue Fort Stewart, GA 31314	
SIGNATURE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE 20 Oct 19	EXHIBIT 1	

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DETAILS

Empty bag of beef jerky (located within right cargo pocket)

Vape (located within left shoulder pocket)

About 1226, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exposed photographs of SFC Jenkins' remains. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) searched SFC Jenkins pockets revealed:

Knife (Located within right waist pocket)

Exchange select day time cold and flu medicine (Located within left cargo pocket)

Chapstick (Located within left waist pocket)

The previous listed items were photographed and collected on an Evidence Custody Property Document (EPCD). It was determined the items did not hold any evidentiary value and were released to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A Company (A Co), U.S. Army Medical Command, (MEDCOM), Winn Army Community Hospital (WACH), FSGA, to be released to the unit. (See EPCD and Disc Containing Photographs of Deceased and Items)

About 1340, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived to BLDG 1320 and made contact with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) G4, 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), FSGA and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 3ID, FSGA. A plan was put in place to secure the BFV in a bay within the motor pool located at BLDG 1320. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated all entry and exit points to BLDG 1320 will be secured and all keys will be provided to this office.

About 1425, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) collected the BFV has evidence which was documented on EPCD, Document Number (DN):488-19. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) exposed external and internal photographs of the BFV. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was wearing Personal Protective equipment while examining the BFV. A search of the BFV revealed multiple impact damage. The photographs of the BFV reveal the BFV as it was collected. During the rescue and recovery of the BFV unit personal placed equipment and personal gear within the rear hatch of the BFV. External photographs of the BFV revealed unknown debris, and what appeared to be water damage. Internal photographs revealed what appeared to be water damage and unknown debris. Multiple items were removed to clear a path into the BFV. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) searched and exposed photographs of items removed from the BFV. (See Disc Containing BFI and item processing photographs and BFV processing Photographic Packet)

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Fort Stewart CID Office
460 West Bultman Avenue
Fort Stewart, GA 31314

SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DATE

20 Oct 19

EXHIBIT

1

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DETAILS

About 1620, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) this office, obtained a copy of the military driver's license of PFC Garcia. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) noted the license was apparently signed by the appropriate certifying authorities, was issued in July of 2019, and listed the Bradley Fighting Vehicle as one of the vehicles PFC Garcia was authorized to operate. (See Copy of Military Drivers License)

About 1700, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) collected a cellular device found in a ruck sack labeled with the name (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The device was a black iPhone and was collected on an EPCD for evaluation as evidence.

Further evaluation of the device determined it was not evidence and the device was returned to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) determined the device belonged to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (See Final Disposition)

About 1702, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) collected a cellular device found in a wet weather bag that held items labeled with "PFC Garcia". The device was a black iPhone with a black plastic case. The collection was recorded on an EPCD. (See EPCD, DN, 486-19)

Between 1641-1715, 20 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) this office, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) placed red tamper proof evidence tape on all doors and windows of Building 1320.///LAST ITEM///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Fort Stewart CID Office
460 West Bultman Avenue
Fort Stewart, GA 31314

SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DATE

20 Oct 19

EXHIBIT

1

CID FOR

00540-19-CID093-019779
000014

Photographic Packet

Death Scene

Training Area F-5, Bridge 11

Fort Stewart, GA 31314

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

EXHIBIT 2

1 of 4



Training Area F-5, bridge 11, BFV Tracks



Damage to the side of bridge 11

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE


Graphic Photo(s)

Graphic Photo(s)

BFV capsized in Canoochee Creek submerged with tracks visible.

Graphic Photo(s)

Rescue and Recovery of Personal and Equipment



Bridge 11 and Route 129 Traffic Signs

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

EXHIBIT 2

Exhibit 3
Pages 000018 withheld as

Duplicate of Exhibit 2

Exhibit 4

Pages 000019 thru 000020 referred to:

Headquarters Air Force/ AALL
(FOIA)
100 Air Force Pentagon Washington,
DC 20330-1000

EVIDENCE/PROPERTY CUSTODY DOCUMENT

For use of this form see AR 190-45 and AR 195-5: the proponent agency is US Army Criminal Investigation Command

MPR/CID SEQUENCE NUMBER
0540-2019-CID093
CRD REPORT/CID ROI NUMBER

RECEIVING ACTIVITY 30 th Military Detachment (CID)	LOCATION Fort Stewart, GA 31314 (FSGA)
NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF PERSON FROM WHOM RECEIVED <input type="checkbox"/> OWNER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER Various Locations within Winn Army Community Hospital	ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) 1061 Harmon Ave, Fort Stewart, GA 31314
LOCATION FROM WHERE OBTAINED Various locations within Winn Army Community Hospital.	REASON OBTAINED Evaluation as Evidence
	TIME/DATE OBTAINED 1133-1241/20 Oct 19

ITEM NO.	QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES <i>(Include model, serial number, condition and unusual marks or scratches)</i>
1	1	Night Vision Goggles: NSN: 5855-01-432-0254; SN: 74186792; black, bronze and white in color; metal and glass construction; .550 cord tied onto. (Left waist pocket of PFC Garcia)1133
2	1	Flashlight: Skill Craft; black and white in color; metal and glass construction; approximately 6 1/4" long, and 3/4" wide at light. (Right waist pocket of PFC Garcia) 1134
3	1	Can: blue, white and black in color; metal type construction; "Camel Snus Frost"; containing approximately 8 pouches. (Right waist pocket of PFC Garcia)1135
4	1	Cellular Phone: black, white and in color, metal and glass type construction; Apple; used condition; screen and back cracked. Phone was in a case, black and clear of color; plastic type construction, in used condition, with a joker playing card between the back of the case and the back of the phone. (Left waist pocket of SPC Walker) 1200
5	1	Bag: red, white, black, green and yellow in color, plastic type construction "Jack Links Jalapeno"; containing crumbs; 3.25 oz. (Right cargo pocket of SPC Walker) 1202
6	1	Vape: red, black, silver, green, and yellow in color; metal type construction; "Trinity Alpha"; used condition; approximately 1 1/2" wide by 3 1/2" tall. (Left shoulder pocket of SPC Walker) 1203
7	1	Knife: black and silver in color, metal and plastic type construction; "Buck USA"; blade length approximately 3"; overall length approximately 7 1/2"; used condition. (Right waist pocket of SFC Jenkins) 1236 continued on page 2...

////////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////////

CHAIN OF CUSTODY

ITEM NO.	DATE	RELEASED BY	RECEIVED BY	PURPOSE OF CHANGE OF CUSTODY
1-9	20 Oct 19	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		Evaluation as Evidence
1-9	21 Oct 19			Final Disposition
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	

DA FORM 4137
1 Jul 76

Replaces DA FORM 4137, 1 Aug 74 and DA FORM 4137-R Privacy Act Statement 26 Sep 75 Which are Obsolete.

LOCATION _____

DOCUMENT NUMBER _____

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EXHIBIT
000021
5

CONTINUATION OF DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES RECEIVED FROM;	MPR/CID SEQUENCE NUMBER 0540-2019-CID093
Various locations within Winn Army Community Hospital.	CRD REPORT/CID ROI NUMBER

ITEM NO.	QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES <i>(Include model, serial number, condition and unusual marks or scratches)</i>
8	1	...Continued from page 1. Packaging: orange, yellow, white, silver and blue in color; paper and plastic type construction; torn condition; containing approximately 18 orange in color capsules within 2 capsules containers; "Exchange select daytime cold and flu". (Left cargo pocket of SFC Jenkins) 1238.
9	1	Tube: blue and white in color; plastic type construction; .15 oz; used condition; "12 SPF" containing what appears to be chap stick". (Left waist pocket of SFC Jenkins) 1241
////////	////////	////////////////////////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////////



EVIDENCE/PROPERTY CUSTODY DOCUMENT

For use of this form see AR 190-45 and AR 195-5; the proponent agency is US Army Criminal Investigation Command

MPR/CID SEQUENCE NUMBER

00540-19-CID093

CRD REPORT/CID ROI NUMBER

019779

RECEIVING ACTIVITY 30 th Military Detachment (CID)	LOCATION Fort Stewart, GA 31314 (FSGA)
NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF PERSON FROM WHOM RECEIVED <input type="checkbox"/> OWNER Death Scene <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER	ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) N/A
LOCATION FROM WHERE OBTAINED Training Area F-5, Bridge 11, FSGA	REASON OBTAINED Evidence
	TIME/DATE OBTAINED 1145/20 Oct 19

ITEM NO.	QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES <i>(Include model, serial number, condition and unusual marks or scratches)</i>
1	1	Vehicle: Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), Local Interconnect Network Number (LIN): F60564, Bumper Number: A13, Serial Number (SN): 2AGR1499Y, Registration Number (RN): MV0410, BFV is described as a woodland camo patterned, full tracked infantry M2A3. BFV sustained multiple points of external impact and water damage and internal water damage containing oil and unknown debris. BFV was transported to building 1320, FSGA, and placed between bays 32, 33, and 34. All entry and exit points were secured with pad locks and sealed with tamper proof evidence tape. BFV was Marked For Identification (MFID) at 1145, 20 Oct 19, ^{(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)} LAST ITEM

CHAIN OF CUSTODY				
ITEM NO.	DATE	RELEASED BY	RECEIVED BY	PURPOSE OF CHANGE OF CUSTODY
1	20 Oct 19	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		Evaluation as Evidence Transport to secure area
1	21 Oct 19			Evaluation as Evidence
1	OCT 21 2019			Received by Evidence Custodian Fort Stewart, GA
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	

DA FORM 4137
1 Jul 76

Replaces DA FORM 4137, 1 Aug 74 and DA FORM 4137-R Privacy Act Statement 26 Sep 75 Which are Obsolete.

LOCATION _____

DOCUMENT NUMBER 488-19



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0000EXHIBIT

6


00540-19-CID093-019778
00024

Photographic Packet


Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFI) Processing
Building 1320, Fort Stewart, GA 31314

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

1 of 4
EXHIBIT 7




Front of BVF



Wood From Bridge 11


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Graphic Photo(s)



BFV Rear Hatch and Equipment


Graphic Photo(s)



BFV TC and Gunner Turret

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Graphic Photo(s)



BFV Turret and Viewport

Graphic Photo(s)



BFV Drivers compartment

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Exhibit 8
Pages 000028 withheld as

Duplicate of Exhibit 7

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

EXHIBIT
000029 1

EVIDENCE/PROPERTY CUSTODY DOCUMENT

For use of this form see AR 190-45 and AR 195-5; the proponent agency is US Army Criminal Investigation Command

MPR/CID SEQUENCE NUMBER 0540-2019-CID093
CRD REPORT/CID ROI NUMBER

RECEIVING ACTIVITY 30 th Military Detachment (CID)	LOCATION Fort Stewart, GA 31314 (FSGA)
NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF PERSON FROM WHOM RECEIVED <input type="checkbox"/> OWNER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER 3 rd Brigade Support Battalion, Building 1320, between bays 32, 33, and 34, FSGA.	ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) NA
LOCATION FROM WHERE OBTAINED Ruck sack Building 1320, between bays 32, 33, and 34, FSGA	REASON OBTAINED Evaluation as Evidence
	TIME/DATE OBTAINED 1700/20 Oct 19

ITEM NO.	QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES <i>(Include model, serial number, condition and unusual marks or scratches)</i>
1	1	Cellular Phone: black, white and in color, metal and glass type construction; Apple; used condition; screen and back cracked. Phone was in a case, black and clear of color; plastic type construction, in used condition. Placed in clean envelope and sealed with brown paper packaging tape. All seals were initialed and envelope was Marked for Identification with 1702, 20 Oct 19 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ruck sack of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
////////	////////	/////////LAST ENTRY/////////

CHAIN OF CUSTODY				
ITEM NO.	DATE	RELEASED BY	RECEIVED BY	PURPOSE OF CHANGE OF CUSTODY
1	20 Oct 19	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		Evaluation as Evidence
1	21 Oct 19			Final Disposition
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	

EVIDENCE/PROPERTY CUSTODY DOCUMENT

For use of this form see AR 190-45 and AR 195-5; the proponent agency is US Army
Criminal Investigation Command

MPR/CID SEQUENCE NUMBER

0540-2019-CID093

CRD REPORT/CID ROI NUMBER

RECEIVING ACTIVITY 30 th Military Detachment (CID)	LOCATION Fort Stewart, GA 31314 (FSGA)
NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF PERSON FROM WHOM RECEIVED <input type="checkbox"/> OWNER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER Bag of Deceased Service Member (DSM) Garcia, 3 rd Brigade Support Battalion, Building 1320, between bays 32, 33, and 34,	ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) NA
LOCATION FROM WHERE OBTAINED From wet weather bag while at motor pool bay located at building 1320.	REASON OBTAINED Evidence
	TIME/DATE OBTAINED 1702/20 Oct 19

ITEM NO.	QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES <i>(Include model, serial number, condition and unusual marks or scratches)</i>
1	1	Cellular Phone; black and silver in color, metal and glass type construction; Apple; used condition covered with dirt. Phone was in a case, black in color; plastic type construction, in used condition. Wrapped in a brown paper bag. Placed in clean envelope and sealed with brown paper packaging tape. All seals initialed and envelope was Marked for Identification with <u>1702, 20 Oct 19</u> ^{(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)} FC Garcia's wet weather bag.)
////////	////////	/////////LAST ENTRY/////////

CHAIN OF CUSTODY			
ITEM NO.	DATE	RELEASED BY	RECEIVED BY
1	20 Oct 19	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
1	21 Oct 19	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE
		SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
		NAME, GRADE OR TITLE	NAME, GRADE OR TITLE

PURPOSE OF CHANGE OF CUSTODY
Evaluation as Evidence
Received by Evidence Custodian Fort Stewart, GA

DA FORM 4137
1 Jul 76

Replaces DA FORM 4137, 1 Aug 74 and DA FORM 4137-R Privacy Act Statement 26 Sep 75 Which are Obsolete.

LOCATION _____

DOCUMENT NUMBER 486-19

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000034 EXHIBIT
14

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Law Enforcement Sensitive

AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

LER: 00540-19-CID093-019779

CID Regulation 195-1

Contents cannot be released outside law enforcement or Dept of the Army channels without the approval of the Commander, USACIDC

PAGE 1 OF 3

DETAILS

About 1206, 21 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DOD ID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A Co, 2-7IN, 1ABCT, 3ID, FSGA, who stated his unit was returning from a Company STIX lane when the accident occurred. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they were initially using the BFV's white headlights; however, were later told to switch to tactical. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was the TC for his vehicle and at one point the BFV went off the roadway into the woods due to poor visibility. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated his vehicle was able to navigate the bridge by him being outside of the TC hatch using his Night Vision Goggles to direct his driver. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated a call came over the radio saying a BFV went off the bridge and he had his driver turn around and go back. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated upon arriving at the overturned BFV other Soldiers were working to get SPC Walker and SFC Jenkins out of the turret. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated once they were out and CPR had been initiated he entered the water in an attempt to remove PFC Garcia. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated for about an hour Soldiers were taking turns holding their breath and going under water in an attempt to get the drivers hatch open. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated his first visual of PFC Garcia was only of his leg as he could only see through the area of the hatch they had partially opened. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated once the hatch was opened the driver's seat was laid back slightly and PFC Garcia was lying face down. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated they couldn't initially get PFC Garcia out due to his arm being under the driver's seat. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated once PFC Garcia was free they were able to load him into a rescue basket. (See Sworn Statement)

AUTOPSY: About 1315, 21 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) this office, arrived at Winn Army Community Hospital, Fort Stewart, GA 31314 to observe the autopsy of the decedent, SFC Jenkins. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed the following pertaining to the examination of the decedent.

Blood was present from the ears, nose, and mouth rigor mortis and livor mortis appeared present.

Upon removal of skin from the skull, a dark red spot was present on the crown of the skull. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Dover Airforce Base, Delaware 19902. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) coordinated with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Dover AFB, DE, for photos of SFC Jenkins remains.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that the Medical Examination case number for SFC Jenkins is ME 19- 256. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that the official report from the medical examiner will be available in four to six weeks.

AUTOPSY: About 1425, 21 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) this office, arrived at Winn Army Community Hospital, FSGA, to observe the autopsy of the decedent, SPC Walker.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) observed the following pertaining to the examination of the decedent: blood was present from the ears, and nose. Rigor mortis and livor mortis appeared present. Upon removal of skin from the skull, a dark red spot was present on the crown of the skull. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) coordinated with

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) for photos of SPC Walker's remains. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that the Medical Examination case number for SPC Walker is ME 19- 257.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Fort Stewart CID Office
460 West Bultman Avenue
Fort Stewart, GA 31314

SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DATE

30 Oct 19

EXHIBIT

12

AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

LER: 00540-19-CID093-019779

CID Regulation 195-1

Contents cannot be released outside law enforcement or Dept of the Army channels without the approval of the Commander, USACIDC

PAGE 2 OF 3

DETAILS

About 1500, 21 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) obtained a copy of death scene photographs from TAI. (See Disc Containing Traffic Death Scene Photographs)

About 1500, 21 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted canvass interviews of A Co, 2-7 IN, 1ABCT, at BLDG 702, FSGA, which revealed no criminality. (See Disc Containing Canvass Interviews)

About 1600, 21 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) coordinated with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID who provided a disc containing a copy of the Field Training Exercise (FTX) OPORD, CONOP and other FTX documents. (See Disc)

AUTOPSY: About 1542, 21 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) both of this office, attended and observed the autopsy of PFC Garcia conducted by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at WACH. PFC Garcia was dressed in an Army Combat Uniform, which was wet and oily. The front left hip pocket contained a Leatherman brand multi-tool and two identification tags of PFC Garcia. The left cargo pocket contained two metallic cotter pins and an empty wrapper of a granola bar. There was no apparent significant external trauma. An approximate 2 inch in diameter red-brown contusion was noted on the superior posterior aspect of the left shoulder. The face and hands were dirty with black/brown discoloration that did not wipe away with water. Internal examination revealed red-black marks to the superior aspect of the skull once the skin was removed. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that the Medical Examination case number for SFC Jenkins is ME 19- 258. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) indicated that the official report from the medical examiner will be available in four to six weeks.

About 1445, 23 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) met with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Fort Bragg, NC 28310, who was assigned as the 15-6 Investigating Officer for the unit's administrative investigation into the BFV rollover, and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TA, FSGA. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he will begin obtaining statements from the unit once this office completes their interviews. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he would let this office know if he identifies any signs of criminality throughout his investigation and would provide this office with copies of the risk assessment, vehicle maintenance paperwork and driver's licenses pertaining to the driver (PFC Garcia) and TC (SFC Jenkins).

About 1223, 25 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who stated their unit had been training most of the day and evening of 19 Oct 19, the mission was completed around 0230, 20 Oct 19, and the was heading back to AA when the accident occurred. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated after an After Action Review (AAR) their convoy rolled out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the weather conditions were not the greatest and his Driver's Vision Enhancer (DVE) was having issues. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he contacted the net

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		Fort Stewart CID Office 460 West Bultman Avenue Fort Stewart, GA 31314	
SIGNATURE	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	DATE	EXHIBIT
		30 Oct 19	12

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AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

LER: 00540-19-CID093-019779

CID Regulation 195-1

Contents cannot be released outside law enforcement or Dept of the Army channels without the approval of the Commander, USACIDC

PAGE 3 OF 3

DETAILS

and informed them his BFV needed to stop and asses the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated after his BFV continued movement, he though he observed the BFV in front of his, and then it was gone. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated his vehicle was directly behind A13. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated after they drove over the bridge a call came on the net stating a BFV had gone over. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the unit immediately started the rescue and recovery of personal. (See Sworn Statement)

About 1237, Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who stated during the unit training on 19 Oct 19 multiple BFVs had mechanical issues and had gotten suck. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated after an AAR the unit rolled out. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in their BFV did not work so PFC Garcia was driving with his NODS and SFC Jenkins was guiding him while wearing NODS as well. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated while driving back to AA he heard a loud pop and felt PFC Garcia hit the brakes; then PFC Garcia pulled over to let other BFV's pass; he did not know he was on a bridge. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated once they went over he helped (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) out of the BFV while the unit started the rescue and recovery of personal. (See Sworn Statement)

About 1245, 25 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who stated in preparing to return to AA he was in the back of the BFV with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he was tired and went to sleep and was woken to a loud pop. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated everything was moving fast and the BFV was filling with water and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was pulling him out while the unit immediately started the rescue and recovery of personal. (See Sworn Statement)

About 1212, 30 Oct 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who stated after training all day on 19 Oct 19 into 20 Oct 19, the unit conducted an AAR and were returning to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he fell asleep and was woken up to a loud crashing noise and felt like he was falling. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pulled him out and saved his life. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated after he was pulled out the unit started the rescue and recovery of personal, he (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and was taken to the hospital for observation. (See Sworn Statement) ///LAST ITEM///

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER	ORGANIZATION Fort Stewart CID Office 460 West Bultman Avenue Fort Stewart, GA 31314	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)	DATE 30 Oct 19	EXHIBIT 12
SIGNATURE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		

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Law Enforcement Sensitive

SWORN STATEMENT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately retrieved.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURES: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

LOCATION 30 TH MP DET (CID), Fort Stewart, GA 31314	DATE 21 Oct 19	FILE NUMBER 1206
LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	GRADE/STATUS ES-AD
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS A Co, 2-7 IN, 1ABCT, 3ID, FSGA		

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On Saturday night/Sunday morning of the 19th and 20th, Alpha Company 2-7 infantry was returning from an attack lane for training of Company six. Upon completion of the lane, we headed back to the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sing white light(non-tactical). My (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was given an order (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to end our non-tactical movement and begin moving tactically. The tactical movement began and immediately was difficult due to extremely poor visibility. Due to such poor visibility Bradley's were running of the road including my Bradley. We came to a bridge crossing and successfully navigated the bridge. After moving about 500-1000 meters away from the bridge, my PSG came across the net that we had lost a Bradley to the bridge. I had my driver turn around to see what was happening all the while my PL was trying to regain communications with my PSG. After about 30 seconds my PL had confirmation a Bradley was in the water. I immediately started to move back toward the bridge. After arriving at the bridge i ran off the front of my Bradley and saw another Bradley overturned in the water. Soldiers were working there hardest to get to the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) After finally getting them free of the turret soldiers started CPR. At this time I entered the water to try to remove the driver. For close to an hour other soldiers and myself rotated holding our breath and going under to try and open the drivers hatch. Unfortunately we were only able open the hatch a little without being able to remove the driver. We were told to get out of the water because an 88(heavy truck) was coming to pull the Bradley out to remove the driver. After all personnel was checked and accounted for my (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) told the other (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) my section he needed him to go down there and open the hatch and get the driver out. I told him that I was going also. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) than informed me I would be taking a team with me to extract the driver from the hatch. We were geared up by EMS and Fire personnel and we waited for the 88 to finish its mission. We were told the 88 did all that it could and we went to the bank where we could enter safely to begin our extraction. At that point the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) made a call to only send myself as it would be too great a risk on all the other soldiers. I went down the bank was tied up to a tree for my safety harness and began my climb on the Bradley to get to the drivers hatch. After getting to the hatch I started to try and open the hatch all the way. While doing so I could see the drivers leg confirming he was still in the drivers hole. I was unsuccessful at opening the hatch due to my unfamiliarity with the Bradley. I than called to the other (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) section to come assist me with opening the hatch. He took the same route I did and when arriving he and I were able to get it open. After opening it all the way we saw the driver face down in the drivers hole. At this time we began extracting the driver from his hole. We quickly realized that his arm was caught underneath the chair and were unable to remove him until he freed his arm. My assistant than climbed back over the brad and went in through the back. He was able to get through the hell hole, to the driver, where he freed his arm. My assistant than realized that he would not be able to get back the way he came, that he would also have to get through the drivers hatch. I then pulled the driver out of the hatch and then he came through. We then were sent down a rescue basket to load the driver onto. We successfully loaded him and strapped him down but were unable to tighten the straps. We struggled with the straps until the fire chief came down to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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INITIALS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT: 13

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000036 EXHIBIT

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT: Fort Stewart CID Office, FSGA DATED: 21 Oct 19. STATEMENT
(Continued)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) assist us. I held on to the chief as he tightened down the straps. We then told the fireman up top to start pulling as we pushed the basket up. The driver was successfully loaded on to the bridge and we exited off the Bradley without further incident.

Q. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q. Did you write the above narrative yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave the order to switch from "white light" to "black out"?

A. Brigade.

Q. Where did your Bradley run off the road at?

A. About 500-1000 meters before the bridge.

Q. The bridge the Bradley went off of?

A. Yes.

Q. How did your Bradley run off the road?

A. I had to go into the turret to clean my Nods and my driver went off the road.

Q. How far off the road did your Bradley go?

A. About 50 meters into the wood line.

Q. How many other Bradley's ran off the road?

A. I can't give an exact number. Maybe 2. Another Bradley did hit the right side of the bridge.

Q. Which Bradley hit the right side of the bridge?

A. 1st Platoons PL Bradley. Bradley 1-1.

Q. Who is 1st Platoons PL?

A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q. What led to these Bradley's running off the road?

A. Extremely poor weather conditions. Extremely poor visibility. Lack of sleep. Not enough recovery.

Q. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A.

Q.

A.

Q. Who was the Commander and gunner of the overturned Bradley?

A. SFC Jenkins and CPL Walker.

Q. Explain where they were taken out from the Bradley?

A. On the back of a Bradley there is a Soldier section where dismounted Soldiers sit. When you walk in there is a gunner section and Commander which is the whole turret. The turret door has to be closed for the equipment to work.

Q. What was the condition or placement of the turret door when you first arrived?

A. Closed before they were taken out. While I was there they were able to open the turret door to get them out.

Q. Who was the other (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q. Who was on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A. Myself, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q. What do you mean by "hell hole" (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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INITIALS

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT: Fort Stewart CID Office, FSGA DATED: 21 Oct 19 . STATEMENT
(Continued)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A. There is a hole between the turret and the Bradley that the driver would come out of if he couldn't exit the drivers hatch. It is a very small space.

Q. Who was the driver?

A. PFC Garcia.

Q. What was PFC Garcia wearing?

A. OCPs.

Q. What gear did PFC Garcia have on?

A. Nothing when I got to him. He was probably trying to take it off to get out. His helmet was in the water not in the Bradley.

Q. What were the conditions traveling to the training site?

A. Terrible.

Q. What do you mean by terrible?

A. Poor visualization, extremely poor weather, bad roads for a tracked vehicle, extremely muddy.

Q. What were the conditions traveling from the training site?

A. The same if not worse?

Q. How fast was the convoy traveling?

A. No faster than 20MPH.

Q. How were you able to navigate the bridge?

A. I was out of the Commanders hatch navigating my driver through my nods.

Q. How were you first notified of the overturned Bradley?

A. Over the radio on the net.

Q. How well were comms working during this training exercise?

A. They were working once we got them working.

Q. Where you were in comparison to the Bradley that overturned?

A. Ahead of the Bradley about 1000 meters ahead.

Q. How many vehicles were between you and the overturned Bradley?

A. I don't know where they were in the order of march. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) threw his helmet at my PSG's Bradley 3-

4.

Q. How were you made aware of this?

A. I was told by my PSG.

Q. What does white light(non-tactical) mean?

A. Means driver's hatch opened, headlights, as much visibility as you can get with the Bradley.

Q. What does moving tactically mean?

A. No lights on black out lights. Drivers hatch closed using the screen to navigate the road.

Q. How do you know another Bradley hit the right side of the bridge?

A. I was told after the incident by my LT.

Q. Explain poor visibility?

A. Extremely bad illumination from the moon. Raining. Just complete and total darkness. Even with my nods on I could barley see the Bradley in front of me. And due to the bad conditions the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q. What can you see on this screen (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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INITIALS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT: 13

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT: Fort Stewart CID Office, FSGA DATED: 21 Oct 19. STATEMENT

(Continued)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 Q. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 Q. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A. I don't know.

Q. What do they see?

A. I think it shows up in front not the front of the Bradley.

Q. What is your vehicle's bumper number?

A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q. How did you find out other Bradley's went off the road?

A. I was told after. I was on Platoon net so I don't know what was announced on the company net. I announced over the net because my vehicle almost hit another Bradley.

Q. The bridge you explained navigating. Was it the same bridge the Bradley over turned on?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you navigate over that bridge?

A. With my nods outside my turret from the commander's hatch.

Q. What did you see while crossing the bridge?

A. The road in front of me.

Q. What did you relay to your driver?

A. Bridge coming up don't sway.

Q. What weather considerations were briefed prior?

A. It was already rainy and stormy, wet and cold. No brief necessary.

Q. What was discussed in the brief prior to conducting this convoy?

A. The plan for the lane.

Q. Who is (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q. What was the sleep/work cycle?

A. I can only speak that I got 4 hours of sleep the night prior. We came in Thursday at midnight and only got about 4 hours in order to prep. We got to AA, prepared all day for the mission, went to sleep around 0030 or 0100 and got up at 0530 to start the day mission.

Q. What do you mean not enough recovery?

A. We have been in the field with a terrible sleep cycle for 2 months. Not only was there not enough time to recovery for people but we didn't have time to fix the Bradley's that were broken.

Q. Had you traveled this route previously?

A. Yes on the way back after the day mission.

Q. Do you know who got the gunner and commander out?

A. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got SFC Jenkins out. I believe he got them both out.

Q. Is there anything you would like to add or delete from this statement?

A: No.///END OF STATEMENT/(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

INITIALS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT: 13

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT: Fort Stewart CID Office, FSGA DATED: 21 Oct 19 . STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 5 . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me and authorized by law to administer Oaths, this 21st day of October, 2019 at 30th MP DEB (CID) FSGA

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Type Name of Person Administering Oath)

10 USC 936

(Authority To Administer Oath)

CD/DVD OR SD CARD

Disc Containing Canvass Interview Worksheets

EXHIBIT 14

000040

Name: RANK

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date: 21 Oct 2019

Company: A

Platoon: 2

Phone number:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes, I was in a 13th Pth Bradley Two vehicles in front of the 1-3 vehicle that crashed. I was driving

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

I woke up at 0800^{Saturday} and did not sleep until Sunday 20th Oct.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radios although the radios in my track did not work

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Yes, the whole convoy switched to blackout

8. Who made the order?

N/A Do not know. High up. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Driver turns off white light and relies on DVE to see. Although many of the tracks DVEs were not working including my own.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes. The three soldiers who made it out

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes, My Platoon leader brief for receiving us. I did not hear of one

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Not that I heard. The course most likely went down

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

We finished the mission and were heading back to the A4

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

After the mission was finished the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got out to receive the AAR. When we got back it was told that we were heading back to sleep because we were done for the day

16. Do you have anything else to add?

The Bradleys DVE's should have been fixed. It was a problem the mechanics looked at and brushed off. After working getting tracks unstuck from mud and fixing one vehicle that broke track we were exhausted and tired not motivated or wanting to do a night mission. Antonio Garcia and I were told to borrow someone else's track to do the mission instead of our own. My DVE was inop halfway through the mission and I'm sure t3's was not working well either. There was no reason for us to be moving in blackout in terrible weather conditions after the mission.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 1LT Date: 21 OCT 19

Company: A Co Platoon 1st Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes, #1, lead vehicle. I was

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No. heard it over the net

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Slept 6-7 hours night before. Most of my guys took nap during the day after the day run

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

5

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes, on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) because it was a straight, wide improved road. we switch from black out

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Yes

to white light to black out

8. What was the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

we all agreed based on training guidance and mitigating risk, we should be good driving black out on the road

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

On order (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with night vision, reduce speed to 10 MPH

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes, that memory, throughout (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) day and before

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

couldn't tell over the NET (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

tactical movement back to our (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Radio check, getting on the road, route recon via map. I had done the same route 2x's before

16. Do you have anything else to add?

I skirted the side of the bridge and thought I hit a log. It was the 2-4 railing on the right side. Our brood tipped. I was in the turret and asked my driver what we hit. He said that he thought we just got on the bridge. We did and we kept rolling.



Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 1LT Date: 21 OCT 2019
 Company: A CO Platoon 3rd PLT Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 DoD ID #: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I was positioned between (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the rear of my vic. I was in the right side of turret as you look from the rear.

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Friday we went out roughly around 0300. Then arrived at our PAA256 roughly around 0700 (conducted TLPs all Friday then bedded down around 2100 and was at 0530 next day (Saturday). conducted mission at (EO: 0730) mission complete at 1100. went back to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP

around 1300 or 1400, conducted rehearsals, show, maintenance. Next mission we LDB at 2100 then complete at 0100. I believe headed back after (T) mission.

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes / used white light from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then blackout once on 129. Plan was to turn on white light again once off of 129.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

unsure I believe they were operating on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

8. Who made the order?

what order? unsure of question (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Vehicle stops must driver turns off white light then switches black out on.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Unsure

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) explained ATE and when to go white light and block out).

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes "on how shitty it was" was shitty for the last 24 hrs.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

A ~~the~~ downstate in the back was able to fly down (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To reconsolidate back at our JAA in vic of PA#256 move to our new TAD. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Day mission on the Saturday, then after day mission TADs for night mission (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also was recovery there Bradley w/ (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) after day mission, then night mission.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

Equipment sucks "the Bradley is a death trap".

DODID

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-



Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SGT Date: 21 Oct 19

Company: A Platoon 3 Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

YES

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

YES

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

ACCIDENT

AND (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

SLEEP WHEN YOU CAN BUT ORGANIZED REST WAS 2300 - 0530 THE NIGHT BEFORE

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Fm - ASIP RADIO

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

YES, SAID BY MULTIPLE SOLDIERS POST-ACCIDENT

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

N/A, WASNT ON RADIO

8. Who made the order?

Romon was (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) BUT I DONT KNOW FOR SURE

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

DURING MOVEMENT, EVERY GOES DARK AT ONCE, NO SOP.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

DONT KNOW FOR SURE

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

PROBABLY AFTER THE AAR - PSG AND VP

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

EVERYONE WAS AWARE OF RAIN, MUD, AND LIMITED VIS

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ESCAPED THE ACCIDENT AND FLAGGED DOWN SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

MOVE BACK (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) FROM (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) COULD NOT SEE FROM THEIR BFV OPTICS, AND ONCE WE WENT BLACKOUT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) USED NVG TO NAVIGATE THE CONVOY. EVERYONE WAS AWARE FOR ABOUT 22 HOURS AT TIME OF MOVEMENT.

Name: FRANK: CPL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DOB: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 11/01/2019
Company: A-CO Platoon: 2nd Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

My platoon didn't get any rest from the morning mission to the night mission due to our trucks getting stuff, and broken truck.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radios

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

yes, but Coms were very spotty and mostly down

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

yes

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) LPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Turning off white light

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Lt. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

No

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) used. White light on the way to the objective, but on the way back were told to go back to Blackout.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

to go back to our AA.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

An offensive Training Exercise

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-*

Name: RANK: SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 20191021

Company: A Platoon 3 Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes, I was in Vehicle 34 and we were towards the rear of the convoy. I was in the turret standing up helping my driver because he was unable to see.

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No I did not see A13 go off the road.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

We had FMV comms in the Bradleys with a PLT Net and Company net.

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Refer to Question #4

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

White light was used on back roads/trails blackout was for main roads or routes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Unsure they were using PLT Net. Question is not concise because which order are you speaking of?

8. Who made the order?

Unsure to which order this reference is to

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

You are supposed to make tactical movements under "black out Drive" white light is for Admin Reasons

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

I believe that 1LT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) witnessed the accident from his accounts

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes there was and the people involved were (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SAs, and any vehicle commanders

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes the weather conditions were discussed before GP and I believe during movement

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No one from the crew but SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) flagged my Bradley down

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

The purpose was to (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) retrieve equipment and personnel from TAA to make movement to our new staging area

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

16. Do you have anything else to add?

Yes that the Bradley is trash and the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) has critical failure during times of inclement

Weather and are unsuitable devices to drive while at night with how easily they fail. There needs to be more than just a chain rail on bridges in the training area, there needs to be something indicating you are driving on about to drive onto a bridge. Additionally there needs to be a rail or deterrent that would notify the crew that they are on the edge about to drive off so that they can make corrections before something like this happens again. The Brigade needs to chill and stop trying to drive these Soldiers into the ground. We have had 1 day for AOM this month, also its absurd to have rec cycle tasks during training cycle!

DoD: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SPC Date: Oct 21 2019
 Company: A Platoon 2nd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes.

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) we were about the sixth or seventh vehicle, I was at the back close to the screen.

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Barely sleep during the day and night

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP radios

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP radios

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Dont know

8. Who made the order?

Dont know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Turning off all white lights.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Don't know

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Don't know

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Going back to AA after Mission

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Night Training Mission

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No

Name: RANK: PVT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 10-21-19

Company: 2-7 Platoon 2nd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes i was at the field.

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

I was in the convoy; i was in the Bradley that crashed, not sure what position

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) in the convoy (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

All i really remember is rolling around, then seeing water flow into the Bradley really fast. That's when the lights went off.

3. What was the work/sleep cycle in the field?

Whenever i got the chance to take nap i would, im not sure of any real set in

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radio's i guess, im not sure.

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Not sure

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

All i know is that the Bradley's had their lights off on the way back to Alpha Alpha.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Not sure

8. Who made the order?

Not sure

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Not sure

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes, Spc (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spc (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Not sure

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

I've just heard of people discussing about rain,

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To get back to Alpha Alpha and bed down for the night.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

We had performed a night iteration and was on the way back from Alpha Alpha.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NO

Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PFC Date: 21 Oct 17 2019
Company: A Co Platoon 1st Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DoD: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

You slept when you could

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I was not monitoring the company net, just internal

8. Who made the order?

I was relayed the order by SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

It halted. → I switched from the control to control mode and selected black out mode. we continued movement.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

I'm NOT SURE, I didn't attend one but was I told of one

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

One of the passengers climbed to the bridge to flag down the ~~convoy~~ ^{convoy}

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

We were going to police call over PAA after a night Inactivation of a company attack

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

A company level attack, with an AAR

16. Do you have anything else to add?

given the weather conditions, Road conditions (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) fatigue this was all avoidable.

DOD ID # : (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-*

Name: RANK: SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 20191021

Company: A CO Platoon 1ST Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

YES

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

YES

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

WE WERE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

2300-0100 w/ (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

THE ORDER WAS TO STAY IN BLACKOUT. THERE WAS NO SWITCH.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I DON'T KNOW

8. Who made the order?

THE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

THERE WERE NONE

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

NO

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

YES. NOT SURE

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

YES

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I DON'T KNOW

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

MOVE FROM SIX LANE BACK TO TAA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

STAGING OF BRADS. MOVEMENT.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

3 GOOD MEN ARE DEAD. DON'T TARNISH
THEIR NAMES!

NoD IO# (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-15-CID093-

Name: RANK (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PL Date: 21 Oct 2019

Company: Aco Platoon: S Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned?

Yes

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

No sleep the first night first call 0000-

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Oct 2019 last night in field 20 Oct 2019

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

They had a platoon net PL's got the order from company net

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Short halt and switch

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes SSc (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I were the first
two on the ground trying to get the crew out
11. Was there a company brief before the incident? Who attended?
Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

No clue wasn't at the brief

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No we spotted them from one of their dismounts
that made it out they flagged us down

14. What was the purpose?

To go back (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and clean up to move to next
area

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

We performed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) company attack

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No

DODID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name/RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) / CPT Date: 21 OCT 2019

Company: A/2-7 IN Platoon HQ Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

YES

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

YES; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO; THE VEHICLE WAS BEHIND ME

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

The exercise was a two day model for 6 days. (day 1 = planning, day 2 = execution).

In the evenings we initiated sleep at 2300 and woke up at 0530. The day of the incident was the day 2 (execution) of the model. Between day and night iterations was approx 4 hours.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP radio in vehicle mount. Frequency hop epher text. Net ID 120.

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

See answer above.

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes. I issued it at the intersection of RTE 20 and RTE 129

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I did not hear a verbal response. I observed all vehicles switch from white light to blackout.

8. Who made the order?

I did. CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Stop vehicle, place in park, keeping foot on brake, close driver's hatch, turn off white light, all crew members confirm night vision optics are operational (NVGs or DVE), identify any vehicle or obstructions near vehicle and prepare to move once ready.

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EX _____

000063

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

A few vehicles behind me say they thought they saw movement off the road but all seem uncertain.

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Negative. I did discuss the route, members, and light changes to what they saw
Platoon sergeants and above. The vehicle leading the convoy to the site was the or what drew
same their attention.
that lead back.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

They were discussed earlier in the day prior to first movement but it had stopped raining and I
 13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred? did not brief it
No. again.

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Return from site of "attack" exercise at METZ MOUT to our staging area at PAR 256

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Beginning at 0530 the morning of 19 Oct the company prepared for and then executed an
attack exercise which lasted till 1300. Following the day iteration we refueled vehicles, attempted
to repair broken vehicle and etc. At approx 1900 we checked to ensure no live ammunition got
 16. Do you have anything else to add? mixed in with blank due to an observation made at another site.
At 2030 we initiated movement to our night iteration at
the same location and completed the attack and AAR
at approx 0100 the morning of the 20th.

Yes. Just for awareness, the crew of A13 was comprised of members of 2nd PCT. Based on the requirements of the mission and vehicle faults that deadlined all of 2nd platoons vehicles, the members of the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) used A13 for the purpose of the exercise.

Name: RANK: ILT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 21 Oct 19

Company: Aco Platoon 2nd PL Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

yes. behind the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Jenkins and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(21F24) We passed the @ an intersection, just before the bridge incident. I was the Bradley commander of the 21 crew.

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

yes; through my CIV I briefly saw the black portion of HIR on the Bradley. It was something that appeared to flip but didn't realize what exactly I saw.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

2nd platoon mounted section woke up @ 0500 on the 19th completed day mission and spent the remainder of the day fixing broken Bradleys. At that moment in time @ the incident we hadn't slept for almost 22 hours. The night before we bedded down @ 2100 w/ 0500 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

FH CT corp radios

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

yes

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Hatch shut; lights out w/ blackout on speed is reduced

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes; me

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes the company

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

return to AA and prepare for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) movement to different AA of defense lane

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Night run of ATK lane

16. Do you have anything else to add?

The (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) initially (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) identified the need to go into white light on back roads off the main MSR. Making every attempt to follow the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) guidance we went into blackout drive on the main MSR (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) co identified it was a wider road and easier to travel due to its lack of turns. After moving into blackout drive we experienced mechanical issues with our vision optics.

If this BDE had any clue or capability of planning this company would have ample time to maintain our equipment. We would be able to do additional training that would enable us to learn rather than just (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and waiving the training requirements. SFC Jenkins was an NCO that did the right thing all the time. Garcia was an experienced driver.

Name: RANK (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) / Date: 2014/02/
Company: Nov Platoon 1st Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes.

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I do not know what truck I was in or where it was in the convoy.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

I did not.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

For mounted I am not sure. I know dismounts in our platoon but to pull security at night. 30% security.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Not sure/ do not know.

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Not sure/ do not know

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Not sure/ do not know

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Not sure/ do not know.

8. Who made the order?

Not sure/ do not know.

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Not sure/ do not know.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

There was an AAR. Don't recall a convoy brief.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Not sure/ do not know.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Not sure/ do not know.

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To get to our next field training area.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

We had just finished running a lane.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No

Name: RANK: CPL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DoD # (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 11 Oct 2019
Company: Aco Platoon HQ Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Yes

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radio

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Yes

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Yes

8. Who made the order?

IDK

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Drive slow.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes everyone

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

We were going back to the Alpha Alpha

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

~~we~~ we just prepare for the mission

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No

Name/RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SPS Date: 21 OCT 2019

Company: A Co Platoon 2nd Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DOD: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes.

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the break(s) (if so, by whom and when)?

No.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

We left Thursday night at midnight, worked all day, slept Friday night, worked/did mission all day Saturday.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

radio in Bradley.

No sleep whatsoever on Saturday.

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

black out the entire night.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

N/A.

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Turn off all lights.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No.

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

No.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Not at all. I heard nothing all day.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) got out of Brad and waved people down.

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

After mission, moving to AA to sleep.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

We did a day run of mission, but the crew that passed spent all day working on their brads getting unstuck (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and fixing tracks after they broke track.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Most of our brads were not fixed, they were all beat up and the soldiers were tired, there was no reason for black out, the mission was completely over, we were literally moving to the AA to go to sleep.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name/RANK:

CPL

Company:

A

Platoon

d

Phone number

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes. Don't know

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

Ran. Here to help get them

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Sleep wherever you can get on
near or times

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radio

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radio

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Yes

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

But I think it came down from

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Turn off lights?

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Maybe

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

IDK

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Not Well enough

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

NO

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Go back to AA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

long Training Mission

16. Do you have anything else to add?

Yes

This truck attempted to contact SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and other Mechanics

SO many times in regards to the drivers screens in so many of our brackets NOT WORKING and many people knew

and ignored it. Antonio Garcia 5988 id his broken drivers screen for MONTHS. Check the records of it. Many drivers screens do NOT work and drivers forced to drive under NODS through periscopes.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

CPL

I know AD & Can't necessarily help this situation, however, it must be addressed, and hopefully you can all get someone who is most qualified to read this.

The system in place to alert the family's or the deceased's a job. It took all day and the help of many of us to Alert Taylor Weber of her husband's death.

Antonio Garcia's family was not alerted by the evening, despite them calling chapters here on post and the chapters responding with "Someone is coming to talk to you" that's it.

Antonio Garcia is my best friend. His family - Mother, and sisters called me all day, begging me to tell them what they already knew. I was denied for hours to respond to them, even though, nothing was seeming to be done about it by anybody etc. This is disgraceful and needs to be addressed immediately.

Name: RANK: PVT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: _____
Company: ACO Platoon: 2nd Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

1 day on 1 day (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Unknown

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Unknown

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Unknown

8. Who made the order?

Unknown

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Unknown

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the Incident first hand?

Yes

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Muddy and rainy / Extremely hot

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Get back (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to sleep after our mission

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Driving

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No They were Driving without their Eye Working and

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name: ** RANK: SPC* (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: *10/21*
Company: *A* Platoon *176* Phone: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convo

yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

no *isaw it upside down*

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

*rehearsals, awakens sleep 2300-0530,
day mission, break, night mission*

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

radio / phones

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

yes, before accident

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

not sure

8. Who made the order?

CPT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) *but* (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) *it was implied the order
was passed down from higher*

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

*white light the small roads, then black out the
main road*

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

the US military is 13, AKO

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

11. Who so, who attended?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

not sure

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

rain from storm passing, muddy

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I didnt hear them

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

to return to AF alt from METZ after

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

night lane iteration, AOR of mission

16. Do you have anything else to add?

These DVEs were terrible, I'm probably one of the most experienced drivers here, but even so I was still having trouble seeing. The rain was impairing the camera. I got to the point where I had to stop because I couldn't see anything.

Name/RANK: SGT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 21 OCT 2019
Company: Alpha Platoon HQ Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No, SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran out in the road and flagged us down to stop. We ran to the bridge me and SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and saw the Bradley in the water I called 911.

3. What was the work/sleep cycle in the field?

We slept before the day mission started mission @ 0130 finished around 1300. Did priorities of work and slept when we could until the Night mission around 2130.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIPs, radios, CVC's

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radios and CVC's

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

WE were told by the commander to black out once we got on the road since others were training in the area.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I don't know

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Put black out lights on and mount your NODS

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

THE Bradley behind them thought they saw something but
couldn't tell because it was so dark.

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes, we were told to be careful

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

NO

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To get back to the PAA after mission

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Day & Night mission, PCC & PCI'S, AAR'S

16. Do you have anything else to add?

As soon as we could get them out of the
bradley we started CPR until EMS arrived.
We tried everything we could to get them
out.

Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PFC Date: 01/21/2019 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 Company: Alpha Platoon 3 Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Sleep wasn't the problem

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

We communicated through radios and CVC's. ASIIPS

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

N/A

8. Who made the order?

I'm not sure who did I was just told to go black out

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) You have to go into combat mode and close your hatch then use your DVE to drive.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

N/A

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) all I remember

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To go back to the PAA from finishing a night iteration

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Our main mission was to attack a village. When we were done we went into the movement school back to the PAA. In the middle of that we were told to go black out and then that's when it all

16. Do you have anything else to add?

I would like to help of the guys who went into the water to help.

Name: RANK: SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 20191021
Company: A Platoon 1 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

I saw nothing till the incident was reported over the net, @ what point the convoy turned round to help

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

You only sleep for 1st pl, unless the men were tired they were sleeping others in 1st were left to sleep - re-allocated loads other than with the vehicle. The fatigue I got was the whole company was the same.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP Radios

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

As per Question 4.

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes white light minor roads, however following the consensus at 1000 129. Was black out for training purposes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Yes - everyone in company followed instructions.

8. Who made the order?

The instruction comes from higher than co and bn

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Not tracking any roads, however when turning black out we stopped as a pl, switched out, composed the crews, then drove on.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
LT [redacted] might be something happen at the bridge when he
passed [redacted] there was a vehicle directly in front of him still, so thought he
11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended? *seeing things!*

Yes, PTE, white light/black out + com, Adams or [redacted] to PAA.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes mixed with [redacted] conditions

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

not initially, once ssg [redacted] came across on the bridge and realized
he called it over radio, [redacted] which point, white
lights came back on and we all tried to [redacted].

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

to go back to our A1 base, then move onto next lane

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

an attack lane @ next village.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

After 2 days of base [redacted], I have never seen a big [redacted] and
managing it's men, over stretched, and worked, under trained, poor
equipment.

*Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) gpc Date: 10/21/19

Company: ACO Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

no, they were the bradley right behind 3-4 track

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

work one day on the exercise training (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then next day rest, and get stuff ready for the fight the next day.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

we used ASIPS

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIPS

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

yes, The order was that this field exercise we had to use black out, or black light same thing.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I dont know they were somewhere behind me.

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

I don't know

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

I'm not to sure I was on 3-3 track waiting for the next thing. To either leave or to restart mission.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

no it was raining the whole time so we just roll with it.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

From A13 track at that time got a hold of my 3-4 track by throwing something at him. my PSA

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To go back to our AO.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

I don't know.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

so what I ^{seen} (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was we were driving back to the AO then pulled off before the bridge and a (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) little more than a half a mile away we then got a call up from our 3-4 track saying a track was in the river. my track turned around and then turned on white lights on got to the spot and seen a few guys trying to open the turret door we tried a few times then I got the door latch open then SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) pulled out Cpl. walker and me, LT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and SSG (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) started CPR on him then SSG Jenkins was taken out and walker was put in a vehicle to be taken to the hospital and I moved to SSG Jenkins to try CPR (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) till the senior medic came and took over.

DOD (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name/RANK: PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 20140621
Company: A Co Platoon 1st Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes, Bradley A-1-1 was in the back of the
Bradley A 1-1 was the lead Bradley

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Getting plenty of rest when not in mission.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

FM Communications, using ASIP Radios

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

All movement was blackout, no order was given for white light.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

8. Who made the order?

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Order is given by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to switch from Black out to white light

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

NO

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Not sure

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes, prior to mission

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Not sure

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Movement from OBJ to A PAA.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Getting all vehicles in line for movement to PAA

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NO.

DOB# (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name: RANK: SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 2019 OCT 21
Company (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)atoon (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

For my platoon all drivers were given plenty of rest and no general shifts

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

radio ASIP

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radio

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

All movement was black out for training purposes 129 especially

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

As per - training purpose, boards - where b/c driver

8. Who made the order?

?

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

CO gives order for movement/training, train how we fight

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

NOT SURE

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

NOT SURE

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

YES

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

NOT SURE

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

end of mission back to AA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

getting us in order of movement back to the AA

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NO

Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) E-1 DOD (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: October 21 2019
Company: Alpha Platoon HQ Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

It was slight from what I know. I'm in HA
So I don't know everyone else's (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radio

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

IDK

8. Who made the order?

IDK

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

IDK

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Return to the Alpha Alpha

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

going over the mission

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

No

Name/RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PV2 Date: 10-21-2019
 Company: ACO Platoon 3RD Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No I did not

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

We get like 7 hours I believe the night before and was going back to sleep I believe

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

not sure

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

not sure

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

not sure

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

not sure

8. Who made the order?

I don't know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

not sure

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

I believe Pfc (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) did but not 100% sure

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

We were told to get on a Bradley to head back to camp
don't remember a convoy brief

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

not that I remember

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I don't think so

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

to head back to camp to plan and rest

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

We were clearing buildings for training bc for
the convoy movement.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

I was in the back of Bradley 65 for most of the
time before they let us out most of the stuff
already happened so I did not witness a lot of it

DOB: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name: RANK: E1 PVT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 20191021

Company: A Platoon 1 Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

no

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

good, got around six hours - eight hours a day

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) radio

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) radio

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

unSURE

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

unSURE

8. Who made the order?

unSURE

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

unSURE

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

no

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

wh sure

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

no

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

no

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

to go back (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A and back

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

our mission / objective to clear the city of
metc

16. Do you have anything else to add?

Name: RANK: SGT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 21 OCT 2019

Company: A Co Platoon 2nd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q00 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

We didn't have a sleep plan. We took short naps whenever we can.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Radio

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes I heard it through loudspeaker in the back

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I'm sure they did

8. Who made the order?

I'm not sure. I'd assume it was PL and above.

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

turning off white light.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Lt. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

It wasn't actually a brief but we were told to head back

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) day.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I'm not sure.

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

going back to AA.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

I do not know.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) SGT Date: 21 OCT 2009
Company: Avo Platoon 3 Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

YES.

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

work 18hrs, sleep 6.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radios at least.

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radios at least.

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Not sure.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Not sure.

8. Who made the order?

Not sure.

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Not sure.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes.

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Not sure.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Not sure.

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To move back to the PAA from which we came.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

An attack on a village and an AAR of the attack.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name: RANK: CPL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: Oct 21, 2014

Company: A Platoon 2nd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

We were conducting a lot of training therefore sleeping less

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

They were using their Headsets

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

They were using their headsets

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

It was only briefed in the op order to be black out in A A.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I could not hear Com's so I don't know

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Never been a driver (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) don't know

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Everyone

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes After the AAR, Everyone

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

NO

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Head back to AA to bed down

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

We had just finished our night mission, conducted our AAR, and at that time we started our convoy

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NO

Name: RANK (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) / SGT Date: 21 Oct 2019
Company: A Co Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes.

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

I did not.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

The night prior we slept from 2300 - 0530.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

FM Comms, Company net frequency 120

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

FM Comms, Company net frequency 120

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

I believe we were utilizing blackout due to training purposes and to not blind other units in the field as well.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I do not know

8. Who made the order?

I do not know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

The driver must switch the mode from non-combat to combat mode for black out to be an option under the lights section in the menu's.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

As far as I know, nobody witnessed it first hand.

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

I do not know.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

We were all aware of the conditions of the weather and that it affected the abilities to move the vehicles.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Yes. SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) flagged down the next vehicle in the Convoy after exiting the Submerged Bradley.

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To return to the staging area to begin movement to the next staging area.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Company attack lane

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name/RANK: SP (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: OCT 21 2019
Company: ACO Platoon (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Phone num (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned?

yes

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO, JUST SEEN IN WATER

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

AFTER RETURNING FROM DAY MISSION, WE PREPARED FOR NIGHT COM, WE HAD THAT TIME TO SLEEP

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

RT 1523 (ASIP) INTERNAL COMMS, PHONE IF NEEDED

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

YES, AFTER TURN ON 129 LIGHT

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

NOT SURE

8. Who made the order?

DO NOT REMEMBER

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

TURNING ON BO MODE & MOUNTING NODS

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

NO

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

NO JUST THE AAR

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I DID NOT HEAR ANYTHING ON THE RADIO

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

TO RETURN TO ASSEMBLY AREA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

AAR + ORDER OF MOVT. LINEUP

16. Do you have anything else to add?

DOD#: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name/RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PV2 Date: 21 Oct 19

Company: 2-7 Platoon A co Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

yes, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO, Ran up after it had already gone down

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Sleep after training was complete (before midnight)
wake up was 0600 and could sleep when extra time found during day

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radio's connected to all Brad CVCS

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

We were doing it for training as if it were real life for tactical situations

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

N/A

8. Who made the order?

N/A

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

N/A

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Just the dismounts inside

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Our AR meeting after training was complete

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Everyone knows. it was rainy and muddy as long as we been there.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

NO

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

get back to Alpha Alpha (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) car pack-up to move out

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Night Raid for offensive attack on training town METS

16. Do you have anything else to add?

N/A

MOD: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 Name/RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 20191021
 Company: 2-7 Platoon 1st Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

we got atleast 8 hours asleep

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

COMS

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

COMS

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

I don't know I was a dismount

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I don't know I was a dismount

8. Who made the order?

I don't know, I was a dismount

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

turning off head lights and use the DVE

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

yes most of my dismount squad

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

yes and Everyone in the Company

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I don't know (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

to get back to the Alpha Alpha to police call

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement? (pick up trash)

we just got done with company
stix

16. Do you have anything else to add?

no

Name/RANK: SFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 21 Oct 19

Company: A Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

- Yes

- Not certain

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

The night prior, sleep was designated from 2300 - 0530 the next morning

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Asip radios on Bradleys

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?



6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Not certain

8. Who made the order?

Not certain

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) helps guide from turret with NODs.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and uses DVE

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Not certain

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Not certain

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Not certain

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Not certain

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Moving from mission area to sleeping area

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

AAR

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name: RANK: PVT

Date: 10-21-19

Company: Alpha Platoon 2nd Phone number

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

no

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Slept the night before, did our day run and then took another hour nap before night run

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Company net

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Company net

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I don't know

8. Who made the order?

I don't know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Kill all lights outside of Brad.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

no

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

I don't know

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

not that I know of

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I don't know

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To get back to Alpha Alpha

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

our night attacks in village.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

no

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name: RANK: S

Date: 21 Oct 19

Company: AEO

Platoon 2

Phone number

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

YES

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

YES

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Slept Friday night from about 2200 to 0500, got a bit of down time Sunday for camp

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radios (ASEP)

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

it was put out to us by the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) to the convoy security

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

N/A

8. Who made the order?

it was put out to us by the

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

turn lights off, use DVE

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

NO

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

YES anyone who was on the AAR

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

YES

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Don't know

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

to move back to AA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Next mission on the attack lane, AAR

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NO

DOD

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

093-

Name/RANK: SGT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2019 1021

Company: A Co Platoon 1st Phone number

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO,

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Roughly 1/3 work/sleep ; guss. has 4-5 hours at night and whenever possible during day

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Fm

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Fm

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

it was black out prior to SP/IT was a tactical movement

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

?

8. Who made the order?

?

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

?

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

?

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

?

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

?

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

?

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To move troops of VICS to new TAA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

?

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NO

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
 Name: RANK: SPC DOD (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 10/21/19
 Company: ACO Platoon 2nd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

no i arrived after it had already flipped

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

minimal BUT adeqoit for a training environment

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP Radid's

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP radios

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

i am UNaware

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

i am UNaware

8. Who made the order?

i am UNaware

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

i am UNaware

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

no

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

i am unaware

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

i am unaware

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

move back to the AA to bed down

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

we conducted a night mission on (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) following that
was a AAR and then we began movement back to
our company AA

16. Do you have anything else to add?

no

Name/RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) / SGT Date: 21 Oct 2019
 Company: A Co Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DoDID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes.

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

I did not.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

The night prior we slept from 2300 - 0530.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

FM Comms, Company net Frequency 120

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

FM Comms, Company net Frequency 120

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

I believe we were utilizing blackout due to training purposes and to not blind other units in the field as well.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I do not know

8. Who made the order?

I do not know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

The driver must switch the mode from non-combat to combat mode for black out to be an option under the lights section in the menu.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name: RANK: CPL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: Oct 21, 2014

Company: A Platoon 2nd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

We were conducting a lot of training therefore sleeping less

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

They were using their Headsets

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

They were using their headsets

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) It was only briefed in the op order to be black out in A A.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in Incident) respond to the order?

I could not hear Comms so I don't know

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Never been a driver (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) don't know

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) EB Date: 21 OCT 2019
Company: Alpha Platoon 2nd Phone num: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

NO SLEEP cycle the last 24+ hours prior to the accident

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes on trails only, on MSR/129 was given order to back into blackout mode for tactical purposes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Do not know

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

on tactical movements

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) discretion and overall call

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Everyone in convoy

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

a brief one was given after our mission/AAR to load up on the brads and which routes we would be taking.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes SFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) brought up that DVE's were very blurry and

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred? Yes, about how it happened and what went on. spotty due to weather.

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To egress off mission move to our assembly area just to grab

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement? our gear.

0500 wake up

→ A full day run mission for (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and a night run mission prior the incident.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name: RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PVT

Date: 10/21/19

Company: A-CO Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

About 6 hours the Night Before

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Asip's

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

I Dont Know

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I Dont Know

8. Who made the order?

I Dont Know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

I Dont Know

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

I Don't Know

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

I Don't Know, (But It was Raining all day)

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I Don't Know

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To go Back to our AA to rest for the Night

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Just finished a lane.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No

Name: RANK: SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 21 Oct 19

Company: A Co Platoon 1st Phone number

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

about 6

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

FM

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

I dont know

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I dont know

8. Who made the order?

I dont know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

I dont know

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

NO

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

YES

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I don't know

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Traveling back to AA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Company Attack

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) didn't know about it till i seen the Ambulance go by

DOD: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name/RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) /SPL Date: Oct. 21

Company: Alpha Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

In the back of a Brad

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

The night prior I got around 6-7 hours and the day of maybe an hour or two

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radios?

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

NO CLUE

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

NO CLUE

8. Who made the order?

NO CLUE

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

NO CLUE

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

NO

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

no clue

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

I looked on my phone and It said rainy and cloudy

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

no clue

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To go back to our sleeping area and move to next place

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Cleared out a town w/ rest of dismounts

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name: RANI (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PVT Date: 21 Oct 2019

Company: A-CO Platoon 3 Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes, what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

We all received a good amount of sleep. Sleep was not the problem

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radios

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radios

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I dont know

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I dont know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Pressing buttons on the drivers screen

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes, everyone

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Dismounts waved down people

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To get back to camp

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

our main mission, to attack a village

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No

Name: RANK: PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 10/21/19Company: Z-7ACo Platoon 1st Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

WORK All Day From 9:30AM to 12: PM 9:30 PM to 12AM WE SLEEP Around 1AM to 3AM

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

FM

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

FM

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

IF there was I couldn't recall But I'm sure there was

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

IF They Did I wouldnt have known

8. Who made the order?

NO CLUE

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

NO CLUE

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

NO

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? ^{If} so, who attended?

YES

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

YES

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

NO

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Clean our PAA.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

WC Dic A COMPANY Lane And An AAR

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NO

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

19-CID093-

Name/RANK: SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 10-21-19

Company: A Platoon 2nd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

I was in it.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 0545 wake up work all day.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

N/A

8. Who made the order?

N/A

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

N/A

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Everyone

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

N/A

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Yes

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Go back to BA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

N/A

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name/RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 55Ca/Act 150a For Mission Date: 21 Oct 19

Company: ACO Platoon HQ Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes, what vehicle, where was your vehicle position in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Day/night lots of rest

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Freq hop / FM

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes we were white light on none main roads and switched to Black Out to meet intent

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order? Intent

Yes we all switched to Black out

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Primary for Brads DVE Primary for wheel NVG's Secondary NVG's

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Yes

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To go back to the AA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Mission in

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

16. Do you have anything else to add?

Yes, we want questions answered by

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name: RANK: S/PC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 2019/10/20

Company: ACo Platoon 1st Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

don't know

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radio

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Radio

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

don't know

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

don't know

8. Who made the order?

don't know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

don't know

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No one witnessed it first hand

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

don't remember

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

don't know

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

to move back to PAA 256

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

don't know

16. Do you have anything else to add?

Name: RANK (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PFC Date: 20191021

Company: A Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes.

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

I did not.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Minimal to non-existent. We usually sleep in the Bradleys from on-site to mission. The night before however we got about 4 hours.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP radios with fill

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

see question 4

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Yes

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

N/A

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

N/A

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

I do not.

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

I don't know

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Not in context of the meeting but the weather was a consideration w/ our plan to assault Dyer.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

No

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To return to our AO after mission.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

An AAR for our mission:

16. Do you have anything else to add?

Name: RANK: SGT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 20191021
Company: ACO Platoon 1st Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your position in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No, I just heard a scream then I heard someone call overnet that a Bradley flipped off the bridge and fell down into water.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

We were sleeping whenever we weren't doing missions.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Frequency hop on ASTP

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Yes we switched after a certain distance from the training area.

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

No + Judd

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) It's a brigade policy or something.

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Hitting a button

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

~~No. A soldier on the incident caught a vehicles
attention~~

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

~~I don't remember.~~

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

~~No. It was pretty obvious. It was a tropical
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)~~

13. Did any ~~(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)~~ communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

~~Not sure. Some of us heard a scream and ran
but that's it.~~

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

~~To go back to our patrol base.~~

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

~~AAR then we got in line and left.~~

16. Do you have anything else to add?

~~The weather conditions happened to be at
the point where dirt roads were mud and night
vision was blurry 1-3 slipping off the bridge
was a freak accident. It could have happened to
any one of us.~~

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name: RANK: SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date: 21 Oct 19

Company: ACC Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes, what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No was able to see the JLTU in front of me

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

1st day (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was nothing but planning so the guys slept most of the day/night. After Saturday mission they had ~4 hours of sleep before the night mission.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

unsure

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

unsure

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Not sure

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

No idea A4 had no comms

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I don't know

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

unsure

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

SAC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was inside the track

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Not sure

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Not sure

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

SAC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ran to the track (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) after the incident

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Move from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) back to our AR

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

An assault on a village followed by an AAR.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NU

Name: RANK: 2LT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 21 OCT 11

Company: A Platoon HQ Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) DOD ID: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(CO FSO)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes, what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

I did not observe it go off the road.

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

The only time I slept was Friday night, aside from maybe a 30 min nap at some point.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIPs

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

It was made before we left the AAR site

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

I could not see A13, but I assume they also went Blackout on 129

8. Who made the order?

I believe it was made at the BOE level.

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

The blackout light button on the vehicle plus NVGs

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

Yes, 1LT (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (2nd PT PL) said he thinks he saw them fall off.

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

Not really an official brief, but the commander told us it was an admin man to PAA 256. To take same route we took to get there. from AAR site to 129 was white light, night run onto 129 → PAA was blackout. Leaders were present for meeting.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

I think so. Everyone knew the rain was ongoing and that the roads were terrible.

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Not that I know of.

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Admin move back to PAA 256 to rest for the night

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

We had just finished the night run of the Attack Lane for Co 5TX, did an AAR and prepped for movement back to begin rest.

16. Do you have anything else to add?

There was nothing else this company should have/did do differently. They responded the best way possible. The blackout call was the source of this issue.

Name/RANK: Spc (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Date: 11/20/09
Company: A Co Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

8 hours of sleep to 8 hours work

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP Radios

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

ASIP Radios

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

Idk

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

Idk

8. Who made the order?

IPK

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

Putting the driver into combat mode

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

NA

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Rainy

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

TO Move Back to the PAA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

The Bradley were used to cover for
purpose of mission

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NA

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name: RANK: PV2

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date: 20/9/21

Company: A-027

Platoon 3rd

Phone number

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

yes

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

IDK

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

IDK

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

IDK

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

IDK

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

IDK

8. Who made the order?

IDK

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

IDK

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

NO

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

I believe so

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

DK

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

Not that I am aware of

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Get back to the AA

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

Waiting

16. Do you have anything else to add?

NO

D09: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name: RANK (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 1 PVT Date: OCT 24 2019

Company: A Co 2-7 Platoon 3rd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

no i was in the back of the Brad with the dismounts

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

we usually sleep around 1140 & ish

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

no idea

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

no idea

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

there was in order to black out i don't know when

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

i believe all vehicles where blacked out

8. Who made the order?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

no idea

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

no i thought it insensitive to ask

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

yes i believe it was section leaders and above

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

not around me but we all knew it was muddy and nasty

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

no idea

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

we were heading to our tent to rest and prepare for the next day

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

we had finished our training and our AAR the BC called the higher up together to discuss the movement back and what to expect for the next day

16. Do you have anything else to add?

No

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

540-19-CID093-

Name/RANK: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) XO Date: 21 OCT 19

Company: A Platoon HQ Phone number: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle positioned in the convoy and where were you in the vehicle?

Yes

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

No

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

Sleep on TLP days (day before). Some rest inbetween missions. We were running one day and one night mission.

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

Cell Phone / FM FM was primary

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

See Question 4

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

We used black out light only on Route 129. when moving on back roads from OBS Washington (METZ)

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order? If so, what was the response?

The A24 crew (in (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)) executed the order of switching to black light on 129

8. Who made the order?

The guidance to utilize black out drive was in line w/ the BDE's guidance. AG ordered us to use white light as risk mitigation during movement on backroads enroute to

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive? 129.

Getting the order to go into Black out drive

were more dangerous. Route 129 was a straight shot and a wide road so we went w/ Black out in line with the BDE's guidance.

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

No one

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) so I am unaware (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) so I can assume one occurred.

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

Yes

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

The dismounts that exited the vehicle communicated w/ those responding

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

Movement back to TAA 256 (staging area) following an Attack on METS mount (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) at night.

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

TLPs, PMCS, maintenance update, from Platoon Leadership.
Identifying degraded vehicles and addressing issues

16. Do you have anything else to add?

A CO executed movement IAW (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) higher's guidance.

DDO: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Name/RANK: SPC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Date: 10/21/2019

Company: A Platoon 2nd Phone number (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

1. Were you at the field training exercise last week into Sunday?

Yes.

Were you on the convoy when the incident occurred? If yes; what vehicle, where was your vehicle position (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were you in the vehicle?

Yes

2. Did you observe the Bradley (A 13) go off the road? If so, what did you see?

NO

3. What was the work sleep cycle in the field?

6+ hours

4. What communication system was used during the convoy?

radio's

5. What communication system was used during the convoy?

radios

6. Was there an order to switch from white light to black out light during the convoy?

I don't know

7. Did anyone in A13 (vehicle involved in incident) respond to the order?

8. Who made the order?

I believe the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

9. What are the procedures for going from white light to black out drive?

I don't know

10. Do you know of anyone who witnessed the incident first hand?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

yes

11. Was there a convoy brief prior to movement? If so, who attended?

NO

12. Were weather conditions discussed at any time?

NO

13. Did anyone from A 13 communicate in any way after the incident occurred?

I don't know

14. What was the purpose of the movement?

To head back to the Alpha Alpha

15. What activities were conducted leading up to the convoy movement?

few back in a file with the Bradley's

16. Do you have anything else to add?

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

If the Bradley in any way shape or form goes down in terms of being able to drive safely spot the drone. If it rains and its too bad go to white light especially when mission was over. It's not worth it to make in dangerous conditions (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) just to lose someone, in this case three people

Exhibit 15

Page(s) 000161

As a result of increases in the Health Protection Condition (HPCON) level, our offices are limited to mission-essential personnel only and are maximizing the use of telework for all other personnel. This means that we are unable to physically retrieve specific exhibits maintained in our office while under elevated HPCON levels. Once we are able to retrieve the exhibit, a release determination will be provide to you.”

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SWORN STATEMENT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide Commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately retrieved.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURES: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

LOCATION 30 TH MP DET (CID), Fort Stewart, GA 31314	DATE 25 Oct 19 1223	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	GRADE/STATUS O2/RA
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS A CO, 2-7 IN, 1ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA		

I (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the evening of 19 October 2019 we were preparing to conduct the night iteration of our Company STX attack lane. 2nd Platoon had throughout the day been working to recover our Bradley's from an onslaught of issues. During the day iteration we were unable to get our Bradley's to the fight due to terrain and getting them stuck. This caused us to work more than normal in order to recover all the tracks. Once the vehicles were unstuck we begun to experience additional issues with our tracks. A22 blew a transmission; A21 threw track. On or around 1800 on the 19th of October 2nd platoon continued to work on the tracks for us to use during the night mission. Quickly we went from having four operational Bradley's to two. As we began to prepare for the our night mission we began to do our checks within the Bradley. A23 DVE and A24 DVE went out causing us to take A12 and A13 tracks from 1st Platoon. As we began the night operation we took the southernmost route from East to west starting at TAA 256 moving to OBJ Metz. The night mission was accomplished and conducted an AAR. It was roughly 0230 at the time of SP back to AA 256 moving North on route 6 and then east to MSR 129. The (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) gave a quick ramp brief and explained the route back. Guidance given to us was due to the windy roads, road conditions and weather we would white light on the route until we met the main MSR on 129 East. Due to 129 being a straight and more wide road we would continue to stay within the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) intent as well as not to get blasted by BDE for not being in black out drive. As we made our way onto 129 we went from white light to black out drive. Once we did this my Bradley began to experience DVE issues. I came on the net and told the CO that we needed to stop for a second to get a better assessment on our DVE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I quickly realized that it was not going to be coming back on so I began to guide him through my NVG as well the CIV. I would continuously be in and out of the hatch watching both the road and the CIV to ensure we weren't going to rear end another Bradley or worse drive off the road. At one point in this drive I came down into the hatch and briefly saw what resembled a vehicle go off the road. Absolutely did not even understand what I saw when I saw it. As I looked further into the CIV and out of my hatch I saw another Bradley and thought my mind was playing tricks on me. We continued to drive over the Bridge and only heard over the radio that a Bradley was in the water roughly 200 M after I passed the bridge. We raced back to the bridge and dismounted only to see a Bradley upside down in the water. I asked who it was and was told it was J. My heart sunk and I didn't know what to think. I immediately went into the water to help get the rest of the crew who was stuck inside get out. We would take turns holding each other's feet to not get lost in the Bradley overturned in the water. What we didn't think about during this time was due to it being flipped over everything was backward. After four or five attempts inside the Bradley we changed the direction of where we were going to try and get the turret door open. It was 0257 and quickly moved to 0308 by the time we were able to get SFC Jenkins pulled from the turret. Immediately myself, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) began CPR on SFC Jenkins. Shortly after CPL Walker was pulled from the turret. After a few minutes we moved SFC Jenkins to the road on a stretcher and continued to perform CPR where our two medics arrived back on scene from taking others to an AXP (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) myself and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) continued to switch off conducting CPR. We were never able to recover PFC Garcia from the drivers hole. After 53 minutes of CPR the medical providers finally made it on scene and asked us to stop. We learned that Walker was taken away along with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) by LMTV with other medical providers. It was after this that recovery assets were finally able to make their way to the scene and pull the Bradley out of the water. There e are a few things that in my mind would of prevented this accident. Obviously the first is not being in blackout drive; however we are required to do those specific tasks. Due to our current training (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 1 of 3

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

INITIALS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT: 16

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT: Fort Stewart CID Office, PSGA DATED: 25 Oct 19 .
STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) progression and support packages required to other BNs, directly due to the Brigades lack of planning capabilities.

This forced us to operate on an OPTEMPO that was not normal to anyone in the BDE or BN. Over tasking in many situations barely afforded us the opportunity to reset ourselves much less our equipment. We were dog tired and going back to the AA in order to pick up and move to another AA because another unit was going to occupy AA256 so they could run the ATK lane. Just prior to our Platoon Live Fire we pulled 8 packs just to ensure we didn't set them on fire from oil spills in the hull. Maintenance was done at every opportunity we could but it became apparent that we weren't going to be afforded the time to do so. The Long Range Training Calendar doesn't exist here. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q: Did you type the statement above.

A: Yes.

Q: When was the last time you communicated with PFC Garcia?

A: Before the night mission?

Q: Can you describe his condition?

A: He was health, tired like the rest of us because it was a long day but he was able to complete the mission.

Q: When was the last time you communicated with SFC Jenkins?

A: Prior to the incident, before we turn onto 129, I told him his right tail light was out Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

Q: While on 129 how was the channel of communication of the convoy?

A: People were talking, no need to have too much radio chatter.

Q: When you thought you saw a BFV go off the road, how far away were you?

A: It's hard to know but maybe around 75 meters.

Q: When you thought you saw a BFV go off did you hear anything over the radio?

A: No.

Q: What did you do after that?

A: I continued to move up 129, until (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) came over the radio saying there was a BVF in the water.

Q: Do you know if any of the personal in the BFV were sleeping when they went over?

A: I've heard that (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were sleeping, which is normal since the mission was over.

Q: Was alcohol involved to the best of your knowledge?

A: No, SFC doesn't mess around like that.

Q: Do you know if safety harnesses and protective gear were being utilized?

A: I don't for sure but in that situation typing only the drive would be where a harness. As far as protective gear, your ACH, eye pro, and hand gear should be used.

Q: How long had PFC Garcia been a BFV driver?

A: About a year, he was a good driver. SFC Jenkins ran his crew very well. This could not have happened to a more experienced crew.

Q: Was it raining before and during the incident, if so describe its impact?

A: Yes, it was rain continually, vision wasn't the greatest. I believe the weathers had great affect on this incident.

Q: How was the lighting before and during the incident?

A: It was cloudy and dark, once the rescue attempt became it was clear there was no light under the water within the overturned BFV.

Q: Have you ever had issues with you drivers using cell phones while in control of a BFV?

A: No, and I have not heard anything about that being the case in this incident.

Q: Who was conducting CPR on SFC Jenkins and SPC Walker?

A: Myself and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) conducted CPR on SFC Jenkins. I don't know who worked on SPC Walker but he was taken away (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 2 of 3
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

INITIALS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT: 16

DA Form 2823-E

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT: Fort Stewart CID Office, FSGA DATED: 25 Oct 19.
STATEMENT (Continued)

- (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Q: Were SFC Jenkins and SPC Walker ever conscious after the incident?
- A: No.
- Q: Are you training in CPR.
- A: Yes.
- Q: Did you hear the command to go black over the radio?
- A: Yes.
- Q: Who gave that command?
- A: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
- Q: Was this command expected?
- A: Yes, it was put out prior to our departure.
- Q: Was there any prior surveillance of 129 and the bridges?
- A: Yes, we were aware of 129, we had been driving it all day.
- Q: Was there a risk assessment conducted before the departure?
- A: Yes, was. It was determined to go black on 129 because it was the safer road.
- Q: Is there anything else you would like to add to your statement?
- A: No///End of Statement///(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, WITHOUT INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed by law
to administer oaths, this 25th day of October, 2019
at 30th MP DET (CID) FSGA

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Type Name of Person Administering Oath)

10 USC 936

(Authority To Administer Oath)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT: Fort Stewart CID Office, FSGA DATED: 25 Oct 19 . STATEMENT

(Continued)

- A: Yes (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was asleep on it.
- Q: Did you see what screen was being displayed?
- A: No
- Q: When did Garcia's DVE stop working?
- A: Start of the mission
- Q: Did Garcia or SFC Jenkins' notify anyone about the DVE not working?
- A: Yes
- Q: Who did SFC Jenkins' notify?
- A: I am assuming the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
- Q: What was the response after notifying the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of the deficiency?
- A: Something along the lines of roll on.
- Q: Was this your normal team and Bradley?
- A: No
- Q: When did the Bradley go black out light?
- A: Right after the ANR
- Q: Was the turret door closed or open?
- A: Closed
- Q: Is there anything else you would like to add to your statement?
- A: No//End of Statement (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25th day of October, 2019 at 30th MP

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Type Name of Person Administering Oath)

Art 136(b)(4)

(Authority To Administer Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

PAGE 2 of 2

INITIAL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT: 17

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SWORN STATEMENT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately retrieved.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURES: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

LOCATION 30 TH MP DET (CID), Fort Stewart, GA 31314 (FSGA)	DATE: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) 25 Oct 19	TIME: 12:45	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) NUMBER 00540-19-CID093
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		GRADE/STATUS E-1/ AD
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS A Co. 2-7 IN BN, 1 ABCT, FSGA			

I, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) I, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) want to make the following statement under oath: we just finished performing a night iteration at around 0100 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was preparing to return to Alpha Alpha, to bed down for the night. The Bradley (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and myself got in, did not in any way stand out. I didn't even exactly know who was driving the Bradley at the time, I was just tired and was looking forward to a small nap before arriving to Alpha Alpha. When I got in the Bradley from what I remember it was relatively clean besides the mud and the only thing inside was a couple of bags stored behind the seats. I don't know how long we rode for before the crash but when it happened, it was a sudden loud pop sound. That's when time seemingly started to move so fast and all three of us started to flip around the inside of the Bradley. I believe this is the first time I (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) that's when I tasted chemicals and was being sprayed in the face by something. I woke and stood upright or tried to, then saw that the Bradley was filling with water. I believe I remember seeing (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) trying to open the exit door of the Bradley, im not to sure as to what (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was doing. It took no longer than 15 seconds for it to fill to the top, the lights shut off in the process so I couldn't see a thing. At this point I was under water and still don't really know for how long, the next thing I know Im being pulled out by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) then goes to lead an NCO to the crash site, I try to help but then decide to just stay out of the way. From there people start arriving to help in any way and around 15-20 minutes later (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q: Were you sleeping?

A: Yes I was at the time.

Q: Where you wearing the safety harnesses?

A: No one was wearing the safety harnesses

Q: Was the Vehicle Commander and Gunners hatches open or closed?

A: I'm not sure, I believe it was open though

Q: Were you wearing your ACH?

A: Yes, full kit

A: Various items were unsecured behind the Bradley's seats

Q: Was the hell hole obstructed with gear?

A: Usually but I am unaware about this time

Q: Was this your assigned Bradley?

A: It was none of the crews assigned Bradley it was borrowed from a different platoon

Q: Was the squad leader display on?

A: it was on but I couldn't tell which screen it was displayed

Q: Did you hear vehicle communications between the driver and vehicle commander?

A: I wasn't listening but I knew they were talking.

Q: Was anyone else sleeping besides you?

A: I'm not sure

Q: Prior to rolling out was there a mission brief, and was there rollover drills conducted?

A: Yes there was a mission brief, but no rollover drills conducted

Q: Was there a PMCS conducted on A13?

A: I don't know

Q: When did your crew change Bradley's?

A: Right before driving back to the AA

Q: Was the turret door closed?

A: It was closed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PAGE 1 of 2

INITIALS (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT: 18

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT: Fort Stewart CID Office, FSGA DATED: 25 Oct 19 . STATEMENT
(Continued)

Q: Was the drivers hatch closed?
A: I do not know
Q: Did anyone in the crew consume any alcohol?
A: Absolutely not
Q: Was SFC Jenkins hatch open?
A: I don't know but he was inside the Bradley
Q: Was the DVG system operational?
A: No
Q: Were you helped out of the Bradley?
A: I was by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
Q: Is there anything else you would like to add to your statement?
A: No///End of Statement/// (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25th day of October, 2019 at 30th MP DET (CID), FSGA

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Type Name of Person Administering Oath)

Art 136(b)(4)

(Authority To Administer Oath)

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SWORN STATEMENT

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately retrieved.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURES: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

LOCATION 30 TH MP DET (CID), Fort Stewart, GA 31314	DATE 30 Oct 19 [REDACTED] 12	NUMBER 0540-16-CID093
LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	GRADE/STATUS E-4 / AD
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS A Co, 2-7IN, 1ABCT, 3ID, FSGA,		

I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

That day we were doing our day and night company mission against op for. for the night mission we were having to [REDACTED] the fact that our PLT brads were all broken. We did our night mission and had our AAR. I believe it was 0200 something when we finished the AAR. After that we went to our brads to had back to the sleeping area. I had my kit and ach on with my m240 between my legs while in the brad and did not have seatbelts on. I remember before I fell asleep SGT Jenkins talking from the squad voice box in the back. I heard [REDACTED] tell SGT Jenkins that his left tail light was out and he said " well that's great lol". we started driving and I fell asleep. I then remember hearing a loud crash then having the feeling of falling. then I heard the loudest crash ive heard when we hit the ground. I was then gathered my self together trying to realise what happened. I then started yelling to [REDACTED] to get the troop door open. I saw him swing the handle open and pushing the door and it wasn't opening. then the halon system went off and stared spraying everywhere. I then yelled put your promask on to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] I closed my eyes held my breathe to put on my promask and then that's when the water came in and filled from head to toe in 1 second. it then became completely dark and I could not see or breathe. I started to freak out and started [REDACTED] then remembered to stay calm and I know where I need to go to get out and pray that the troop door was open. I kept trying to swim there but [REDACTED] but I kept pushing my self to find that door but my [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I just kept trying to keep moving then that when I felt a hand and it was [REDACTED] and he ripped me out the brad and that's when I was able to breathe again. I got to the side of the river and [REDACTED] went straight back in to get [REDACTED] I got out of the water and [REDACTED] came back up with [REDACTED] and dragged him to the side and I pulled him out of the water. I looked up at the bridge and brads were driving past us [REDACTED] went back down in the water to get sgt jenkins and sgt walker. hecame back up and said he couldn't get the door open. so we ran uop the side of bridge and just kept yelling help and waving down the brads. they stopped and we ran down back to brad and that's when everyone started to come down and get in thye water to get the others out. I [REDACTED] and stood next to mthe water waiting for them to get the others. then they firsted pulled out sgt walker and after helping him [REDACTED] I remember [REDACTED] to the bridge and seen them carry sgt walker and sgt jenkins up. I was then checked by the medstar people and then we were put in the back of lmtv to get transported to the hospital. [REDACTED]

Q: [REDACTED]

A: [REDACTED]

Q: Were you wearing you safety harness or other safety gear?

A: I was wearing my kit and ACH. I wasn't wearing my safety harness and I believe that fact helped me get out faster.

Q: Who was driving the vehicle?

A: PFC Garcia.

Q: When was the last time you communicated with PFC Garcia that morning? [REDACTED]

PAGE 1 of 2 [REDACTED]

INITIALS [REDACTED]

EXHIBIT: 19

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT: Fort Stewart CID Office, FSGA DATED: 30 Oct 19 . STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) A: Right before we rolled out, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) sure he was good to go.

Q: Was PFC Garcia driving with the drivers hatch closed?

A: I couldn't see but if we were in black out mode the hatch was closed.

Q: What was the weather like at the time of the incident?

A: It was raining, not sprinkling, normal rain.

Q: Was the DVE working before you rolled out?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you know how this incident happened?

A: No, but I do believe our unit had just been over training in the month of October.

Q: Do you believe (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

A: (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q: Was the turret door open inside when you rolled out?

A: I was sleeping but it is closed normally, however, I remember it being open this time.

Q: Did you hear anything from Walker and Jenkins after the incident?

A: No.

Q: In the AAR brief did they cover going into black out drive?

A: I don't remember.

Q: Who gave the command to go into black out drive?

A: I believe the (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) but don't remember.

Q (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
A (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Q: Is there anything else you would like to had to your statement?

A: No//End of Statement// (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 30th day of October, 2019 at 30th MP DET

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(Type Name of Person Administering Oath)

10 USC 936

(Authority To Administer Oath)

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AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

LER: 00540-19-CID093-019779

CID Regulation 195-1

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PAGE 1 OF 4

DETAILS

About 1234, 15 Nov 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) coordinated with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) who stated Army Safety completed their inspection of the BFV, no mechanical errors were discovered, and they no longer required access to the vehicle.

About 1630, 21 Nov 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received copies of the autopsy photographs pertaining to SFC Jenkins, SPC Walker, and PFC Garcia. (See Disc Containing Autopsy Photographs)

About 1630, 21 Nov 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received copies of the autopsy and toxicology reports pertaining to SFC Jenkins, SPC Walker and PFC Garcia. All autopsy reports revealed the cause of death was drowning and the manner of death was accidental for all three Soldiers. The toxicology reports revealed the toxicology tests were negative. (See Autopsy and Toxicology Reports)

About 1810, 21 Nov 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) briefed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) on the autopsy and toxicology findings. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated he completed his interviews of the unit and did not receive any information that criminality was involved in the accident. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) provided (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) with a copy the risk assessment pertaining to A Co, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, FSGA which revealed the unit planned to operate in black out drive during the exercise. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) also provided a copy of SFC Jenkins and PFC Garcia's Military Driver's License packet which revealed both Soldiers were trained to operate the BFV; and a copy of the Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet which revealed A13 was fully operational during the last inspection. All documents were subsequently burned to a disc. (See Disc)

Final Legal Opinion: About 1222, 22 Nov 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) briefed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) OSJA, FSGA, on the autopsy and toxicology reports pertaining to SFC Jenkins, SPC Walker and PFC Garcia. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was further briefed on the Army Safety BFV examination. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) agreed no criminality was present and provided her legal opinion to move forward with case closure.

About 1742, 25 Nov 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) received a copy of the Traffic LER 00617-2019-TAI093, Military Police Traffic Accident Report, Traffic Investigator (INV) Statements of (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) The Traffic Accident Report included a description of the accident and a sketch and measurements of the bridge. The reports and statements revealed similar information that has previously been described. The investigator statements below were retrieved from LER 00617-2019-TAI093 and were documented verbatim. (See LER and Military Police Traffic Accident Report)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated "On 20 October 2019 at approximately 0300 I received a call from the Ft Stewart Military Police desk sergeant which stated that there was a Bradley rolled over a bridge and there

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		Fort Stewart CID Office	
SIGNATURE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		460 West Bultman Avenue	
		Fort Stewart, GA 31314	
		DATE	EXHIBIT
		25 Nov 19	20

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AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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DETAILS

was three people still trapped inside. Once I arrived at the Ft Stewart PMO I met with the desk and they told me that the incident was happening on FS 129 and bridge 11. I proceeded to the scene of the rollover and saw the Bradley completely submerged in water with only a little bit of the tracks showing. When I got on scene I met with (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and he advised me that medical personnel had already pronounced two of the individuals that were trapped deceased. At this time the driver was still in the over turned vehicle, no one could get inside the Bradley far enough in the fuel and oil soaked water to recover him. At this time I proceeded to tape the bridge off so non-essential personnel could come in the crime scene. At this point in time we were awaiting the arrival of a recovery vehicle to recover the driver of the Bradley. At this point in time CID arrived on scene and began to collect information from me surrounding what has went on since I'd been there. After speaking with CID I spoke to the unit's commander and requested the soldier's information that were in that crew. The soldiers that were backseat passengers made it out and were transported to WINN Army Community Hospital, their names were (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). At this point the two soldiers that had been pronounced deceased were SFC Jenkins and SPC Walker which was the vehicles vehicle (b)(6) (b)(7)(C). The soldier that was still trapped in the Bradley was PFC Garcia. While awaiting the arrival of the recovery vehicle I ordered everyone off of the bridge so I and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) could assess the scene. At this point the evidence showed where the Bradley hit the bridge and rode the guardrail and eventually went over the bridge upside down. Once the recovery vehicle got on scene, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I assisted with the recovery of the vehicle and the recovery of PFC Garcia. At this time PFC Garcia was pronounced deceased by medical personnel. The victims were transported to AXP ALPHA for transportation to WINN Army Community Hospital. Once the vehicle was recovered and everyone cleared the scene we were able to conduct our accident investigation. We photographed the entire scene top to bottom, also took measurements of the bridge, roadway, track marks, everything that would assist us in our investigation as to what occurred. After we conducted our preliminary investigation we cleared the scene. The vehicle was transported to building 1320 for further investigation. On 23 October 2019, I went back out to the scene of the incident to do FARO scans for a three dimensional presentation of the scene, and I also conducted a hand drawing of the sketch that was not to scale. On 25 October 2019, I assisted CID with interviews of the

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated "On 20 October 2019 at 0350 hrs I was notified by (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) of a tactical vehicle accident that occurred on FS 129 at Bridge #11. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated that a Bradley Fighting Vehicle had went off the side of the bridge and landed in the Canoochee Creek upside down with only the tracks showing. I arrived on scene at 0603 hrs and meet with the other Traffic Investigators. I was briefed that there were two dead and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) person was still trapped in the vehicle. At 0700 hrs the driver of the BFV was extricated from the

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER	ORGANIZATION Fort Stewart CID Office 460 West Bultman Avenue Fort Stewart, GA 31314
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)	DATE 25 Nov 19
SIGNATURE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	EXHIBIT 20

CID FORM 5-1

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AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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DETAILS

vehicle and turned over to EMS personnel and pronounced dead. At this point the two unit M88 recovery vehicles positioned on the south end of the bridge on the roadway to remove the BFV from the water. As recovery teams worked on recovering the BFV myself, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) started to look over the roadway and bridge to determine what happened. As we were walking the scene we noticed damage to the entrance to the bridge crossing on the right side as traveling South. We annotated and photographed but later ruled out being struck by the down BFV from statements. As we continued to inspect the area there was damage found on an approach sign on the left side travelling South. As the path was followed track marks were found on the railroad tie curb that travelled approximately 42 ft at which time a left turning movement was done and then the vehicle left the bridge and landed in the creek upside down with the turret facing south and the rear of the vehicle facing north. The bridge sustained damage from the 42 foot mark to the 64 foot mark of the railroad tie curb. The track width that was travelling on the bridge road tie curb was approximately 8-9 inches wide and appeared to be the inside portion of the overall track. Bridge #11 was located at grid coordinate 32.014331/-81. 73307 and was located 3.2 miles south of FS 20 and 1723.40 feet north of FS 22. The height of the bridge from the roadway to the water was 10 feet and the measurement of the BFV from top of vehicle to the bottom of the side apron was 9 feet 2 inches which was under water. The weather conditions during this time were mostly cloudy with intermittent rain and spotty fog as observed while on scene. The BFV was recovered and transported back to Bldg. #1320 for further inspection and mechanical evaluation by the Army Safety Team and secured by CID. On 23 October 2019, myself (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) returned to the crash site with a FARO scanner and provide a 3D scan of the top and bottom area of the bridge. Coordination with Army Safety Team the Investigating Officer and CID has been ongoing."

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) stated "On 20 October 2019 at approximately 0300 I received a call from the Ft Stewart Military Police desk sergeant which stated that there was a Bradley rolled over a bridge and there was three people still trapped inside. Once I arrived at the Ft Stewart PMO I met with the desk and they told me that the incident was happening on FS 129 and bridge 11 . I proceeded to the scene of the rollover and saw the Bradley completely submerged in water with only a small amount of the tracks sticking up out of the water. When I got on scene I met with the incident commander and he advised me that medical personnel had already pronounced two of the individuals that were trapped deceased. Shortly after (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) arrived on scene At this time the driver was still in the over turned vehicle, in the drivers hatch, and no one could get inside the Bradley far enough in the fuel and oil soaked water to recover him. At this time myself and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) proceeded to tape the bridge off so non-essential personnel could come into the crime scene. At this point in time we were awaiting the arrival of a recovery vehicle to remove the tank from the water and recover the driver of the Bradley. At this point in time CID arrived on scene and began to collect information from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) surrounding what has went on since he had been there. After speaking with CID INV

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) PED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER	ORGANIZATION Fort Stewart CID Office 460 West Bultman Avenue Fort Stewart, GA 31314
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)	DATE 25 Nov 19
SIGNATURE (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	EXHIBIT 20

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AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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PAGE 4 OF 4

DETAILS

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) spoke to the unit's commander and requested all soldier's information that was in that crew of the rolled over tank (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C) At this point the two soldiers that had been pronounced deceased were SFC Jenkins and SPC Walker which was the vehicle's commander and gunner. The soldier that was still trapped in the Bradley was PFC Garcia. While awaiting the arrival of the recovery vehicle myself and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) ordered everyone off of the bridge so we could asses the scene. At this point the evidence showed where the Bradley hit the bridge and rode the guardrail and eventually went over the bridge upside down. Once the recovery vehicle got on scene, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and I assisted with the recovery of the vehicle and the recovery of PFC Garcia. At this time PFC Garcia was pronounced deceased by medical personnel. The victims were transported to AXP ALPHA for transportation to WINN Army Community Hospital. Once the vehicle was recovered and everyone cleared the scene we were able to conduct our accident investigation. We photographed the entire scene top to bottom, also took measurements of the bridge, roadway, track marks, everything that would assist us in our investigation as to what occurred. After we conducted our preliminary investigation we cleared the scene. The vehicle was transported to building 1320 for further investigation. On 23 October 2019, myself, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) went back out to the scene of the incident to do FARO scans for a three dimensional presentation of the scene."///LAST ITEM///

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

REPORTED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Fort Stewart CID Office
460 West Bultman Avenue
Fort Stewart, GA 31314

SIGNATURE

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DATE

25 Nov 19

EXHIBIT

20

Exhibit(s) 21 thru 27
Page(s) 000175 thru 000193

U.S. Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFMES)
documents

Exhibit 28

Page(s) 000194

As a result of increases in the Health Protection Condition (HPCON) level, our offices are limited to mission-essential personnel only and are maximizing the use of telework for all other personnel. This means that we are unable to physically retrieve specific exhibits maintained in our office while under elevated HPCON levels. Once we are able to retrieve the exhibit, a release determination will be provide to you.”



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

IMSH-ESP
Fort Stewart, GA
354 EAST BULTMAN AVE BLDG 280
FT Stewart, Georgia, 31314

IMSH-ESP

2019/11/01

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Law Enforcement Report - Final/Referred - 00617-2019-TAI093-3A1

1. Offense: Vehicle Crash: Undetermined Manner of Death (None)
2. Dates/Times/Locations of Occurrences: 0258, 20 Oct 19 - 0258, 20 Oct 19; FS 129, Bridge #11, Ft Stewart, GA, 31314
3. Date/Time Reported: 0258, 20 Oct 19
4. Investigated By: **(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)**
5. Subjects/Suspects: UNKNOWN - 10899604; [Vehicle Crash: Undetermined Manner of Death]

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000198 EXHIBIT
2a

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IMSH-ESP

SUBJECT: Law Enforcement Report - Final/Referred - 00617-2019-TAI093-3A1

6. Victims:

- a. Jenkins, Bryan Andrew (Deceased); SFC; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Age 41; Male; White; Company A, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, Ft Stewart, GA, 31314; FC; [Vehicle Crash: Undetermined Manner of Death]
- b. Walker, Thomas Cole (Deceased); SPC; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Age 22; Male; White; Company A, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, Ft Stewart, GA, 31314; FC; [Vehicle Crash: Undetermined Manner of Death]
- c. Garcia, Antonio Gilberto (Deceased); PFC; (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Age 21; Male; Unknown; Company A, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, Ft Stewart, GA, 31314; FC; [Vehicle Crash: Undetermined Manner of Death]
- d. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Unknown; Company A, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, Ft Stewart, GA, 31314; FC; [Vehicle Crash: Undetermined Manner of Death]
- e. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Unknown; Company A, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, Ft Stewart, GA, 31314; FC; [Vehicle Crash: Undetermined Manner of Death]
- f. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Unknown; Company A, 2-7 IN, 1 ABCT, 3 ID, Ft Stewart, GA, 31314; FC; [Vehicle Crash: Undetermined Manner of Death]

7. Report Summary:

On 20 October 2019, at 0258 hrs, Ft Stewart Military Police responded to FS 129 at Bridge #11 for a vehicle crash. Garcia, operating a camouflage in color M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) struck Bridge #11, and proceeded to roll over the side of the bridge landing upside down in the Canoochee Creek. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the rear area passengers, were able to exit the BFV. SFC Jenkins, the vehicle commander, SPC Walker, the vehicle Gunner, and PFC Garcia, the vehicle driver were unable to exit the vehicle and were pronounced deceased on scene by medical personnel. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were transported to WINN Community Hospital for further medical evaluation. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was then transferred to Memorial Health University Medical Center in Savannah for further treatment. The vehicle was recovered by the unit and transported to building 1320 for safe keeping and further investigation. This is a final report. Investigation continues by CID and Army Safety Team.

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SUBJECT: Law Enforcement Report - Final/Referred - 00617-2019-TAI093-3A1

Crash Investigation: After reviewing evidence on the scene and an inspection of the vehicle it was determined that the BFV was maneuvering south when it drove to the left side of the roadway and drove up onto the curbing of the bridge unknowingly and drove a short distance on the curbing before making a turn to the left which caused the BFV to slide off the bridge and land upside down in the Canoochee Creek below. The vehicle dropped approximately 20 feet from the roadway to final rest in the creek. It is unknown if the BFV had night vision difficulty or not due to the damage done to the electrical systems by the water intrusion into the vehicle.

This report is exempt from automatic disclosure IAW the provision of title 5 USC 552 (b) (7) and title 5 USC 552 (j) (2) as implemented by exemption number 7, AR 25-55 and Chapter 5 AR 25-22.

This document is provided for official information and use only. Copies of this document or enclosures thereto and information therefrom will not be further released without the prior approval of the Chief of Law Enforcement Branch, Fort Stewart, Georgia. When the purpose for this document has been satisfied destroy it.

As a cost saving initiative this office will no longer furnish enclosures as a part of the case distribution. Enclosures may be requested by contacting the Law Enforcement Branch Administrative Support at 912-767-8498.

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8. Unique Circumstances:

0540-2019CID093

q. Training and troop movement accidents resulting in serious injury or death.

9. Exhibits:

a. Attached:

(1) DA Form 3946, Traffic Accident Report

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SUBJECT: Law Enforcement Report - Final/Referred - 00617-2019-TAI093-3A1

(2) DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement:X4

b. Not Attached: None

Commanders are reminded of the provisions of AR 600-8-2 pertaining to suspension of favorable personnel actions and AR 380-67 for the suspension of security clearances of persons under investigation. Army Law Enforcement reports are exempt from automatic termination of protective markings IAW Chapter 3, AR 25-55. IAW AR 25-22, AR190-45, and DODM 5400.07, information contained in this report is law enforcement sensitive, confidential and private in nature, and any further distribution (forwarding to unauthorized personnel) without the authorization of the Provost Marshal General will be in violation of the UCMJ and USC.

Report Prepared By

Report Approved By

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Signature Authority

GS13 CHIEF, LE BRANCH (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DISTRIBUTION:

DES

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IMSH-ESP

SUBJECT: Law Enforcement Report - Final/Referred - 00617-2019-TAI093-3A1

CASE HISTORY:

05536-2019-MPC093

00617-2019-TAI093

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MILITARY POLICE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. PM ACTIVITY CODE/REPORT NO. 00617-2019-TAI093	2. DATE OF ACCIDENT (YYYYMMDD) 2019/10/20	3. TIME OF ACCIDENT (Use 2400 hour) 0258	4. DAY OF WEEK OF COLLISION (Sunday, Monday, etc.) Sunday
---	---	--	---

5. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT

a. MILITARY RESERVATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	b. NAME AND LOCATION OF MILITARY RESERVATION (Include City and State, etc.) Fort Stewart, GA 354 EAST BULTMAN AVE BLDG 280, FT Stewart, Georgia, 31314, United States
--	--

c. ROAD OR STREET ON WHICH ACCIDENT OCCURRED FS 129, Bridge #11, Ft Stewart, Georgia, 31314, United States	d. NAME OF INTERSECTING STREET IF AT INTERSECTION
---	---

e. NAME OF NEAREST INTERSECTING STREET, HIGHWAY, OR OTHER PERMANENT IDENTIFYING LANDMARK IF NOT AT INTERSECTION	f. NO. OF FEET	g. DIRECTION
---	----------------	--------------

h. IF ACCIDENT OCCURRED OFF MILITARY RESERVATION, AND OUTSIDE CITY LIMITS, INDICATE:
 _____ MILES N S E W FROM CITY LIMITS CENTER OF CITY OR TOWN

i. KIND OF LOCALITY

<input type="checkbox"/> Troop Billets	<input type="checkbox"/> Mfg or Industrial	<input type="checkbox"/> School or Playground	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> Residential	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Open Country	<input type="checkbox"/> Business	

6. TYPE OF ACCIDENT

<input type="checkbox"/> Vehicle-Vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/> Vehicle-Object	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Single Vehicle (Non Collision)	a. SEVERITY	
<input type="checkbox"/> Vehicle-Pedicycle	<input type="checkbox"/> Vehicle-RR Train	<input type="checkbox"/> Hit and Run	NO. KILLED	NO. INJURED
<input type="checkbox"/> Stolen Vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/> Vehicle-Pedestrian	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	3	3
b. TOTAL NO. OF VEHICLES INVOLVED 1			<input type="checkbox"/> PROPERTY DAMAGE ONLY	

7. WEATHER, LIGHT, AND ROAD CONDITIONS

VEHICLE		DRIVING LANES	VEHICLE		CHARACTER	VEHICLE		SURFACE	VEHICLE		WEATHER
1	2		1	2		1	2		1	2	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	One	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Straight	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Concrete	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Clear
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Two	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Curve	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Black Top	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Rain
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Three or More	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Level	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Brick	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Fog
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Divided Highway	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	On Grade	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Gravel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Snowing
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other

VEHICLE		CONDITIONS	VEHICLE		DEFECTS	VEHICLE		LIGHT
1	2		1	2		1	2	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Dry	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Holes, Ruts, Bumps, etc.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Daylight
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Wet	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Loose Material on Surface	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Dawn
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Mud	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Defective Shoulder	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Dusk
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Snow	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	No defects	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Dark, Street Lights
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Dark, No Street Lights

8. TRAFFIC CONTROL

VEHICLE 1 2	VEHICLE 1 2	VEHICLE 1 2	VEHICLE 1 2
<input type="checkbox"/> Stop and Go Signal	<input type="checkbox"/> Flashing Light	<input type="checkbox"/> Warning Sign	<input type="checkbox"/> One way Street
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No Traffic Signal	<input type="checkbox"/> Officer or Watchman	<input type="checkbox"/> Solid Center Line	<input type="checkbox"/> Stop Sign
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Explain)			

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9a. VEHICLE NO. 1					9b. VEHICLE NO. 2						
USA REGISTRATION OR LICENSE NO. A13		MAKE M2 Bradley	YEAR	BODY TYPE Armored Tru	USA REGISTRATION OR LICENSE NO.		MAKE	YEAR	BODY TYPE		
UNIT MARKINGS/DECAL NO.			<input type="checkbox"/> Privately Owned <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Government	UNIT MARKINGS/DECAL NO.			<input type="checkbox"/> Privately Owned <input type="checkbox"/> Government				
REGISTERED OWNER (If not driver) (Last, First, MI) U.S. Government					REGISTERED OWNER (If not driver) (Last, First, MI)						
ADDRESS OF OWNER					ADDRESS OF OWNER						
NAME AND ADDRESS OF INSURANCE COMPANY OR AGENT					NAME AND ADDRESS OF INSURANCE COMPANY OR AGENT						
10a. DRIVER NO. 1					10b. DRIVER NO. 2						
NAME (Last, First, MI), Grade and Address Garcia, Antonio, G., E3 - U.S. Army - Private First Class (PFC), Building Number 632 Room Number 344, Fort Stewart, GA, 31314			SSN (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	NAME (Last, First, MI), Grade and Address			SSN				
			AGE 21 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female				AGE <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female				
DRIVER'S LICENSE/PERMIT NUMBER			STATE	DRIVER'S LICENSE/PERMIT NUMBER			STATE				
LIMITATIONS ON LICENSE/PERMIT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES (Specify)			YEARS' DRIVING EXPERIENCE 2	LIMITATIONS ON LICENSE/PERMIT <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES (Specify)			YEARS' DRIVING EXPERIENCE				
CODES	CAT (1) B	INJ (2) B	SEAT BELT (3) U	SEAT POS (4) 1	CODES	CAT (1)	INJ (2)	SEAT BELT (3)	SEAT POS (4)		
11. OCCUPANTS											
NAME AND ADDRESS					VEH NO.	AGE	SEX	CODES			
								CAT (1)	INJ (2)	SEAT BELT (3)	SEAT POS (4)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)					1	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		B	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	U	7
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)					1	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		B	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	U	7
(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)					1	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)		B	(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)	U	7
Jenkins, Bryan, A., (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)					1	41	Male	B	B	U	7
Walker, Thomas, C (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)					1	22	Male	B	B	U	7
CODES											
(1) CATEGORY			(2) INJURY CLASS			(3) SHOULDER/LAP BELTS			(4) SEAT POSITION		
A. Army Officer B. Army Enlisted C. Other Service Officer D. Other Service Enlisted E. Civilian F. Dependent O. Other			A. No Injury B. Dead at Scene C. Dead on Arrival D. Died in Hospital E. Incapacitating Injury F. Non-incap (evident) Injury G. Possible Injury H. Injury Unknown			A. Lap Belt Used B. Shoulder Harness Used C. Both Used D. Not Used E. Not Installed F. Lap Belt Failed G. Shoulder Harness Failed H. Both Failed U. Unknown			1. Front Left 2. Front Center 3. Front Right 4. Back Left 5. Center Back 6. Back Right 7. Other Position (Bus-Motorcycle) 8. Position Unknown		

12. PEDESTRIAN					
a. NAME AND ADDRESS		b. AGE	c. SEX	d. CATEGORY	e. INJURY
f. PEDESTRIAN WAS GOING <input type="checkbox"/> N <input type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> E <input type="checkbox"/> W <input type="checkbox"/> ALONG <input type="checkbox"/> ACROSS <input type="checkbox"/> INTO STREET, ROAD OR HIGHWAY, FROM (NW to SW corner, or east to west side, etc.) TO _____					
<input type="checkbox"/> Crossing With Signal	<input type="checkbox"/> Crossing No Signal	<input type="checkbox"/> Standing on Roadway	<input type="checkbox"/> Walking in Road Against Traffic		
<input type="checkbox"/> Crossing Against Signal	<input type="checkbox"/> Hitching on Vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/> Coming From Behind Parked Car	<input type="checkbox"/> Walking in Road With Traffic		
<input type="checkbox"/> Crossing Not at Intersection	<input type="checkbox"/> Playing on Roadway	<input type="checkbox"/> Pushing or Working on Vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/> Other		
13. WITNESSES					
a. NAME AND ADDRESS			b. TELEPHONE NUMBER		
14. VEHICLE DAMAGE					
a. DAMAGED VEHICLE NO. 1		DAMAGED VEHICLE NO. 2		DAMAGED TRAILER, MOTORCYCLE ETC. <i>(Sketch Damage)</i>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Right Front of Car	<input type="checkbox"/> Left Front Door	<input type="checkbox"/> Right Front of Car	<input type="checkbox"/> Left Front Door		
<input type="checkbox"/> Right Front Fender	<input type="checkbox"/> Left Front Fender	<input type="checkbox"/> Right Front Fender	<input type="checkbox"/> Left Front Fender		
<input type="checkbox"/> Right Front Door	<input type="checkbox"/> Left Front of Car	<input type="checkbox"/> Right Front Door	<input type="checkbox"/> Left Front of Car		
<input type="checkbox"/> Right Rear Door	<input type="checkbox"/> Hood	<input type="checkbox"/> Right Rear Door	<input type="checkbox"/> Hood		
<input type="checkbox"/> Right Rear Fender	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Roof	<input type="checkbox"/> Right Rear Fender	<input type="checkbox"/> Roof		
<input type="checkbox"/> Right Rear of Car	<input type="checkbox"/> Trunk	<input type="checkbox"/> Right Rear of Car	<input type="checkbox"/> Trunk		
<input type="checkbox"/> Left Rear of Car	<input type="checkbox"/> Undercarriage	<input type="checkbox"/> Left Rear of Car	<input type="checkbox"/> Undercarriage		
<input type="checkbox"/> Left Fender	<input type="checkbox"/> Overturn	<input type="checkbox"/> Left Fender	<input type="checkbox"/> Overturn		
<input type="checkbox"/> Left Rear Door		<input type="checkbox"/> Left Rear Door			
b. SEVERITY OF DAMAGE VEHICLE NO. 1		SEVERITY OF DAMAGE VEHICLE NO. 2			SEVERITY OF DAMAGE OTHER VEHICLE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Disabling Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Other MV Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Disabling Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Other MV Damage		<input type="checkbox"/> Disabling Damage
<input type="checkbox"/> Functional Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> No Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Functional Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> No Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> Functional Damage	<input type="checkbox"/> No Damage
c. TOWED BY Unit Recovery		TOWED BY		TOWED BY	
d. TOWED TO Bldg 1320		TOWED TO		TOWED TO	
e. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OTHER THAN VEHICLE Water Damage					
f. SKETCH OF COLLISION. (1) Identify roadway and roadway features, vehicles, pedestrians, objects on/off roadway, traffic controls, skidmarks, unusual/temperature conditions (<i>ice patch, construction areas, etc.</i>). (2) Locate probable point of impact. (3) Show vehicle, pedestrian or object positions at impact. (4) Show probable vehicle or pedestrian paths before and after collision. NORTH = ↑					
g. DESCRIPTION OF COLLISION. Indicate what probably happened before, during, and after the crash; include information not on sketch, e.g., driver disability, reduced visibility, pedestrian clothing color, construction or repair work, etc. On 20 October 2019, at 0258 hrs, Ft Stewart Military Police responded to FS 129 at Bridge #11 for a vehicle crash. Garcia, operating a camo in color M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle struck Bridge #11 and proceeded to roll over the side of the bridge landing upside down in the Canoochee Creek. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) the rear area passengers were able to exit the rear the of the Bradley while it was fully submerged in water. SFC Jenkins the vehicle commander, SPC Walker the vehicle Gunner, and PFC Garcia the vehicle driver were unable to exit the vehicle safely and were pronounced deceased on scene by medical personnel. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) were transported to WINN Community Hospital for further medical evaluation. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) was then transferred to Memorial Health University Medical Center in Savannah for further treatment. The vehicle was recovered and transported to building 1320 for safe keeping and further investigation. This is a final report. Investigation continues by CID.					


Exhibit 30

Page(s) 000204

As a result of increases in the Health Protection Condition (HPCON) level, our offices are limited to mission-essential personnel only and are maximizing the use of telework for all other personnel. This means that we are unable to physically retrieve specific exhibits maintained in our office while under elevated HPCON levels. Once we are able to retrieve the exhibit, a release determination will be provide to you.”

SKETCHES


Section/Plan View Sketches



PLAN
N.T.S.

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EXHIBIT
000205
31



TYPICAL BRIDGE TRANSVERSE SECTION
NO SCALE

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AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

LER: 00540-19-CID093-019779

CID Regulation 195-1

Contents cannot be released outside law enforcement or Dept of the Army channels without the approval of the Commander, USACIDC

PAGE 1 OF 1

DETAILS

Final Command Brief: About 1555, 9 Dec 19 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) briefed (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) Commander, 1ABCT, FSGA, this office is closing this investigation and the AFMES report stated the cause of death for SFC Jenkins, SPC Walker and PFC Garcia as drowning, and their manner of death was accidental.

About 1000, 11 Dec 19, (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) obtained documents from (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) which included the Material Factors Report which is the Army Safety Investigation Board's factual summary, BFV Service record, BFV Dispatch History, and BFV Inspection Worksheet. A review of the Material Factors Report revealed the BFV was mechanically sound prior to this incident. (See Material Factors Report and Disc containing all documents.)///LAST ITEM///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Fort Stewart CID Office
460 West Bultman Avenue
Fort Stewart, GA 31314

SIGN

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

DATE

11 Dec 19

EXHIBIT

32

MATERIAL FACTORS INVESTIGATION
USACRC Case Number 20191020001

1. Vehicle/Equipment Worthiness. In addition to conducting interviews with key maintenance personnel, the Board conducted reviews of the maintenance historical records, licensing and dispatch records, Motor Pool Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and supervised a -20 level Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) post mishap inspection on the M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV).

Vehicle was an M2A3 BFV, Serial Number: 2AGR1499Y, Registration Number: MV0410, administrative number: A-13, belonged to A Company, 2-7 IN, 1ABCT, 3ID. The vehicle had 3588 kilometers on the odometer at the last time of dispatch. A BAE Systems Field Service Representative (FSR) and two 91M Bradley Fighting Vehicle mechanics conducted the post mishap technical inspection (TI) on 28 OCT 19. There were several significant deficiencies related to water intrusion from the mishap noted in the DA FORM 2404 in TAB 4. Post-mishap photos of A-13 are depicted in Figures 1 and 2




Figure 1: A13 in maintenance bay following rollover




Figure 2: A13 upright following recovery mission

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000208 EXHIBIT

33

Material Factors-20191020001

2. Vehicle Systems. The technical inspectors were unable to apply power to the electrical systems of the mishap BFV based on hazards created by water intrusion of the electrical system. Therefore, the technical inspectors were not able to assess the functionality of the Driver's Tactical Display to fully assess the functionality of the Driver's Vision Enhancer (DVE) as a system. However, the technical inspectors did conduct a swing test of the DVE camera for A-13 on another BFV. The DVE camera functioned as designed on the second BFV. Figure 3 is a photograph of the removed DVE camera during post mishap technical inspection. Figure 4 is the installed DTD on A-13 that was not inspected for functionality due to inability to apply power to the BFV.



Figure 3: A-13 Removed DVE




Figure 4: A-13 installed DTD

a. M2A3 Turret. The impact resulted in a damaged and partially missing Blue Force Tracker 2/Joint Battle Command-Platform (JCBP) Satellite Transceiver and damaged TOW Missile Launcher (see figure 5 and 6).

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


Figure 5: Damaged JBCP Satellite Transceiver



Figure 6: Damaged Tow Missile Launcher

b. M2A3 Steering and Brake Linkage. During the technical inspection of A-13, it was found that the left and right side propeller shafts and brake linkage had been removed. Upon interviewing of the recovery team, was confirmed that these components were installed correctly prior to the accident and that the recovery team removed them in order to facilitate recovery operations (see figure 7 and 8 below). The steering linkage was intact and installed correctly.




Figure 7: Removed Brake Linkage




Figure 8: Removed Right Side Propeller Shaft

Material Factors-20191020001

c. M2A3 Track. During the technical inspection of A-13, the BAE FSR and 91M mechanics found the left and right side track system intact and serviceable. The recovery team confirmed that these components were installed correctly prior to the accident and that there was no evidence of anomalies with the track system post recovery. This was also evident in the post mishap photo take before the recovery operation (see figure 9 below).




Figure 9: Post Mishap Photo A-13

d. M3A3 Powertrain. Because of water intrusion, the Board was unable to start the engine to exercise the powertrain. Neither the final drives nor the transmission was locked and recovery vehicles were able to reposition the BFV without incident.

e. M3A3 Restraint Systems. The technical inspectors found all of the restraint systems in the BFV (driver, gunner, commander, and troop compartment) operational and fully mission capable.

Material Factors-20191020001

3. Maintenance record inspections included vehicle inspection worksheets (5988E), Equipment Status Reports (NMC report), service records, dispatch records, Unit Maintenance SOP, Drivers Training SOP, and maintenance specific additional duty orders.

a. The Board found the DA Form 5988E, Maintenance Inspection Worksheet (dated 15 October 2019) in the vehicle logbook. The maintenance faults continuation page detailed a PMCS inspection conducted by PFC (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and supervised by SGT Garcia (Vehicle Commander of A-13) on 16 October 2019. Faults annotated on the DA Form 5988 did not have an associated TM item number or status symbol, but did have the date of inspection noted. There was one identified fault on the PMCS, which included, "Seals around hatches leaking water". The corrective action column listed the material numbers for the leaking seals.

b. The Board reviewed A-13's service packet for accuracy. The unit used pre-printed inspection checklists out of the TM. Although a service packet was on hand, there was no definitive means outside of the GCSS-A data to validate when the field maintenance team conducted the last service as the checklist used did not have a start or completion date listed. The annual service checklist are located in TAB 4 of this report. GCSS-Army records indicated the last service was conducted one day late on 26 February 2019.

Exhibit 34

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As a result of increases in the Health Protection Condition (HPCON) level, our offices are limited to mission-essential personnel only and are maximizing the use of telework for all other personnel. This means that we are unable to physically retrieve specific exhibits maintained in our office while under elevated HPCON levels. Once we are able to retrieve the exhibit, a release determination will be provide to you.”