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# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATIVE UNIT DIGITAL FORENSICS AND RESEARCH BRANCH 27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

CISA-CCI-DF

22 Sep 11

- 1. (U) Case Number: CAF# 0028-10-CID361 / ROI# 0028-10-CID221-10117
- 2. (U) Investigating Office: Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, Quantico, VA 22134
- 3. (U) Date of Report: 22 Sep 11
- 4. (U) Examiner: SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)
- 5. (U//FOUO) **Summary of Analysis**: Examination of the U.S. Army SIPRNET computer assigned IP 22.225.28.216 and primarily utilized by SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (a coworker of PFC MANNING) disclosed the following:
  - A) (U) Examination of the file C: \Document and Settings \( \begin{align\*} \begin

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#### (U) Case Number: 1.

(U) CAF# 0028-10-CID361 / ROI# 0028-10-CID221-10117

### (U) Investigating Office:

(U) Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, Quantico, VA 22134

#### (U) Date of Report: 3.

(U) 22 Sep 11

### (U) Examiner:

### (U) SAC(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

#### (U) Definitions of Technical Terms: 5.

#### 5.1 (U) Internet Protocol (IP) Address:

(U) An IP address is part of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). A protocol is the standard language used to communicate over a network. TCP/IP is the most common "language" that computers use to communicate over the Internet. An IP address is the method of identifying a specific computer on a network--only one computer can be assigned a specific IP address at one time. Internet service providers (ISP) typically keep records showing the dates and times when an IP address was used by each customer account.

#### 5.2 (U) Message Digest-5 (MD5):

(U) An MD5 hash value (as used in digital forensics) is a 128-bit (16-byte) number that uniquely describes the contents of a file. It is essentially the "digital fingerprint" of a file or an entire disk. The MD5 hash algorithm was developed by RSA Laboratories and is publicly available. For this reason, the 128-bit MD5 hash is a standard in digital forensics. The algorithm used to generate an MD5 hash is such that the odds of two different files having the same hash value are approximately 1 in  $2^{128}$ .

#### 5.3 (U) Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1):

(U) A SHA-1 hash value is a 160-bit number that uniquely describes the contents of a data set. It is essentially a "digital fingerprint" of a file or set of data (e.g., an entire disk). The SHA-1 algorithm was developed by the National Security Agency (NSA), is publicly available, and (like the MD5 algorithm) is commonly used in the forensic community to calculate hash values. The algorithm used to generate a 160-bit SHA-1 hash value is such that the odds of two different files or data sets having the same hash value are approximately 1 in 2<sup>160</sup>.

### (U) Analysis:

- (U) About 1100, 11 Jun 10, SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received a DA Form 2922, Forensic Laboratory Examination Request, from SA 7(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Central Baghdad CID Office, USF-I, Unit #42232, Camp Liberty, Iraq APO, AE 09342. SA(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)requested this office conduct a forensic examination of the digital media seized as Item 2, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 0585-10.
- (U) EXAMINER's NOTE: Upon receipt by this office, DN 0585-10 was assigned the local CCIU DN 073-10. These items collected as evidence pertained to PFC Bradley E. MANNING in connection with the following offenses:
- -UCMJ Article 106a: Espionage.
- -18 USC 793: Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information
- -18 USC 798: Disclosure of Classified Information

#### 6.1 (U) Examination of the hard disk drive (HDD), Serial Number Z5FX1422S 6P2 EC A:

(U//FOUO) Examination of the HDD removed from the primary SIPRNET computer of SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coworker of PFC MANNING) revealed it had the Microsoft XP Professional operating system, installed at 17:24:19, 5 May 08. It was assigned the computer name S2D10MTNBDE840 and IP 22.225,28.216.

	Encase File Name	2310-28May10	
	Operating System	05 May 08 17:24:19	
[	Installed		
	IP address	22.225.28.216	
	Operating System	Microsoft Windows XP (SP2)	
[	Computer Name	S2D10MTNBDE840	
Į	Time Zone	(GMT+03:00) Baghdad	
ĺ	Domain	2BCT10MTN (Primary)	
	Date	N/A	
	bradley.manning first		,
	logged on		
	Date	N/A	
	bradley.manning last		
	logged off		,
	Number of times	N/A	
· .	bradley.manning		
	logged on	rmation for SPC (b)(6)(	1 \ (7) (0)

(U) Figure 1 - System information for SPC SIPRNET computer

primary

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### 6.1.1 (U) Imaging:

```
Name
        2310-28Mav10
Actual Date
                 31 May 10 21:15:23
                 31 May 10 21:15:23
Target Date
                 J:\Source\2310-28May10\2310-28May10.E01
Filē Path
                 0160-10-CID899-14463
Case Number
Evidence Number
Examiner
         Name
        This is the HDD serial Z5FX1422S 6P2 EC A
Notes
model
        Disk
Drive Type
                 Fixed
                 Completely Verified, 0 Errors
037863b076e48a9632fbb13185b2352e
File Integrity
Acquisitión MĎ5
Verification MD5
                          037863b076e48a9632fbb13185b2352e
Acquisition SHA1
                          6a9b4e366790fb9f02b88a9ba29c3f3fbe610300
Verification SHAL
                          6a9b4e366790fb9f02b88a9ba29c3f3fbe610300
```

- (U) Figure 2 Imaging and verification data for HDD, serial number Z5FX1422S 6P2 EC A
  - 6.1.2 (U) Time Zone information:
- (U) All times shown in this report are in relation to Baghdad Time (+3:00 GMT), unless otherwise noted.
  - 6.1.3 (U) Voucher Information:
  - (U) Item 1, EPCD DN 070-10.
  - 6.1.4 (U) A review of the HDD using Anti-Virus:
- (U) The examined HDD was scanned using Symantec Endpoint Protection Version 11.0.4000.2295 with Definitions dated June 09, 2010 r22. No malicious files were located.
  - 6.1.5 (U) Examination of the file C: \Document and Settings (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) pst:

(U) Examination of the file C: \Document and Settings\\( \begin{align\*} \begin{al

Forensic Report for SIPRNET Computer assigned the IP 22,223.20.216 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)



```
From - Fri May 28 12:28:48 2010

Received: from COMMANDO02SVR01.2bct10mtn.ds.army.smil.mil (22.225.53.13) by commando02svr02.2bct10mtn.ds.army.smil.mil (22.225.53.24) with Microsoft SMTP Server id 8.1.393.1; Fri. 28 May 2010 19:28:50 +0300

Received: from 192.10.70.22 ([192.10.70.22]) by COMMANDO02SVR01.2bct10mtn.ds.army.smil.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675); Fri. 28 May 2010 19:28:48 +0300
Content Type: multipert/mixed; boundary-Port 2360e8548eb1df1976d24787e198e1569
X-HP-DIGITAL SERDER: HP Digital Sender Service
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 May 2010 16:28:48.0569 (UTC) FILETIME=[D9EC7290:01CAFE82]
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-SenderYdResult: NONE
X-Converted-Ru: Frailows 8 2 Frai
   X-Converted-By: Emailchemy 9.9.2 Forensic Edition; licensedTo-*Computer Crime Invest. Unit
   This is the preemble area of a multipart message. Mail readers that understand multipart
                                                   _2_360e8548eb1df1976d24787e198c1569
  Content-Type: text/plain: charset-UTF-8
  --Part---_2_360e8548eb1df1976d24787e198c1569
Content-Type: application/pdf
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition; attackment; filename="Document.pdf"
```

(U//FOUO) Figure 3 - Email message header for an email sent to @bct10mtn.army.smil.mil from an HP Digital Sender (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)scanning device (box and arrow added by the exmainer for emphasis)

SECTION I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA  1, NAME (Last First MI)  2, SSN  3, RANK  PFC  5, ETHERSAMARD 20111001  4, On Active Drb   Not on Active Drb   On ADT 20111001  5, STATION (Geographical Location);  WIDNAA 020301000404 (20 DB LID 3 PSC CONTROLLING FLAGGING ACTION AND TELEPHONE NUMBER  9) THIS ACTION IS TO:  Wistation at fing (Sections III and V Only)   Transfer a fing (Sections III and V Only)   Remove Fing (Sections IV and V Only)  ECCTION III - INITIATE A FLAG  10  A FLAG IS INITIATED, EFFECTIVE 20100527 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:  NON-TRANSFERABLE  PAPER Failate (J)  Elimination - fold initiated (B)   Weight control program (K)  Removed them selection Bid - field initiated (C)  Reformed OER (D)  Security Violation (E)  HQDA use only - elimination of removed from selection Bid (F)  SECTION III - TRANSFER A FLAG  11.   A FLAG IS TRANSFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:  Adverse action - punitibenent phose (H)   Weight control program (K)  SECTION IV - Remove A FLAG  12.   A FLAG IS TRANSFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:  Adverse action - punitibenent phose (H)   Weight control program (K)  SECTION IV - REMOVE A FLAG  12.   A FLAG IS REMOVED, EFFECTIVE   FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:    A SECTION IV - REMOVE A FLAG  13.   A FLAG IS REMOVED, EFFECTIVE   FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:    Case closed favorably (C)   Emoneous Fing (2)    Disciplinary ection taken (D)   Other final action (E)  SECTION V - AUTHENTICATION  DISTRIBUTION  1 - FAAO  1 - Commander, gaining und (trensfer Reg only)  NOW THE AUTO ORGANIZATION  SIGNATURE  DATE  27 HANGE  27 HANGE  1 - CAMPAN  SIGNATURE  DATE  10 DATE  11 - CAMPAN  CET, (A) (CAMPAN  CE	REPORT TO SUSPEND FAVORA	BLE PERSONNEL ACTIONS (FLAG) 2; the proposent agency is MILPERCEN.	
1. NAME (LALL FIEL MI)  MANNING, BRADLEY EDWARD  ANNING, BRADLEY EDWARD  4. On A65ve Duly   Notes Assiss Dury   On ADT  5. ETSIESAMED  20111061  7. STATION (Geographical Location)   NY  WIDDAM 2020101NHO DE DUD  8 PSC CONTROLLING FLAGGING ACTION AND TELEPHONE NUMBER  9 THIS ACTION IS TO:  10 Interest of any (Sections III and V Only)   Transfer a flag (Sections III and V Only)   Remove Flag (Sections IV and V Only)  5. ETSIESAMED  20111061  7. STATION (Geographical Location)   NY  8 PSC CONTROLLING FLAGGING ACTION AND TELEPHONE NUMBER  9 THIS ACTION IS TO:  5. ETSIESAMED  20111061  7. STATION (Geographical Location)   NY  8 PSC CONTROLLING FLAGGING ACTION AND TELEPHONE NUMBER  9 THIS ACTION IS INSTITUTED, EFFECTIVE 20100527 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON: NON-TRANSFERABLE  7 AMORTS ACTION IN PROVIDED TO THE FOLLOWING REASON: 10 Adverse Action (A)  11 A FLAG IS TRANSFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON: 12 A FLAG IS TRANSFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON: 13 Adverse action - HOLD detected reassignment (G) 14 Adverse action - HOLD detected reassignment (G) 15 Supporting documents stacked? 16 Adverse action - HOLD detected reassignment (G) 17 APPT Failure (J) 18 Supporting documents stacked? 19 Ves No Section IV - REMOVE A FLAG 10 Case closed Tavorably (C) 10 Disciplinary action tation (b) 10 Disciplinary action tation (b) 11 FAAO 11 - FAAO 12 Cammander, gaining and (Ivensite flag only) 11 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 11 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 12 Case closed Tavorably (C) 13 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 14 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 15 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 16 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 17 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 18 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 19 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 19 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 10 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 10 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 10 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 11 - FOC OTTON ON AND THE FOLLOWING REASON: 11 - FOC			•
4.			
4.  On Actor Daily Note Anabod Daily On ADT 29111061 7. STATION (Geographical Location) 1. ASTATION (G	MANNING, BRADLEY EDWARD		ı
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8 PSC CONTROLLING FLAGGING ACTION AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 9 THIS ACTION IS TO:    Pristice a flag (Sections III and V Only)   Trender a flag (Sections III and V Only)   Remove Flag (Sections IV and V Only)   SECTION II - INITIATE A FLAG   PART   Principle   Pri	6. UNIT ASSIGNED AND ARMY MAJOR COMMAND		ation)
9 THIS ACTION IS TO:    Patients a flag (Sections II and V Only)   Transfer a flag (Sections III and V Only)   Remove Flag (Sections IV and V Only)     SECTION III - INITIATE A FLAG			
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10. ✓ A FLAG IS INITIATED, EFFECTIVE 20100527 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:  NON-TRANSFERABLE  Adverse Action (A)    AFFT Failure (J)   Elimination - Fold inheliated (B)   Weight control program (K)   Removal from selection bit - held substated (C)   Reformed OER (D)   Security Violation (E)   HQDA use only - elimination or removal from selection list (F)  SECTION III - TRANSFER A FLAG  11.   A FLAG IS TRANSFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:   Adverse action - HQDA chected reassignment (G)	141 sessas a rag (Sections II and v Only) [ ] Transfer a rag (Sec	asons III and V Only) [] Remove Fing (Sections IV and V Only)	
NON-TRANSFERABLE    Adverse Action (A)	SECTION II -	INITIATE A FLAG	- '
APFT Failure (J)    Removal from selection bit - field initiated (B)   Weight control program (K)     Removal from selection bit - field subtated (C)     Referred OER (D)   Security Violation (E)     HQDA use only - elimination or removal from selection flat (F)     Security Violation (E)     HQDA use only - elimination or removal from selection flat (F)     Security Violation (E)   APFT Failure (J)     Averse action - HQDA directed reassignment (G)   APFT Failure (J)     Adverse action - HQDA directed reassignment (G)   Weight control program (K)     Supporting documents attached?   Yes   No     Supporting documents attached?   Yes   No     Section IV - Remove A PLAG     FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:     Case closed favorably (C)   Emonoous Fing (Z)     Disciplinary action taken (D)   Other final action (E)     Section V - Authentication     Signature   Authority   APPD 9V3 600     APPD 9V3 600   APPD 9V3 600   APPD 9V3 600     APPD 9V3 600   APPD 9V3 600   APPD 9V3 600     APPD 9V3 600   APPD 9V3 600   APPD 9V3 600   APPD 9V3 600     APPD 9V3 600   AP		LLOWING REASON:	1
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SECTION III - TRANSFER A FLAG  11.  A FLAG IS TRANSFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:  Adverse action - HODA directed reassignment (G)  Adverse action - punishment phase (H)  Supporting documents attached?  Yes No  SECTION IV - REMOVE A FLAG  12.  A FLAG IS REMOVED, EFFECTIVE  FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:  Case closed favorably (C)  Disciplinary action taken (D)  SECTION V - AUTHENTICATION  DISTRIBUTION  1 - FAAO  1 - Disciplinary action taken (D)  SECTION V - AUTHENTICATION  DISTRIBUTION  1 - FAAO  1 - Commander , gaining und (transfer flag only)  NAME SAME TITLE - NO ORGANIZATION  SIGNATURE  DATE  20 MALS	Security Violation (E)		
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Disciplinary action taken (D)  SECTION V - AUTHENTICATION  DISTRIBUTION  1 - FAAO 1 - Commander, gaining und (transfer fleg only)  NAME BANK TILLE AND ORGANIZATION  SIGNATURE  DATE  COT, (S), Commander  DATE  D	12. [ ] A FLAG IS REMOVED, EFFECTIVE	FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:	il
SECTION V - AUTHENTICATION  DISTRIBUTION  1 - Unit Commander  1 - FAAO 1 - Commander, gaining und (transfer flag only)  NAME RAME TITLE AUTOORGANIZATION  SIGNATURE  DATE  DAT	Case closed favorably (C)	Erroneous Flag (Z)	; <b> </b>
DISTRIBUTION  1 - FAAO  1 - Commander, gaining und (transfer flag cray)  1 - PSC  1 - Commander, gaining und (transfer flag cray)  NAME BANK TITLE AND ORGANIZATION  SIGNATURE  DATE  DATE	Disciplinary action taken (D)	Other final action (E)	- 1
DISTRIBUTION  1 - FAAO  1 - Commander, gaining und (transfer flag cray)  1 - PSC  1 - Commander, gaining und (transfer flag cray)  NAME BANK TITLE AND ORGANIZATION  SIGNATURE  DATE  DATE			· [
1 - Commander 1 - FAAO 1 - Commander, gaining und (transfer flag only)  NAME RANK TITLE AND ORGANIZATION  SIGNATURE  DATE  DAT	SECTION V - A DISTRIBUTION	AUTHENTICATION	
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) $(a7,67), (a24,67), (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)$ $(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)$ $(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)$ $(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)$ $(c7,67), (c24,67)$ $(c47,67), (c24,67)$ $(c47,67), (c47,67)$ $(c47$	1 - Unit Commander 1 - F&AO	oraly)	
DAPO 9V3 DOD APD 9V3 DOD APD 9V3 DOD	NAME BANK TITLE AND ORGANIZATION	SIGNATURE DATE	
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ttps://emilpo.ahrs.army.mil/loadSfpaReport.do?eurIndex=0&disableToken=true 5/28/2010	DA FORM 258, JUH 67 EDITION OF 1 JAN	APO APO	8/3 000
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	https://emilpo.ahrs.army.mil/loadSfpaReport.do?cu	urIndex=0&disableToken=true 5/	28/2010

	7. (	$(\mathbf{U})$	Non-Lead	Observ	ations:
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(U) None.

Forensic Report for SIPRNET Computer assigned the IP 22.223.20.216 (WALSH)

### 8. (U) Summary of Examination:

(U//FOUO) Examination of the U.S. Army SIPRNET computer assigned IP 22.225.28.216 and primarily utilized by SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (a coworker of PFC MANNING) disclosed the following:

A) (U) Examination of the file C: \Document and Settings\\( (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) \\ \( (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) \) . pst revealed an incoming email dated 28 May 10 sent from an HP Digital Sender scanner device, which contained a scanned DA Form 268, Report to Suspend Favorable Personnel Actions (Flag), pertaining to PFC Bradley MANNING.


### 9. (U) Investigative Leads:

(U) None.

### 10. (U) Evidence Disposition:

(U) All evidence was placed into the evidence room of this office.

REPORT PREPARED \ APPROVED BY:




### 11. (U) Appendices:

(U) Attachment A, Enclosure 1 (Report to Suspend Favorable Personnel Actions (FLAG) for PFC MANNING with PII redacted)

Forensic Examination Report Date: 22 Sep 11 Forensic Report Author: SSA(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

### **ENCLOSURE 1**



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

REPORT TO SUSPEND FAVORABLE PERSONNEL ACTIONS (FLAG)  For use of this form, see AR 600-8-2; the proponent agency is MILPERCEN.				
SECTION I - ADMINI	STRATIVE DATA			
1. NAME (Last, First, MI)	. SSN 3. RANK			
MANNING, BRADLEY EDWARD	PFC			
4. On Active Duty Not on Active Duty On ADT	5. ETS/ESA/MRD			
ACTION OF SECURITION OF A PROPERTY OF SECURITIES AND A SECURICAL SECURITIES AND A SECURITIE	20111001			
UNIT ASSIGNED AND ARMY MAJOR COMMAND     WBDAAA 020010INHHC BDE LID	7. STATION (Geographical Location) , NY			
8. PSC CONTROLLING FLAGGING ACTION AND TELEPHONE NUMBER	MADE AND			
9. THIS ACTION IS TO:	_			
Initiate a flag (Sections II and V Only) Transfer a flag (Sections	III and V Only) Remove Flag (Sections IV and V Only)			
SECTION II - INIT	IATE A FLAG			
10. M A FLAG IS INITIATED, EFFECTIVE 20100527 FOR THE FOLLOW	VING REASON:			
NON-TRANSFERABLE	TRANSFERABLE			
Adverse Action (A)	APFT Failure (J)			
Elimination - field initiated (B)	Weight control program (K)			
Removal from selection list - field initiated (C)				
Referred OER (D)				
	2 0			
Security Violation (E)	*			
HQDA use only - elimination or removal from selection list (F)				
SECTION III - TRAM	ISFER A FLAG			
11. A FLAG IS TRANSFERRED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:				
Adverse action - HQDA directed reassignment (G)	APFT Failure (J)			
Adverse action - punishment phase (H)	Weight control program (K)			
Supporting documents attached? Yes No				
SECTION IV - REMOVE A FLAG				
12. A FLAG IS REMOVED, EFFECTIVE	FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:			
Case closed favorably (C)	Erroneous Flag (Z)			
Disciplinary action taken (D)	Other final action (E)			
SECTION V - AUTHENTICATION  DISTRIBUTION				
1 - Unit Commander 1 - F&AO				
1 - PSC 1 - Commander, gaining unit (transfer flag only)	CICNATURE			
D(6)(b)(7)(C)	SIGNATURE DATE			
(D) (D) (1) (C) COT, AD, Commanding	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 28 MA/J3			
DA Form 268, JUN 87 EDITION OF 1 JAN 80 is	APD 9V3.000			

https://emilpo.ahrs.army.mil/loadSfpaReport.do?currIndex=0&disableToken=true

5/28/2010

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Page(s) 017311 withheld:



# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATIVE UNIT DIGITAL FORENSICS AND RESEARCH BRANCH 27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

CISA-CCI-DF

22 Sep 11

- 1. (U) Case Number: CAF# 0028-10-CID361 / ROI# 0028-10-CID221-10117
- 2. (U) Investigating Office: Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, Quantico, VA 22134
- 3. (U) Date of Report: 22 Sep 11
- 4. (U) Examiner: SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)
- 5. (U) **Summary of Analysis**: Examination of the rewritable compact disc (CD-RW), which was marked SECRET and recovered from the personal quarters of PFC MANNING, FOB HAMMER, Iraq, revealed the following:
  - A) (U) The CD-RW was located in the back of a case labeled "Starting out in Arabic. All the Arabic you need to get started in a simple audio-only program. 3 Audio CDs. No books necessary" in an apparent attempt to hide the disc.
  - B) (U) The data on the CD-RW was recorded by a Macintosh computer at 21:03, 27 Apr 10 (GMT+0:00) and contained a partial video (12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv) of an Apache helicopter airstrike.
  - C) (U) References to the file 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv found on this CD-RW were also located within 12 different restore points (created between 2 Mar 10 and 7 May 10) linked to the user profile bradley.manning during the previous forensic examination of PFC MANNING's primary SIPRNET computer.

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### 1. (U) Case Number:

(U) CAF# 0028-10-CID361 / ROI# 0028-10-CID221-10117

### 2. (U) Investigating Office:

(U) Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, Quantico, VA 22134

### 3. (U) Date of Report:

(U) 22 Sep 11

### 4. (U) Examiner:

(U) SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

### 5. (U) Definitions of Technical Terms:

### 5.1 (U) Message Digest-5 (MD5):

(U) An MD5 hash value (as used in digital forensics) is a 128-bit (16-byte) number that uniquely describes the contents of a file. It is essentially the "digital fingerprint" of a file or an entire disk. The MD5 hash algorithm was developed by RSA Laboratories and is publicly available. For this reason, the 128-bit MD5 hash is a standard in digital forensics. The algorithm used to generate an MD5 hash is such that the odds of two different files having the same hash value are approximately 1 in 2<sup>128</sup>.

### 5.2 (U) Restore Point:

(U) A restore point is a Microsoft method to allow a user with administrative privileges on the system to undo changes made to the operating system (such as the installation of a new program or a scheduled backup). Restore points can capture filenames, registry information and file locations in the users accounts. The restore points will usually reside in the hidden, protected System Volume Information folder and are enabled by default for most modern Windows operating systems.

### 5.3 (U) Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1):

(U) A SHA-1 hash value is a 160-bit number that uniquely describes the contents of a data set. It is essentially a "digital fingerprint" of a file or set of data (e.g., an entire disk). The SHA-1 algorithm was developed by the National Security Agency (NSA), is publicly available, and (like the MD5 algorithm) is commonly used in the forensic community to calculate hash values. The algorithm used to generate a 160-bit SHA-1 hash value is such that the odds of two different files or data sets having the same hash value are approximately 1 in  $2^{160}$ .





### 5.4 (U) Security Identifier (SID):

(U) The SID is a number most modern Windows operating systems use to identify specific user accounts. Information regarding the associations between a specific user and his assigned SID are found in the SAM registry hive.

### 6. (U) Analysis:

- (U) About 1100, 11 Jun 10, SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received a DA Form 2922, Forensic Laboratory Examination Request from SA(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Central Baghdad CID Office, USF-I, Unit #42232, Camp Liberty, Iraq APO, AE 09342. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) requested this office conduct a forensic examination of the digital media seized as Item 2, Evidence Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 0585-10.
- (U) EXAMINER's NOTE: Upon receipt by this office, DN 0585-10 was assigned the local CCIU DN 073-10. These items collected as evidence pertained to PFC Bradley E. MANNING in connection with the following offenses:
- -UCMJ Article 106a: Espionage.
- -18 USC 793: Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information
- -18 USC 798: Disclosure of Classified Information

### 6.1 (U) Examination of CD-RW, Serial Number LD623 MJ04184038 B16:

- (U) Examination of the CD-RW revealed it contained the digital movie file 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv.
  - 6.1.1 (U) Imaging:

```
Name This is the CD serial LD623 MJ04184038 B16 - MARKED SECRET
Actual Date 31 May 10 20:23:53
Target Date 31 May 10 20:23:53
File Path D:\CD\0115-28May10\0115-28May10.E01
Case Number 0160-10-CID899-14463
Evidence Number 0115-28May10
Examiner Name SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
Notes MARKED SECRET
Drive Type CD-ROM
File Integrity Completely Verified, 0 Errors
Acquisition MD5 5c993ee621b036482bae1353f844322f
Verification MD5 5c993ee621b036482bae1353f844322f
```

(U) Figure 1 - Imaging and verification data for CD-RW, serial number LD623 MJ04184038 B16

#### 6.2 (U) Time Zone information:

(U) All times shown in this report are in relation to UTC (+0:00 GMT) unless otherwise noted.

#### 6.3 (U) Voucher Information:

(U) Item 6, EPCD DN 067-10.






### 6.4 (U) A review of the CD-RW using Anti-Virus:

(U) The examined CD-RW was scanned using Symantec Endpoint Protection Version 11.0.4000.2295 with Definitions dated June 09, 2010 r22. No malicious files were located.


### 6.5 (U) A visual inspection of Item 6:

(U) A review of Item 6 revealed it was a hard plastic CD case (shown in Figure 2 below) labeled "Starting out in Arabic. All the Arabic you need to get started in a simple audio-only program. 3 Audio CDs. No books necessary!" There were four (4) discs contained within the case, of which three (3) were production audio CDs for learning the Arabic language. The fourth disc (a CD-RW) was placed in this case in an apparent attempt to conceal its true nature (see Figures 2-5 below). SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noted the CD case was located within PFC MANNING's quarters at FOB HAMMER, Iraq.




(U) Figure 2 - CD case seized from PFC MANNING's quarters at FOB HAMMER, Iraq





(U) Figure 3 - Contents of the CD case seized from PFC MANNING's quarters at FOB HAMMER, Iraq




(U) Figure 4 - Contents of the CD case seized from PFC MANNING's quarters at FOB HAMMER, Iraq

017317








(U) Figure 5 - CD-RW containing 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE GC Anyone.wmv located in the CD case seized from PFC MANNING's quarters at FOB Hammer, Iraq

#### 6.6 (U) Examination of the CD:


(U//FOUO) The data on the CD-RW shown in Figure 5 above was created at 21:03, 27 Apr 10 (GMT+0:00) on a Macintosh computer. The CD-RW was labeled with "12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC", handwritten "Reuters FOIA Req" and had a SF 707 (1-87) SECRET sticker applied to its front. Further examination of the CD-RW revealed it contained a Microsoft Windows-format video file called 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv. Attempts to view the video file revealed it may have been improperly burned to the CD-RW (see Figures 6 through 8). The video file on the CD-RW ended about the 24:28 mark, short of the full 38:21 length of the original video file identified during the previous forensic examination of the U.S. Army computer assigned the IP 22.225.41.22 (PFC MANNING's primary SIPRNET computer). See Attachment A on Enclosure 1 to this report for the full content of the video file found on the CD-RW.

Name 2	Hash Value
12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv	c2b5cded222b6c92ad30c19fa25eb4f9

(U) Figure 6 - Hash value for 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE GC
Anyone.wmv located on the CD-RW



(U) Figure 7 - Screenshot from the digital video 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE GC Anyone.wmv on the CD-RW at the 00:01 minute mark



(U) Figure 8 - Metadata for the CD-RW

(U//FOUO) EXAMINER'S NOTE: References to the file 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv found on this CD-RW were also located within 12 different restore points (created between 2 Mar 10 and 7 May 10) linked to the security identifier (SID) for the user profile bradley.manning during the previous forensic examination of the U.S. Army computer assigned IP 22.225.41.22 (PFC MANNING'S primary SIPRNET computer). (See the forensic report for PFC MANNING'S primary SIPRNET computer for details.)

017319



	Name	Preview	File <b>2</b> Created
<b>52</b> (	REGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_5-1-5-21-665654282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	:™<;K 12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone,wmv	02 Mar 10 15:01:12
<b>¥</b> 2	REGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_S-1-5-21-665654282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	deo(12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv n.wm	25 Apr 10 13:58:46
<b>₽</b> 3	_REGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_5-1-5-21-665654282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	deo(12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv n.wm	26 Apr 10 15:00:36
<b>Ø</b> 4	_REGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_S-1-5-21-665654282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	deo(12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv n.wm	27 Apr 10 16:28:24
₩ 5	REGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_5-1-5-21-665654282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	:M <k 07="" 12="" 30="" anyone.wmv<="" cz="" engagement="" gc="" jul="" td="" zone=""><td>20 Apr 10 18:27:20</td></k>	20 Apr 10 18:27:20
₩ 6	REGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_5-1-5-21-665654282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	IMSK 12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv	'30 Apr 10 20:52:12
₩ 7	REGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_S-1-5-21-685854282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	MCK 12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 38 GC Anyone.wmv	01 May 10 22:52:13
8 🔀	T _REGISTRY_JJSER_NTUSER_5-1-5-21-685854282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	:™ <k 07="" 12="" 30="" anyone.wmy<="" cz="" engagement="" gc="" jul="" td="" zone=""><td>03 May 10 00:51:07</td></k>	03 May 10 00:51:07
₹ 9	_REGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_S-1-9-21-665854282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	:M<;K 12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv	04 May 10 01:46:38
10	[] _REGISTRY_USER_NTLISER_S-1-5-21-685854282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	:M <k 07="" 12="" 30="" anyone.wmy<="" cz="" engagement="" gc="" jul="" td="" zone=""><td>05 May 10 03:46:38</td></k>	05 May 10 03:46:38
50 11	_REGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_5-1-5-21-685854282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	:™ <jk 07="" 12="" 30="" anyone.wmv<="" cz="" engagement="" gc="" jul="" td="" zone=""><td>06 May 10 05:47:44</td></jk>	06 May 10 05:47:44
<b>Z</b> 12	AEGISTRY_USER_NTUSER_S-1-5-21-685854282-2421746616-1197546713-4796	:M<;K 12 JUL 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv	07 May 10 07:47:43

(U//FOUO) Figure 9 - The file 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE GC Anyone.wmv present on PFC MANNING's primary SIPRNET computer


### 6.7 (U) International news agency Thomson Reuters:

(U) Handwritten portions of the CD-RW label stated "REUTERS FOIA REQ," which appeared to indicate this CD-RW was destined for the Reuters news service pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. It is unknown whether such a request was ever made by international news agency Thomson Reuters, but the screenshot shown in Figure 10 below (from the 2:25 mark within the "Collateral Murder" video) specifically mentioned the news service.

(U//FOUO) EXAMINER'S NOTE: A movie similar to the one located on this CD-RW was the basis for the movie "Collateral Murder", which was created by Wikileaks.org. The movie in Figure 10 below (osc\_youtube-CM.wmv) was located within the user profile of PFC MANNING during the previous forensic examination of the U.S. Army computer assigned IP 22.225.41.22 (PFC MANNING's primary SIPRNET computer).







(U) Figure 10 - Screenshot from the "Collateral Murder" video (osc youtube-cm.wmv) at minute mark 2:25

# 6.8 (U) Previous forensic examination of PFC MANNING's personal Macintosh computer:

(U) Previous forensic examination of PFC MANNING's personal Macintosh computer (users\bmanning\Library\Logs\DiscRecording.log) revealed a CD-RW was burned at 00:03, 28 Apr 10 (GMT+3:00) and the CD-RW verification failed (see Figure 11). Data may have been successfully burned to a CD-RW, despite the failed verification.





```
Finder: Burn started, Wed Apr 28 00:03:37 2010
Finder: Burning to CD-NW media with SAO strategy in HL-DT-SI DVDRW GS23N SB00 via ATAPI.

Finder: Burning to CD-NW media with SAO strategy in HL-DT-SI DVDRW GS23N SB00 via ATAPI.

Finder: Burn widerrum protection is supported, and enabled.

Finder: Burn finished, Ved Apr 28 00:13:29 2010

Finder: Verify started, Wed Apr 28 00:13:29 2010

Finder: DVDRW GS23N: SGSITask 1292453.250000 CDB: Read (10), block: 98816, count: 512 failed with service response = 1

(SERVICE DELIVERY OR TARGET FAILURE), status = 5 (DeliveryFailure)

Finder: DVDRW GS23N: SGSITask 1292468.375000 CDB: Read (10), block: 98816, count: 512 failed with service response = 1

(SERVICE DELIVERY OR TARGET FAILURE), status = 5 (DeliveryFailure)

Finder: Retry $2

Finder: DVDRW GS23N: SGSITask 1292463.250000 CDB: Read (10), block: 99816, count: 512 failed with service response = 1

(SERVICE DELIVERY OR TARGET FAILURE), status = 5 (DeliveryFailure)

Finder: Retry $3

Finder: DVDRW GS23N: SGSITask 1292498.375000 CDB: Read (10), block: 99816, count: 512 failed with service response = 1

(SERVICE DELIVERY OR TARGET FAILURE), status = 5 (DeliveryFailure)

Finder: GVDRW GS23N: SGSITask 1292498.375000 CDB: Read (10), block: 99816, count: 512 failed with service response = 1

(SERVICE DELIVERY OR TARGET FAILURE), status = 5 (DeliveryFailure)

Finder: GVDRW GS23N: SGSITask 1292498.375000 CDB: Read (10), block: 99816, count: 512 failed with service response = 1

(SERVICE DELIVERY OR TARGET FAILURE), status = 5 (DeliveryFailure)

Finder: GVDRW GS23N: SGSITask 1292498.375000 CDB: Read (10), block: 99816, count: 512 failed with service response = 1

(SERVICE DELIVERY OR TARGET FAILURE), status = 5 (DeliveryFailure)

Finder: GVDRW GS23N: SGSITask 1292498.375000 CDB: Read (10), block: 99816, count: 512 failed with service response = 1

(SERVICE DELIVERY OR TARGET FAILURE), status = 5 (DeliveryFailure)
```

(U) Figure 11 - The DiscRecording.log file pertaining to CD creation at 00:03, 28 Apr 10 (GMT +3:00)

### 7. (U) Non-Lead Observations:

(U) None.

### 8. (U) Summary of Examination:

- (U) Examination of the rewritable compact disc (CD-RW), which was marked SECRET and recovered from the personal quarters of PFC MANNING, FOB HAMMER, Iraq, revealed the following:
  - A) (U) The CD-RW was located in the back of a case labeled "Starting out in Arabic. All the Arabic you need to get started in a simple audio-only program. 3 Audio CDs. No books necessary" in an apparent attempt to hide the disc.
  - B) (U) The data on the CD-RW was recorded by a Macintosh computer at 21:03, 27 Apr 10 (GMT+0:00) and contained a partial video (12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv) of an Apache helicopter airstrike.
  - C) (U) References to the file 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv found on this CD-RW were also located within 12 different restore points (created between 2 Mar 10 and 7 May 10) linked to the user profile bradley.manning during the previous forensic examination of PFC MANNING's primary SIPRNET computer.

### 9. (U) Investigative Leads:


(U) None.



### 10. (U) Evidence Disposition:

(U) All evidence was placed into the evidence room of this office.

REPORT PREPARED \ APPROVED BY:



(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

### 11. (U) Appendices:

(U) Attachment A, Enclosure 1 (Video file 12 Jul 07 CZ ENGAGEMENT ZONE 30 GC Anyone.wmv)

Page(s) 017324 withheld.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Third Party Information Not Reasonably Segregable

Page(s) <u>017325</u> thru <u>017325</u>s withheld:

Page(s) 017326 withheld:

### AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361 ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

CID Regulation 195-1

DETAILS

Basis for Investigation:

1 1-4----

On 07 Dec 11, SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received a written request from SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street Northwest, Washington DC 20535 to conduct a preliminary examination of the digital media seized as Item 1, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 179-11. Item #1 consisted of a United States Department of Energy, Brookhaven National Laboratory computer which was assigned to Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and utilizing the Linux operating system. Specifically it was requested to examine the file b.zip to determine if it was same file identified as the file BE22 PAX.zip originally located on EPCD, DN 123-10, Item #1, which was a classified U.S. Army computer.

#### **Examination Date and Contents:**

Between 08 Dec 11 and 09 Dec 11, SAC onducted a preliminary investigation of the computer in question. All times shown in this preliminary report are in relation to Eastern Standard Time (EST -5:00 UTC) unless otherwise noted.

A review of the Acquisition and Verification hash values showed they did match, see Figure 1 below.

MD5 Acquisition Hash Value: b3fefc178c3e2c7bf577a21a6c8f93d9

MD5 Verification Hash Value: b3fcfc178c3e2c7bf577a21a6c8f93d9

SHA1 Acquisition Hash Value: 0720ce13812dea2b7b7336b74c057d9636bdc80f SHA1 Verification Hash Value: 0720ce13812dea2b7b7336b74c057d9636bdc80f

Figure 1, the acquisition and verification hash values

### **Pertinent Information:**

Examination of the file system determined there was only one user account named kupo.

Examination of the file \home\kupo\b.zip revealed it was created at 11:28:25, 15 Dec 09. A comparison between b.zip and BE22 PAX.zip revealed they did not have the same hash value, see Figure 2 below.

EPCD, DN 179-11, Item #1, b.zip: c2ba26766091b62526c57b4bc9ac69ae

EPCD, DN 123-10, Item #1, BE22 PAX.zip: a07f7a4c3ba6301748af6b18da2b1b41

Figure 2, the hash values of the files in question.

Examination of the two zip files revealed they both were password protected zip files and they contained a file named BE22 PAX.wmv. Examination of the file BE22 PAX.wmv from both zip files revealed they had the same hash value, see Figure 3 below.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SAC (b) (6) (b) (7) (C), (b) (7) (E)

SIC (b) (6) (b) (7) (C)

DATE

ORGANIZATION

CCIU-Digital Forensics and Research Branch

U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22136

DATE

OP Dec 11

U.S. HIBIT

OP Dec 11

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(0 Approved

### AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER CAF: 0028-10-CID361 ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

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DETAILS

```
EPCD, DN 179-11, Item #1, b.zip (BE22 PAX.wmv): 35c8b3cafe8c341457ffbf329cedecb4
EPCD, DN 123-10, Item #1, BE22 PAX.zip (BE22 PAX.wmv): 35c8b3cafe8c341457ffbf329cedecb4
```

Figure 3, the hash values of the files in question.

In an attempt to determine what the user kupo was doing with the file b.zip the \home\kupo\.bash\_history file was examined. The .bash\_history file disclosed it was a history of the commands typed into the computer for the user kupo. There are no times and dates associated with individual commands. It was disclosed there were 54 commands issued which concerned the attempted decryption of the file b.zip, see Figure 4 below for a partial list.

```
./fcrackzip -p -D -u ././b.zip
./fcrackzip -p D8.DIC -D -u .././b.zip
./fcrackzip -p D8.DIC -D -u .././b.zip
./fcrackzip -p D8.DIC -D -u .././b.zip
./fcrackzip -p D8.DIC -D ././b.zip
./fcrackzip -p dic-0294.txt -D .././b.zip
./fcrackzip -p dic-0294.txt -D -u ././b.zip
./fcrackzip -p dic-0294.txt -D .././b.zip
```

Figure 4, partial list of the command issued concerning decryption

In an attempt to determine how the classified file b.zip arrived onto this computer, an examination of the file \home\kupo\.bash\_history revealed there were 73 SSH (Secure Shell) connections to IP address 173.68.194.47. It is of note there were two SCP (Secure Copy) sessions to the IP 173.68.194.47 downloading the files d8.zip and dic-0294.zip which appeared to aid the user kupo in the decryption effort, see Figure 5 below for a partial list.

```
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
scp 173.68.194.47:~/d8.zip ./
scp 173.68.194.47:~/dic-0294.zip ./
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
```

Figure 5, partial list of connections initiated by the user kupo.

The file \home\kupo\CODE\fdcrackzip-1.0\D8.DIC was a text file dictionary of words used to help decrypt files, see Figure 6 below for segment of the file.

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE 09 Dec 11	EXHIBIT 494

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AGENT'S INVES	STIGATION REPORT	ROI NUMBER
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CID R	Regulation 195-1	PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
DETAILS		
	ni-bb a-lhi-sr a. a00 al a2 a20 a3 a4	71130001 a5 a6 a7 a
	ak aakwal aakoos aakuang aal aalberts aax aay saz aazq ab aba ababa aback a carrous abarsis abace abased abasemen cey abbey's abbeys abbi abbie abbot ab abdel-sa abdelami abdelmad abdelrah ab cduct abducted abductio abductor abduc abelbeth abellan abell abella abeller ng abeu abey abeyance abeyant abez abf ciasaph abiathar abib abico abicos abi abilene abilitie ability ability' abil	saltje sal bacus abad abases aba bot's abbo delran abd ts abdul a a abelmaim abg abgre d abida ab
	Figure 6, partial contents of the fi	le D8.DIC
The file \home\kupo\CODE\: used to help decrypt files, see Fig	fdcrackzip-1.0\dic-0294. gure 7 below for segment of the file	txt was a text file dictionary of words.
	sl sM sN sa sb sc sd se sf so td te tf tg th ti tj tk tl tm	
	ui uj wk ul um un up uq ur vn vo vp vq vr vs vt vu vv v	us ut
·	ws we bu by ww un my wz nA nE nu no nm nn ny nz yA yB yC yC	жC жD
	ZA ZB ZC ZD ZE ZF ZG ZH ZI ZJ .G A4K A4N A4O A4P A4R A4T A4W	zK zL
	: A/A A/B A/C A/D A/E A/F A/G A A8N A8R A8V A6X AA1 AAs AAu Aa	/I A/L .
	Figure 7, partial contents of the file	AIs AI
1	rigure 7, partial contents of the me	dic-0294.txt
Summary:		
classified password protected zip was originally located on classif examination could not determine	p file containing a video named BE fied server available only to users on the source of the file b.zip, how arther the user of the U.S. Governm	vever it was likely the IP address
	///////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////	
•		
YPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE	NUMBER ORGANIZATION	
THE AGENT S NAME AND SEQUENCE	177 177	l Forensics and Research Branch
$\operatorname{SAC}(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)$	_	CID, Quantico, VA 22136
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# DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATION UNIT DIGITAL FORENSICS AND RESEARCH BRANCH 27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD QUANTICO, VA 22134

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

CISA-CCI-DF 4 Jan 12

1. Case Number: CAF 0028-10-CID361/ROI 0028-10-CID221-10117

2. **Investigating Office:** Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, Quantico, VA

3. Date of Report: 4 Jan 12

4. Examiner: SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

5. Summary of Analysis: Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 119-10, Items #2 and #3, consisting of two PST files from the bradley manning user profile. One PST file was from the NIPRNET email server from FOB Hammer, Iraq and the other PST file was from the SIPRNET email server from FOB Hammer, Iraq. The items in question were not of evidentiary value.



### Forensic Report for DN 119-10, Items #2 and #3



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#### Forensic Report for DN 119-10, Items #2 and #3



### 1. Case Number

CAF 0028-10-CID361/ROI 0028-10-CID221-10117

### 2. Investigating Office

Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, Quantico, VA

### 3. Date of Report

4 Jan 12

#### 4. Examiner

### SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

### 5. Analysis

### 5.1 Examination of the Log Files

5.1.1 Voucher information

EPCD, DN 119-10, Items #2 and #3 consisting of two PST files from the bradley.manning user profile. One PST file was from the NIPRNET email server from FOB Hammer, Iraq and the other PST file was from the SIPRNET email server from FOB Hammer, Iraq.

5.1.2 Pertinent Information

The items in question were not of evidentiary value.

### 6. Summary of Examination

The item in question was of no evidentiary value.

### 7. Evidence Disposition:

All evidence was placed into the evidence room of this office.



Forensic Report for DN 119-10, Items #2 and #3



Report Prepared/ Approved By: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

Special Agent-in-Charge

Exhibit\_

Page(s) 017334 thru 017334j withheld: