

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 0932, 7 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one Seagate 500 GB hard drive, Serial Number (SN) # 2GE7HP0D, and one Universal Serial Bus (USB) cable, both sent to this office by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters, CJZ-Systems - Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), APO AE 09356, via United States Postal Service Registered Mail # RE 531 100 529 US. The hard drive purportedly contained log files pertaining to the CIDNE database system. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 172-10.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

7 Dec 10

EXHIBIT

260

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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001675

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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## DETAILS

About 1545, 9 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) obtained a Federal Magistrate Search Warrant from the Honorable Ivan D. DAVIS, U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, 401 Courthouse Square, Alexandria, VA 22314, for conducting a seizure and search of a cardboard box sent from the Kuwait Theater Confinement Facility (TCF), bearing U.S. Certified Mail Label/number "7008 1300 000 2028 4546"; one (1) hard disk drive; six (6) memory cards; sixteen (16) optical media discs; and a paper disc envelope. All of the aforementioned items had been collected as evidence during a search of the home of Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) on 2 Nov 10. This search and collection of property items belonging to PFC MANNING, was conducted under a written consent executed by Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). These items had been retained on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 162-10.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** The mentioned cardboard box, which was sealed at the time of collection, had been sent from the Kuwait TCF to Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) home, as her address was listed as PFC MANNING's Home of Record address. The facts and circumstances related to this sealed container and the collection of the other items of evidence were previously documented in another Agent's Investigative Report detailing the search of Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) residence and evidence collected.

//////////////////////////////////// **LAST ENTRY** //////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

9 Dec 10

EXHIBIT

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Exhibit(s) 262

Page(s) 001677 thru 001683

Documents

**SEALED**

by the

U.S. District Court  
for the Eastern District of Virginia

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## DETAILS

Between 1130 and 1515, 11 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by his cousin Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Between 1130 and 1515, 12 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by his friend Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

About 1230, 13 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence, one Compact Disc (CD), which captured the recording of PFC MANNING's 11 Dec 10 and 12 Dec 10 visitation periods at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 177-10.

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

13 Dec 10

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## DETAILS

About 1620, 15 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected the following items as evidence from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 930 Dolly Madison Blvd, McLean, VA 22101:

One Compact Disc - Recordable (CD-R) marked SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON containing files reportedly accessed by PFC MANNING from computers/websites owned and or operated by the CIA.

One document printed on CIA letterhead addressed to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Captain, Chief, Military Justice and marked SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN.

One document marked with "Attachment A", "Attachment B", and "Attachment C" containing log file information related to systems accessed by PFC MANNING from computers/websites owned and/or operated by the CIA. Document marked SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN.

The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 184-10.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGN

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

15 Dec 10

EXHIBIT

264

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1 FEB 77

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001685  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

CLASSIFIED

Exhibit(s) 265

Page(s) 001686 thru 01686b referred to:

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate  
Joint Forces HQ-NCR/US Army  
Military District of Washington  
103 3rd Ave SW  
Fort McNair, DC 20319-5058

Exhibit(s) 266

Page(s) 001687 thru 01687h withheld:

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)

Permits withholding information that  
is classified for  
National Security purposes

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1500, 17 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, 10200 North Riva Ridge, Fort Drum, NY 13602, as he was identified as one of the officers in charge of the All-Source or 'Fusion' section in which PFC MANNING worked while at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated while deployed in Iraq he was responsible for the technical aspects of compiling and creating intelligence products within his Brigade. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained this did not include being responsible for the personnel who worked in the S-2 section. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the S-2 Section was roughly divided into two sub-elements: Current Operations and Future Operations. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that Current Operations was located in the Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and was involved in providing quick answers and intelligence products needed nearly immediately for operations. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said Future Operations was the sub-element where PFC MANNING worked, which generally involved more long-term planning and/or historical intelligence products. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated Future Operations was further divided into Shia and Sunni elements with a day and night shift for both groups. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he initially reported to MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was the Brigade S-2; however, two or three months into the deployment CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was then the Assistant Brigade S-2) replaced MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) in his position. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) estimated this happened around December 2009. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further explained taskings for intelligence products would come from Operations or CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) generally. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING was good at analysis, but was one of the best personnel for putting together targeting packets and creating diagrams. When asked about how well he knew the various personnel he deployed with and what training had preceded the deployment, CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had been out of the unit due to ankle surgery on both feet and didn't join the unit until about three months prior to the deployment, and consequently he could not speak in a lot of detail about personnel prior to getting back to the unit after his medical leave. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned personnel in the S-2 Section attended "Top-Off" Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) training which was given by a Mobile Training Team (MTT) prior to the deployment. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said this training included the use of the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database, but did not include real data related to this system. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated all of the analysts should have received this training together. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, in regard to whether PFC MANNING had access to the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network prior to deployment, that only CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and himself routinely used SIPR prior to deployment; and that PFC MANNING was not on SIPR prior to being deployed. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said once in theater unit members would have received individual and/or additional training, but because he was three weeks late in arriving to Iraq, he could not elaborate on training analysts received during that time. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he arrived at FOB Hammer the same day members of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne Division, who his unit was replacing, were departing Iraq. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he knew there had been refresher training related to working in the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) on FOB Hammer as well as classified information handling procedure training conducted which all of the analysts would have attended. CW2

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SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said that MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was in charge of this training. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related he believed all personnel had attended a Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) training class which was provided by the 1st Armored Division. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained this FDO training would have covered topics such as what information was releasable to Iraqi Government personnel, who could downgrade classified information, and other related topics. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he believed the Division office which provided this training kept a sign-in roster of the attendees of this training - specifically in the event someone did not do what they were supposed to, it could be determined whether this person had attended the FDO training. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related when asked about websites analysts could access for producing intelligence products, he believed in Advanced Individual Training (AIT) analysts were given a list of the best sites and/or on-line resources to access data; and that he saw a document containing this type of information while at a Warrant Officer training course at Fort Huachuca. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the document contained the names of sites such as the CIA WIRE, IntelLink, FBI sites, etc., and that there was no limit as to what sites or systems could be used by analysts to get data. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING would have had the opportunity to brief the Brigade Commander, but felt PFC MANNING was otherwise unknown to the Brigade Staff; however, CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING was well known to personnel in the S-2 Section due to his computer skills and previous computer background. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related in regard to Future Operations, big projects were usually completed on the night shift as the day shift was very hectic. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING was part of the Shia/Night element and that MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had assigned personnel to their roles. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained personnel would be moved around from time to time to cover vacant positions due to mid-tour leaves of other unit personnel. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the Shia groups, which intelligence analysis activities would have been conducted on, were the most active in the 10th Mountain Division operating area. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he felt PFC MANNING was good at working on his own, but had SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) as his supervisor. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was not always there, as SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was periodically reassigned per the needs of the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) he belonged to. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related an incident which he witnessed in which PFC MANNING flip over a table containing computer(s) and electronic equipment. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained this incident was the result of SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) counseling PFC MANNING for being late to work. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did this incident occurred in front of him and that he put PFC MANNING into a headlock and escorted him out of the SCIF. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned PFC MANNING was given quarters after being slightly injured during the incident and was also referred to Mental Health for about a week. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said this incident should have been documented in both PFC MANNING's counseling and medical records. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) went on to discuss the physical layout of the SCIF, which he described as the entire area in which PFC MANNING normally worked and also included an area in the back room where the Cryptological Support Team personnel worked. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said whenever anyone who was uncleared entered this area (such as workers who would fix the air-conditioning systems), documents, maps, etc., would have to be covered up or secured. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said three personnel that he knew of, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would have had access to the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) database to look up clearance information on personnel entering the SCIF. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about what tasks PFC MANNING

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

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SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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## DETAILS

should have been conducting while working in the SCIF, that PFC MANNING would have generally been conducting "data pulls" to gather as much information as possible on an action or event as directed by his leadership. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) went on to say that PFC MANNING knew how to produce various types of intelligence products, such as Excel spreadsheets, PowerPoint presentations, story boards, map overlays, etc. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he could not immediately see a need for PFC MANNING to have accessed the Afghanistan CIDNE data. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING may have occasionally found data related to GTMO documents; however, there would not be a need to access these GTMO documents directly. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he felt SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and/or SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) may know more about PFC MANNING. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not immediately provide additional information related to this investigation.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) were involved in this interview as the Military Prosecutors in this case as there were several questions they needed clarification on; specifically getting a better idea of what PFC MANNING was supposed to be working on while assigned in Iraq and the general organization of the SCIF and the personnel working within it. All personnel unless otherwise mentioned, were assigned to the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, during the time of PFC MANNING's was deployed to Iraq.

//////////////////// **LAST ENTRY** //////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE 17 Dec 10	EXHIBIT 267	

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1604, 17 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (formerly SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)), Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, 10200 North Riva Ridge, Fort Drum, NY 13602, as he was identified as the Fusion Cell Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) and Shia Threat Group Senior Analyst during the time PFC MANNING was assigned to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had been assigned to the Intelligence Master Analyst Course (IMAC) for several months and up to three weeks before his unit's deployment to Iraq. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said consequently he could not readily answer questions about things that occurred in his unit prior to its deployment; however, he believed PFC MANNING had gone to one or both of the unit's pre-deployment rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also explained he believed PFC MANNING would have received pre-deployment training on a system known as the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A). WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further described this system as a suite of various software products which included the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database, Multi-Function Workstation (MFWS), ArcGIS, and other software/database systems used for intelligence analysis. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he believed everyone who was in the rank of Staff Sergeant or higher received Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) training, but did not believe Sergeants in grades E-5 and below would have received this training. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that prior to his units' deployment, there were weekly meetings on the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network with personnel from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne Division, as this was the unit which WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and PFC MANNING's unit would be replacing in Iraq. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated because of the limited number of SIPR workstations his unit had at Fort Drum, only one or two soldiers could be using a SIPR computer at a time. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING had a couple of tasks requiring SIPR access prior to deployment, but could not immediately elaborate on what specific tasks these were. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated when asked about PFC MANNING's analytic strengths and weaknesses while in Iraq, he felt PFC MANNING was very good at pulling data from various systems, compiling this data, using various computer programs, making products and graphs of data; however, WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained PFC MANNING was bad at figuring out what the data meant and in communicating his thoughts to others. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he did not know much about PFC MANNING's personal life or the activities PFC MANNING engaged in while on his mid-tour leave taken while deployed to Iraq. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did think that PFC MANNING was often volatile and would get a crazy look in his eyes. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING seemed to be very interested in politics and computers, and liked to interject his thoughts and not let the subject drop. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained overall he felt PFC MANNING was a better than average Intelligence Analyst, but was not a very good soldier. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING was assigned as a Shia Analyst within the S-2 Section. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further explained the Sunni Groups in the 2nd BCT area of operations were focused on attacking civilians, while the Shia Groups focused on attacking coalition forces. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was the person responsible for coming up with the teams and/or work schedule and that WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) put PFC MANNING on the night shift as PFC MANNING

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

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SIGNATURE

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## DETAILS

was believed to be a self-starter who would not need a lot of supervision. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related after returning from his own mid-tour leave in Jan-Feb 10, he found things did not appear to be getting done during PFC MANNING's night shift. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING seemed like he was side-tracked and/or it seemed as if PFC MANNING was doing unnecessary tasks which had seemingly already been completed; however, WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was unable to readily provide any examples. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) when asked about various types of data involved in this investigation and whether PFC MANNING would have needed to access this type of data in his daily work, WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING would have likely accessed the CIDNE-Iraq data, and possibly State Department data. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said however he did not personally feel the State Department had relevant data in relation to the 2nd BCT mission, even though there may have been Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating in the 10th Mountain Division area. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did not think analysts needed to be on CIA WIRE, accessing documents related to Guantanamo Bay detainees, and that accessing CIDNE-Afghanistan data was questionable given the unit's mission in Iraq. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned several things that were especially noteworthy when asked if PFC MANNING had ever been 'Outside the Wire' in Iraq as PFC MANNING claimed in one of his chat conversation - which was that PFC MANNING would not have left FOB Hammer during his tour in Iraq with the only exception of when PFC MANNING went on his mid-tour leave. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained when asked about other systems or information PFC MANNING may have accessed, that it was somewhat common knowledge that a Staff Judge Advocate folder on the network was unsecured and could be accessed by anyone on that network. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not immediately provide additional information related to this investigation, but felt 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) or PFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both previously assigned with PFC MANNING in Iraq, may be able to provide more information about PFC MANNING. WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was not immediately able to provide additional information related to this investigation.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** During the interview WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned an additional SIPR system he believed PFC MANNING may have accessed known as "QueryTree". WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he believed this system required a login to access. All of the personnel mentioned in this interview, unless otherwise stated, were assigned to the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division.

//////////////////// **LAST ENTRY** //////////////////////

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## DETAILS

Between 1130 - 1330, 18 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA 22134. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

A subsequent review of the recording revealed that PFC MANNING could be heard very clearly but that his visitor, previously identified as Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not be heard clearly. The recording indicated that Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) seemed to ask a large number of questions of PFC MANNING pertaining to the conditions of his incarceration. PFC MANNING responded with considerable good humor and laughter. PFC MANNING discussed medications he was taking, his receipt of a new mattress with a built-in pillow, and travels outside of the confinement facility "in a motorcade". PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discussed his confinement conditions and PFC MANNING specifically stated, "Kuwait was ten times worse" and that he was, "happy to be here."

AGENT's COMMENT: Due to clarity problems with certain parts of the recording, it was difficult to determine the purpose of PFC MANNING's travel outside of the confinement facility via "motorcade" but it is believed the travel was to meet with his defense counsel.

About 0925, 20 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) which captured the recordings of PFC MANNING's 18 Dec 10 visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 187-11.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

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U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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20 Dec 10

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## DETAILS

Between 1145 - 1510, 19 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA 22134. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

About 1447, 20 Dec 10 SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) which captured the recording of PFC MANNING's 19 Dec 10 visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 188-10.

Between 1507-1807, 20 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the digitally recorded conversation between PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) which took place on 19 Dec 10. The review of the conversation revealed nothing of evidentiary value.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

20 Dec 10

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001694

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

Between 1140 and 1515, 25 Dec 10, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) conducted monitoring of PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by his cousin, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also noted that PFC MANNING was allowed to make an outgoing phone call to someone not on his approved list between 1257-1312, 24 Dec 10. The brig guards indicated the recipient of the call was (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) NFI, who was likely Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING's (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The call was made from brig phone number 703-784-6516.

About 1230, 27 Dec 10, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) which captured the recordings of PFC MANNING's 25 Dec 10 visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig -Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 192-10.

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

27 Dec 10

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271

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1337, 30 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 1st Army Division East, 4550 Parade Field Lane, Fort Meade, MD 20755 (formerly assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq, APO AE 09308), as he was identified as having been assigned with PFC MANNING while in Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was also identified as having been the Assistant S-2 Officer, but was selected to be the 2nd BCT S-2 Officer about three months into his Iraq deployment. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related about December 2009 – January 2010, MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was the 2nd BCT S-2 Officer, was sent to be part of a Military Transition Team (MiTT) by the 2nd BCT Commander. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained prior to that time he was the Assistant S-2 Officer, but then became the S-2 Officer once MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had transferred into the new position. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not know all of the details as to why MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was moved into another position during the deployment, but believed the BCT Commander felt MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not provide briefings very well and/or the BCT Commander did not feel he was getting a good picture of enemy activity. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he felt MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had issues speaking in front of people, which was the problem with his briefings; however, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he did not believe MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received any adverse personnel actions as the result of the change in position. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he consequently became the S-2 Officer and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) became the Assistant S-2 Officer. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was the Commander of B Company, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB), 10th Mountain Division, which he also referred to the "Military Intelligence Company" or "MICO", leading up to the 2nd BCT's deployment to Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained consequently before the deployment, he was mainly worried about issues involving B Company, training unit personnel, and other issues associated with the unit's deployment to Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related in regard to training related to classified information, he believed all of the intelligence personnel received Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) training while in Iraq; and that a handful of the leadership personnel assigned to the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) on FOB Hammer were further certified on conducting FDO duties. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the analysts also received Distributed Common Ground System - Army (DCGS-A) training prior to deployment, which included training on many of the systems and/or software products central to this investigation; such as the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database system. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the DCGS-A training was an 80-hour course that was conducted on Fort Drum, NY. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said personnel also received a Command Security Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) briefing, which was an effective presentation because of the personnel who provided the training, but not necessarily due to the presentation itself. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said this training should have been received by one hundred percent of the personnel who deployed. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he also believed the entire 2nd BCT went to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA, twice prior to the deployment to Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he was about 95-percent sure PFC MANNING should have been part of both training rotations to JRTC. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated, when asked why the 2nd BCT went to JRTC twice, that the unit was originally assigned to deploy to Afghanistan, but the location of their deployment changed to Iraq as their deployment date got closer. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that consequently the unit went to JRTC again for training which was more Iraq-focused. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related before his unit's deployment to

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

30 Dec 10

EXHIBIT

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

Iraq, the S-2 section had used one Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network computer within the Headquarters SCIF at Fort Drum, to conduct classified information tasks in support of their upcoming deployment. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and PFC MANNING seemed to have conducted a majority of this work which involved preparing briefings and other documents related to the current operations of the unit they would be replacing in Iraq, the 3rd BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further added in regard to pre-deployment training, analysts would have also received professional development training provided by MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related upon deployment his unit essentially fell-in on the 3rd BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division and appear to have adopted the same organizational structure within the SCIF in regard to the way the 3rd BCT had organized personnel. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained the major organizational structure which was retained was the division of analysts into 'Shia' and 'Sunni' analytical groups. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also explained the SCIF that his unit inherited from the 3rd BCT was accredited as a SCIF for processing up to, and including, Top Secret - Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS-SCI) classified data. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related this accreditation of the SCIF was granted by their higher echelon Special Security Officer (SSO) while in Iraq, who would have been from the 1st Armored Division. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated this accreditation had occurred with the 3rd BCT prior to his unit's arrival in theater, and that during the Replacement in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) process, the SCIF accreditation paperwork was re-done reflecting the 2nd BCT having assumed duty at FOB Hammer. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that this SCIF was also referred to as a "T-SCIF" (for 'Temporary-SCIF'). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said there was not a Command Inspection Program (CIP) while in Iraq, but that 1st Armored Division, specifically the G-2 SSO, would conduct surprise inspections. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned that there were at least two inspections conducted that he remembered. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated once in theater, analyst personnel also received training on: the Biometric systems used in theater such as the Biometric Automated Tool-Set (BATS) and Handheld Interagency Identification Detection Equipment (HIIDE) systems; information collection management; as well as Information Assurance (IA), and other training which was necessary for obtaining email and/or network accounts within the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained, when asked about network systems, that the 2nd BCT S-6 Section was generally responsible for ensuring that Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network connections and the majority of Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) worked, but the S-6 Section was not responsible or had authority for dealing with the DCGS-A computers. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related DCGS-A computers were taken care of by two government contractors who were deployed to Iraq prior to the 2nd BCT arriving, and were in Iraq the entire time of his unit's deployment. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) identified these two contractors as Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who he believed worked for the company L-3 Communications Corporation, 600 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10016; but were based in Charlottesville, Virginia. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated due to the heat and dust in Iraq, as well as the computers used for DCGS-A were Alienware brand computers, the DCGS-A computers were always crashing and that he personally went through three or four computers that had to be fixed or replaced. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained due to this fact, and issues related to the computer(s) PFC MANNING used for his work on the SIPR network, he believed Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and/or Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would be important personnel to speak with. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said, when asked about whether and/or how intelligence analysts would access various information systems, that personnel would often access the CIDNE database system directly via their web browser as going through the DCGS-A system to access this

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

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SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

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## DETAILS

same resource was usually slower. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING would not have likely had any mission requirements for accessing CIDNE Afghanistan related information; however, PFC MANNING may have had some exposure to the U.S. State Department Net-Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained there had been requests of the analysts to identify how tactical information fit into the larger picture of political issues within the 2nd BCT area of operation, and within Iraq overall. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) consequently said the information related to where the NCD database could be found on the SIPR network was disseminated amongst the analysts in order for them to have a source for gaining political insights into events occurring in Iraq; however, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated there should have been no need for PFC MANNING to be accessing NCD documents related to areas of the world except Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he did not know anything about the use of the CIA WIRE website by analysts and that PFC MANNING should not have had any need to be accessing documents related to detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained websites related to other units, specifically units operating in areas adjacent to the 2nd BCT in Iraq, were also a source of information. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the 2nd BCT Commander wanted to have situational awareness of adjacent units, and reports and other documents produced by adjacent U.S. Army units were one method of finding this information. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said by examining shared folders on the SIPR network, specifically on the SharePoint system that was set up, was one way of obtaining this information. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that overall, there was no limit as to what sources of information analysts could use on the SIPR network in order to answer questions and/or obtain information for producing intelligence products. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained, when asked about the general mission areas the 2nd BCT was involved in while in Iraq, that analysts were typically working on the analysis of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Iraqi Police Assassinations, and Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortars (IRAMs). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING would have appreciated the potential damage of disclosing to the public Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) related to IEDs, as PFC MANNING would have known 10th Mountain Division units were hit about four or five times a week by IEDs and this was one of the aforementioned missions of the unit in conducting analysis. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also explained another mission of the unit was to train their Iraqi counterparts on analysis and mentioned nearly every intelligence product produced needed to be Releasable to Iraq (REL TO IRAQ), and would be included as one of the caveats to the classification markings. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated this was one of the reasons personnel had attended and/or certified on the FDO training and also explained why some removable media was in the SCIF. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related when intelligence products were produced that would be disseminated to Iraqi forces, a supervisor would review the products on the optical removable media (CDs, DVDs) to ensure it did not have any information which was deemed too sensitive for release to the Iraqi forces. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained at which point the optical media containing the specified intelligence product could be released to the appropriate Iraqi authority. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further stated that optical media was absolutely necessary due to the transfer of information to Iraq which he referred to as 'Partnered Intelligence Training'; but admitted, to his knowledge, there was no process to control and/or account for recordable optical media within the SCIF. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING never left FOB Hammer with the exception of when he went on his mid-tour leave, wherein he would have left FOB Hammer to get to Kuwait in order to fly back to his leave destination. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related, when asked about an incident mentioned by PFC MANNING in his Internet chat conversations with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that he knew of the incident in which PFC MANNING referenced Iraqi personnel being arrested. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained the incident

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

30 Dec 10

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

which occurred, sometime prior to the Iraqi Parliamentary Elections held in the first week of March 2010, involved numerous Iraqi civilians who CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described as members of a Shia group. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the Iraqis had reportedly broken into a printing press facility and had subsequently printed protest materials. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the Shia men who entered the printing facility were essentially arrested for burglary and/or breaking and entering, and that a report was disseminated within the 2nd BCT which identified a large propaganda cell had been found and the Shia personnel involved had been apprehended by soldiers from the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Field Artillery Regiment – also a unit within the 2nd BCT. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he was surprised to have read about this information within the Internet chats of PFC MANNING after they had been published in the news media, as CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said this incident did not have any impact within personnel working in the SCIF and he felt it was a fairly small and/or petty thing to have occurred while in Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further said he could not remember PFC MANNING mentioning this incident to anyone as was claimed in the published Internet chats he had read related to this investigation. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) went on to discuss PFC MANNING, specifically that PFC MANNING was not the greatest intelligence analyst as he couldn't put the pieces together to know what was going to happen in a given situation. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did mention PFC MANNING was very good at what CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) called 'Statistical Analysis' - which CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further described as being able to take large amounts of data, and manipulate it to create numbers and figures from the data. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING was initially assigned to work on the night shift within the SCIF, which appeared to be a decision made by and/or during MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) time as the S-2 Officer during the beginning of the deployment. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING had issues with SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) presumably as she was PFC MANNING's own rank, was his supervisor, and she was difficult for PFC MANNING to work with. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING was consequently moved to a day shift due to a poor working relationship with SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) but PFC MANNING later claimed to be having issues with his sleep – in that PFC MANNING apparently preferred to work during the night-time hours. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he could not offer any information as to PFC MANNING's personal life, but did mention PFC MANNING always seemed to be alone while in Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) added he could not remember seeing PFC MANNING with other people even in the dining facility. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he only remembers PFC MANNING by himself smoking cigarettes outside of the SCIF and drinking soda. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned PFC MANNING was transferred back to the night shift again and that CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was the plans officer and Assistant S-2 Officer, would often task PFC MANNING due to his ability to work with statistical and number related tasks. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) as someone who had come from Fort Bragg, NC, and was good at her job. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also mentioned CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had been late to the deployment as she had just transferred to Fort Drum, NY, after completing her Officer Advanced Course right before the deployment. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was consequently one of the last of the main-body 2nd BCT personnel to arrive to FOB Hammer due to these circumstances. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated, when asked about CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) apparent reluctance and/or avoidance in speaking with CID and the military prosecutors in regard to this investigation, that CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) always seemed nervous and/or anxious, and believed because PFC MANNING had reportedly shown her the Apache air-strike video which had been published on the Internet and that she was the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the SCIF when all of these issues came to light – CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was probably even more guarded now. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said sometime in January 2010, PFC MANNING was being counseled by SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) for having been late

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

30 Dec 10

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

to work for his assigned shift in the SCIF. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was not present when the incident occurred, but it was later reported to him that PFC MANNING got upset during the counseling session and subsequently flipped a table containing computers and/or other items. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) dealt with this incident immediately, and that MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) later counseled PFC MANNING because of the incident. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) went on to mention the incident involving PFC MANNING punching SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) while in the SCIF, which occurred while CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had been on his own mid-tour leave. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that upon returning from leave, he counseled MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) on the issue of PFC MANNING's behavior problems and began to initiate action in relation to PFC MANNING being removed from the SCIF and subsequent measures to suspend PFC MANNING's security clearance. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said as a result of the incident involving SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING was transferred into the supply section of the unit. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he did not find out until later that the supply section also had a SIPR network computer, and that PFC MANNING's access to SIPR computers should have been terminated earlier than it was. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he knew MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had prepared three Memorandums For Record (MFRs) to document behavioral issues of PFC MANNING, and that CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had retained copies of these documents. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated these MFR's had been created at or shortly after the occurrences mentioned in each MFR. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also stated he was aware PFC MANNING had been counseled prior to deployment and was getting some form of help. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said that even though PFC MANNING was having issues, he was still good at being a 'Data Manager' while in Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) added that PFC MANNING was bad at briefing intelligence information as PFC MANNING had a nervous stutter, and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed PFC MANNING had problems in talking in front of other people to include his peers. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) remarked PFC MANNING did not appear to handle stress very well, in that PFC MANNING gave the impression he thought others were asking too much from him; although CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he did not feel PFC MANNING was given difficult taskings. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related once PFC MANNING was transferred to work in the supply section after the incident in which PFC MANNING assaulted SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) which occurred on or about 7 May 10, PFC MANNING's intelligence analysis work was completed by SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and/or SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) when asked whether his unit was adequately resourced to achieve the unit's mission, related the situation was manageable, but the unit could have used two or three more Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated, when asked if he believed his unit would have received a replacement for a 35F Intelligence Analyst if one was lost during the deployment, that he did not believe the unit would have received a backfill for any lost analyst personnel during the deployment. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further provided details in regard to the organizational structure of the personnel who worked in the SCIF. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not immediately provide any additional information pertinent to this investigation or PFC MANNING.

//////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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30 Dec 10

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

Between 1125 and 1530, 2 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA, . During visiting hours, PFC MANNING had two visitors, Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and her son, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) visited with PFC MANNING for approximately 28 minutes.

About 1235, 3 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one CD which captured the recording of PFC MANNING's 2 Jan 11 visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico. The collection was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 001-11. ///LAST ENTRY///.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

3 Jan 11

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1510, 3 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, traveled to the residence of Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) located at (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed that SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) wanted to search her residence for any cameras that PFC MANNING had stored at her residence. Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was also informed that the cameras would be tested to see if they were used to produce pictures that had been recovered on a prior search. Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) agreed to let SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) search the residence for PFC MANNING's cameras.

About 1542, 3 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) obtained Consent to Search from Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) authorizing a search of her residence for any cameras that PFC MANNING may have stored there. (See Consent to Search)

About 1552, 3 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) located a Kodak EasyShare digital camera, plastic and metal construction, gray and silver in color, serial number "KCKDC42407837", in unknown working condition. The camera was located in a cardboard box along with miscellaneous cords and audio equipment on a shelf of a wardrobe, located on the right side (as you walk in) of the basement. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) the location of the Nikon camera and bag she had identified as belonging to PFC MANNING on a prior visit. Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that she last saw the camera prior to Christmas in the basement. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) continued to search the basement with assistance from (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) but the camera was not located at that time. Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) contacted her son Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) by telephone who related the camera was now in his bedroom, under his bed. Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) went to the bedroom and retrieved and camera bag and turned it over to SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

About 1630, 3 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) inventoried the contents of the bag and found one Nikon D-40 digital camera, plastic and metal construction, black in color, serial number "3448911", in unknown working condition. Also found in the bag was a Nikon battery charger, a spare Nikon camera battery, a receipt for the purchase of the camera at the Fort Drum Post Exchange (PX), a Trailways Bus receipt for \$99.90, dated 26 Nov 2008, issued for travel from Watertown, NY to Washington DC for Manning, Bradley and two books from Nikon.

Between 1552 and 1647, 3 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one Kodak EasyShare DX7630 digital camera, serial number KCKDC42407837; one Nikon D40 digital camera, serial number 3448911; one Nikon Quick Charger MH-23, serial number 0710043406G; one Nikon Lithium Ion Battery, serial number 817A; one AAFES receipt dated 14 Sep 08; one Adirondack Trailways receipt dated 26 Nov 08; one book "The Nikon Guide to Digital Photography With the D40 Digital Camera"; one book "Nikon School, Guide to Digital SLR Photography"; and one Nikon camera bag, from Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) residence. The collection was documented on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number 002-11.///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

3 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

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001702

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date: <b>3 JAN 11</b>		<b>Consent To Search</b> (USACIDC Supplement 1 to AR 190-22)		Time: <b>1542</b>
1. Name of person consenting to the search: <b>MRS (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</b>		2. Organization and location: <b>N.A.</b>		
3. I have been informed by the undersigned USACIDC Special Agent that an inquiry is being conducted in connection with the following possible violation(s) of law: <b>18 USC 1030 UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS</b>				
4. I have been requested by the undersigned USACIDC Special Agent to give my consent to a search of my person, premises, or property as indicated below. I have been advised of my right to refuse a search of my person, premises, or property. (If you <u>do not</u> give your consent, do not sign this form.)				
5. I hereby authorize the undersigned USACIDC Special Agent and/or other Authorized Law Enforcement Officials assisting the undersigned USACIDC Special Agent to conduct a search of: (initial and sign applicable blocks)				
a.	My Person	Initials	Signature <b>N.A.</b>	
b.	My Quarters	Initials	Signature <b>N.A.</b>	
Located At:				
c.	My Vehicle	Initials	Signature	
Located At:				
Described As:				
d.	Other	Initials <b>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</b>	Signature <b>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</b>	
Located At: <b>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</b>				
Described As: <b>RESIDENCE OF MRS (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</b>				
I am authorizing the above search(s) for the following general types of property which may be removed by the authorized law enforcement personnel and retained as evidence under the provisions of Army Regulation 195-5, or other applicable laws or regulations:				
<b>PFC MANNING'S CAMERAS</b>				
6. This written permission is given to the undersigned USACIDC Special Agent freely, voluntarily and without threats or promises of any kind:				
<b>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</b>		Signature of Person Granting Consent		
SA. <b>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</b>	<b>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</b>		SA. <b>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</b>	(available)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1120, 5 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NMN) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, 10112 4th Armored Division Drive, Fort Drum, NY 13602, as he was identified as the Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) of the 2nd BCT Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) while in Iraq and was noted to have had numerous interactions with PFC MANNING by other personnel interviewed. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated, when asked about memorandums he had authored documenting behavioral incidents PFC MANNING presented both before and during PFC MANNING's deployment to Iraq, that he had indeed created these documents. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related the memorandums he had prepared related to incidents involving PFC MANNING were created at or immediately after these incidents involving PFC MANNING occurred. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained the purpose of this documentation was not to protect himself or other members of the unit at a later time, but was created for the purpose of allowing PFC MANNING's mental health providers to see what type of incidents PFC MANNING was involved so that they could get a full appreciation for any behavioral problems he may be experiencing. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not provide any additional information as CID and SJA personnel present were satisfied by his response and did not have any further questions for MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) at this time.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** It was noted by CID investigators and SJA personnel currently involved in this investigation that MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) documentation of incidents involving PFC MANNING were very thorough and consequently somewhat unusual to have been created at the time these incidents took place. Based on the circumstances involved in this investigation it was suspected this documentation may have been created subsequent to the initiation of the criminal investigation involving PFC MANNING's activities and alleged unlawful disclosure of Classified U.S. Government materials. Based on the statements made by MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) in addition to further interviews of other personnel who described MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) leadership style and confirmed MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) nature to document incidents like those involving PFC MANNING - the explanation provided by MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) appeared to be reasonable. At the time of this interview a full review of PFC MANNING's medical and/or mental health records had not been conducted due to on-going discussions regarding the legal process for obtaining access to PFC MANNING's records.

//////////////////// **LAST ENTRY** //////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGN

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

5 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1138, 5 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office; CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both of the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington, Fort McNair, D.C. 20024, interviewed CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) S-2X section, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Fort Drum, NY 13602, who related he arrived at the brigade in Aug 09 and did not know PFC MANNING well. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING worked in the fusion cell during the unit's deployment to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, which occurred prior to the deployment to Iraq. He recalled an incident in which PFC MANNING looked visibly upset. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) pulled PFC MANNING aside, spoke with him, then referred the matter to PFC MANNING's Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) support chain.

CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not have a lot of interaction with PFC MANNING and did not participate in any training with him. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recalled receiving Information Assurance and Operations Security training; however, he stated there was no training on Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) procedures. During the deployment, CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recalled receiving one day of foreign disclosure training from a team that came to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer to conduct the training.

CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that PFC MANNING worked the night shift. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not notice anything abnormal about PFC MANNING's visits with the Signals Intelligence personnel, who were co-located in the SCIF. According to CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) analysts visiting web sites on Afghanistan would be unusual but not unheard of. Regarding the use of CDs within the SCIF, CW2 stated that documents releasable to the Iraqis were regularly transferred to them on CDs.

CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that PFC MANNING was "such a loner" and "socially weird," though he noted that PFC MANNING was good at his job and was computer savvy. According to CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING never left the FOB.

///LAST ITEM///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		DATE 5 Jan 11	EXHIBIT 277

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1330, 5 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NMN) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) B Company, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB), 10124 4<sup>th</sup> Armored Division Drive, Fort Drum, NY 13602, as she was identified as having initially been assigned as the Security Manager and Assistant S-2 for Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, but later worked as an Intelligence Analyst while at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq with PFC MANNING. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that in April 2009, she was initially the Security Manager and Assistant S-2 assigned to HHC, 2nd BCT; however when deployed to Iraq 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she worked mostly as an Intelligence Analyst focused on Sunni Groups operating in Iraq. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related prior to the deployment to Iraq, the S-2 Section consisted of: MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI), who left prior to the deployment; MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C); SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING; CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who left before the deployment and was replaced by CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she attended the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation at Fort Polk, LA that the 2nd BCT went on in July 2009; and that PFC MANNING had also gone to JRTC during this training rotation. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained PFC MANNING used the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network a few times after the JRTC rotation and before the deployment to Iraq, in preparation for their unit's deployment. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING's work on the SIPR network would have included work related to Iraqi information briefs and data relating to Sunni and Shia Groups in Iraq. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) was not used by their unit while at Fort Drum. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING was very good at certain portions of his job and/or computers, and mentioned PFC MANNING taught her how to use more advanced functions of Microsoft Excel. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was shown by PFC MANNING how to put together link diagrams. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reiterated PFC MANNING was good at computers and would help people in using various software applications such as ArcGIS, PowerPoint, and Excel. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she did not believe PFC MANNING was a good analyst although she didn't work with him directly and stated different people had different opinions of PFC MANNING's abilities. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained she remembered an incident where PFC MANNING froze and/or was unable to speak for approximately two or three minutes during a briefing he was giving to a group of personnel in their unit; however, 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING did not have a problem talking with people individually. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related taskings for intelligence products would initially come from MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and then later CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who arrived in Iraq about two months into their unit's deployment. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) aid taskings would generally involve the use of Google on the SIPR network and other systems for answering the 5 W's (Who, What, Where, Why, and When) of a given issue. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she did not use the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Afghanistan data; she was not aware of the Net Centric Diplomacy database operated by the U.S. State Department; but did mention that a CIA website/system would publish Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reports she would use. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she received Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) training while in Iraq along with the other soldiers in her unit. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related this training was provided from the division (1st Armored Division) the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT reported to, and believed the

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

5 Jan 11

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

trainers for this course were Air Force personnel. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said personnel who completed this course should have been issued a certificate showing their completion of the training. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) were certified as FDO's. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related during conversations she had with PFC MANNING, he mentioned having been homeless at one point prior to joining the U.S. Army and claimed to have lived in his car at O'Hare International Airport in the Chicago, IL area. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said that based on statements PFC MANNING had said, she thought he was knowledgeable about the stock market, and that PFC MANNING had also mentioned having come from a broken home. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained a situation while in Iraq wherein PFC MANNING received a small television which had reportedly been sent to him by his father. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) remembered PFC MANNING was trying to give the television away as he apparently didn't want any gifts from his father. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING mentioned having visited the Washington, DC area a lot, that he was a Democrat, and he would meet political figures while in Washington, DC; however, 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) thought PFC MANNING may have been exaggerating. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained upon deploying to Iraq, she felt PFC MANNING had started to become more angry, whereupon 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned an incident where PFC MANNING had flipped a table while in the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) they worked in. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also mentioned an incident where PFC MANNING started yelling for some reason, and that MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was involved in this incident. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained another situation in which MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) knew of PFC MANNING being in a supply room and that PFC MANNING was reportedly just rocking back and forth for what she believed was over an hour. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she believed PFC MANNING associated with SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and that the two of them would often go to lunch together. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about the change in S-2 Section leadership during the deployment, that MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was the S-2 Officer at the beginning of the deployment, was very smart but did not communicate his thoughts well. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was consequently moved out of his position as the S-2 Officer during the unit's deployment in Iraq. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained while on her mid-tour leave, which she took from late March to mid April 2010, she saw the Apache video involved in this investigation on television and/or in the news media; however 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained she believed she had seen this video prior to it being released by the media. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she does not remember PFC MANNING's reaction to either the Apache video or its release by the media. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who arrived in Iraq at the same time as CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was the SCIF Night Shift Officer in Charge (OIC), but he was reassigned in January or February of 2010, to another unit within the 2nd BCT. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that after CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reassignment, his duties as the OIC of the Night Shift in the SCIF were assumed by MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about something mentioned by PFC MANNING in his Internet chat conversations about the reported arrest of Iraqi civilians for distributing political leaflets, that PFC MANNING never left FOB Hammer aside from taking his mid-tour leave. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said the issue of soldiers leaving the FOB was an ongoing argument within the unit as some personnel believed the soldiers should get out to see Iraqis and/or Iraq in order to know what was going on in the country; however, 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related generally the soldiers in her unit never left FOB Hammer. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained she would travel to other FOB's two or three times a week in order to meet with other units and/or Iraqi personnel, but this travel to the other FOB's was by helicopter. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further explained she did not know or remember any incidents

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGN

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

5 Jan 11

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

involving Iraqis being arrested in regard to printed propaganda material. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she was puzzled about why PFC MANNING wasn't removed from the SCIF after previous behavior incidents occurred with SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was one of PFC MANNING's supervisors, as well as incidents involving MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he would take care of incidents involving PFC MANNING, but 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed PFC MANNING was probably allowed latitude regarding his behavior due to his computer abilities and the man-power of the SCIF. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related around the December 2009 timeframe is when she noticed PFC MANNING's attitude change, but could not explain or identify any specific reason for change in his behavior. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING seemed more isolated while on the deployment. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related a situation that was told to her by another soldier in which PFC MANNING was on Temporary Duty (TDY) in the Washington, DC area prior to the deployment to Iraq, and was reportedly seen kissing a male civilian in front of the hotel PFC MANNING and other soldiers were staying. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related this information was mentioned to her by SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) but couldn't be sure of the truthfulness of this information as SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was himself involved in disciplinary/integrity issues after reportedly having worn a Special Forces tab on his uniform which he was not authorized. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained, when asked about removable media being present in the SCIF, that rewritable optical media (CDs and DVDs) had been in the SCIF as their unit produced intelligence products which were later releasable to Iraqi Army personnel as part of an on-going partnered training mission of her unit's Iraqi counterparts. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about documents related to SCIF procedures, that she had never seen a SCIF Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), and that after the investigation involving PFC MANNING began, 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had searched for a SCIF SOP. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not immediately provide additional information relating to this investigation.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** All personnel, unless otherwise mentioned, were assigned to the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division during the deployment of PFC MANNING's former unit in Iraq. Incidents involving PFC MANNING's behavioral outbursts have generally been acknowledged in other documents and interviews and the mentioned incidents by 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) match previously identified incidents. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she remembered the details of PFC MANNING saying he lived in a car in the Chicago, IL area as she is originally from this same area; further this information was also substantiated by interviews of PFC MANNING's family members. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noted that during forensic examinations of computers used by PFC MANNING, documents related to an Article 15 which SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received while in Iraq for the unauthorized wear of a Special Forces Tab on his Army Combat Uniform (ACU) were found on the SIPR network computer used by PFC MANNING. It is unknown why these disciplinary documents would have been present on a computer used by PFC MANNING and associated with PFC MANNING's user profile. It is suspected these documents may have been contained in a shared network folder PFC MANNING accessed. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not identify whether 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ever found a SCIF SOP.

//////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

5 Jan 11

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1613, 5 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, 10112 4th Armored Division Drive, Fort Drum, NY 13602, as he was identified as the Assistant S-6 Officer and was one of the personnel involved in the initial response to PFC MANNING's alleged unlawful disclosure of Classified U.S. Government materials while his unit was deployed to Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was a 'late deployer' to Iraq as he had arrived to the unit at Fort Drum on 1 Oct 09, approximately eleven days before the unit's deployment to Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked who would have created accounts, to include PFC MANNING's network accounts, that CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) the 2nd BCT Systems Tech, would have created these accounts. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related a signed user agreement for each user was required prior to either a Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) and/or Non-secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) network account being created for each user. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained after PFC MANNING was apprehended CID investigators asked for the user agreement related to PFC MANNING's account; however, this user agreement could not be found. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained PFC MANNING's user agreement was not the only one missing and he did not feel there was any type of suspicious actions involved in relation to this missing paperwork. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he may have other previous copies of user agreements and/or blank and signed versions of the same agreement PFC MANNING would have signed; and that he would attempt to provide these agreements to investigators for review of the language contained in them. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) aid, when asked about computers that CID had previously collected as evidence, that CID had not collected: the unit's SharePoint server containing SharePoint related data; a SQL database server which runs the backend for the SharePoint system; and the Microsoft Exchange e-mail servers used by the unit. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related while he was deployed in Iraq he was generally concerned about three things: security, stability, and survivability of their network and computer systems. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about security permissions on shared folders, that he was advised by the S-6 Officer to not change security permissions on shared folders and/or other resources as open or less restrictive permissions helped in the sharing of information amongst 2nd BCT personnel. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further identified the S-6 Officer during the deployment as MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he arrived at FOB Hammer the day after the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) process was completed, arriving on approximately 14 Nov 09. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained, when asked about what networking and computer equipment his unit had brought with them, that the "T-Drive" was in existence when his unit arrived and had reportedly been there prior to the arrival of the unit they were relieving (3rd BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further explained other computers and network equipment was brought with the 2nd BCT for the deployment. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the 2nd BCT SharePoint server and/or associated portal site was not open to access outside the 2nd BCT with the exception of the period when the 2nd BCT was being relieved by the unit which took over FOB Hammer (the 1st BCT of the 3rd Infantry Division) when the 10th Mountain departed Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated, when asked about access to the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) network on FOB Hammer, that FOB Hammer did not have JWICS access. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he knew this for a fact as providing this type of network connection

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

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U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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access and/or bandwidth would have been his job. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did however explain FOB Hammer did have access to the National Security Agency Network (NSANet). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not know PFC MANNING at all and only saw PFC MANNING for the first time when he was being removed from the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided a personal observation in that PFC MANNING was probably a smart kid; however, what he did was not 'rocket science'. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related all computers on both the SIPR and NIPR networks used a username and password as a logon mechanism; versus using Common Access Cards (CAC) for logging in. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said, when asked about why computers forensically examined during this investigation may have numerous user profiles present within the operating system, that the process for imaging computers (installing the required operating system and software on the computer) was to first identify the brand and model of the computer which needed to be imaged. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related personnel in his section would then find the same brand and model of computer, matching the computer to be imaged, which already had the current software versions and up-to-date patches installed. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated S-6 personnel would use the updated computer as the basis for creating a new hard drive image. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained it was this newly created image that would then be used for imaging any computers of that make and model which required imaging. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said this process saved a lot of time compared to trying to create hard drive images from scratch and may explain why so many user profiles were on various computers examined during this investigation. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further explained profiles belonging to personnel in his office could be fairly easily identified as these profile names would have started with the name "admin" at the beginning of the user profile name. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further explained that due to the nature of the communications while his unit was in Iraq, most users had a SIPR network computer (versus NIPR network computer), which may have explained why a SIPR network computer was located in the HHC, 2nd BCT Supply Section. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not immediately provide any additional information pertinent to this investigation.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** All personnel, unless otherwise mentioned, were assigned to the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division during the deployment of PFC MANNING's former unit in Iraq.

//////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1715, 5 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), this office, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, 10112 4th Armored Division Road, Fort Drum, NY 13602, as he was identified as PFC MANNING's Company Commander at the time PFC MANNING was apprehended by CID in Iraq on or about 27 May 10. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he arrived at Fort Drum in June 2009, from Fort Bliss, TX and that he was an Air Defense Artillery Officer. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he took command of HHC, 2nd BCT, which was his first command, in April 2010; which was approximately four weeks prior to issues involving PFC MANNING first came to his attention. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated his first time interacting with PFC MANNING was during his reading of PFC MANNING's Article 15 to PFC MANNING. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he was scheduled to take command of HHC, 2nd BCT, but due to numerous property book issues involving the unit, this change of command was postponed several times in order to allow the property book issues to be corrected. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said the amount of property book accountability concerns were in excess of \$3.1 million dollars worth of property. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained the aforementioned property book issues took up a majority of his time and attention prior to him assuming command. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the previous Company Commander of HHC, 2nd BCT, MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) finished his command on-time, after serving 12 months in command. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) added this was not a situation in which the previous commander was being relieved of duty. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the incident where PFC MANNING assaulted SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) while in the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer occurred the first week of May 2010. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related as a result of this incident he was advised by MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that PFC MANNING no longer needed to be working in the SCIF. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said that consequently arrangements were made to have PFC MANNING transferred to working in the HHC Supply Section. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the circumstances of PFC MANNING's behavioral issues were not completely known by him, but if PFC MANNING had problems as mentioned to him by other personnel, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained his intended course of action was to pursue chapter (discharge) action with PFC MANNING upon completing the Article 15 process. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not remember telling PFC MANNING whether he was going to be chaptered from the U.S. Army, but CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned he had directed the HHC Supply Sergeant to begin making appointments for PFC MANNING to obtain a physical(s) and to conduct other required chapter process activities. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the mental health paperwork he received regarding PFC MANNING did not really say much detail in regard to PFC MANNING's behavioral issues; however, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING had a thick company-level personnel file which contained various documents. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further provided CID investigators the opportunity to review the documents contained in PFC MANNING's personal file. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said, in his opinion, MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) tried to help soldiers and gave them multiple chances; however, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said it seemed a little shocking about PFC MANNING's behavioral issues at the time PFC MANNING received an Article 15, that more serious disciplinary actions had not been taken prior to that time. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about personnel who may have more information regarding PFC MANNING, that the previous HHC, 2nd BCT

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First Sergeant prior to him taking command was 1SG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who had been reassigned to Fort Polk, LA. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there was also MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was the First Sergeant after 1SG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was now working in the 2nd BCT, S-3 Section. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also mentioned, when asked about an Equal Opportunity (EO) complaint that had been lodged during the time his unit was deployed to Iraq, that he did not know the details of that EO complaint; but felt the EO Representative from that time, SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) may be able to provide additional information regarding the complaint and/or its resolution. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he believed SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had transferred to another assignment in England several weeks ago. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had learned from another soldier in the unit, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that three out of the four male soldiers working in the SCIF had behavioral issues during the unit's deployment to Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related these personnel included SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and PFC MANNING. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related one of the personnel, SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was presently incarcerated due to other criminal issues. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not immediately provide any additional information pertinent to this investigation.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** All personnel, unless otherwise mentioned, were assigned to the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division during the deployment of PFC MANNING's former unit in Iraq. Given the nature of the HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT as a company level element, noting that CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reportedly only held a Secret level security clearance, and the timing of CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) having taken command of PFC MANNING's unit; it appears unlikely CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would have been in a position to have known detailed information about PFC MANNING's behavioral issues prior to the initiation of this investigation and/or that CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would have had limited knowledge of day-to-day issues occurring with the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT SCIF which are central to this investigation. Further checks related to SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) revealed he was currently incarcerated by local civilian authorities in the Fort Drum, NY area, and was pending a criminal trial in relation to the offense of Reckless Endangerment – 2<sup>nd</sup> Degree, involving his dependent infant child, which is further documented in USACIDC Report of Investigation file 0365-10-CID452-19643.

//////////////////// **LAST ENTRY** //////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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## DETAILS

About 1013, 6 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both of the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington, Fort McNair, D.C. 20024, interviewed CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (formerly (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Assistant S-2, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Fort Drum, NY 13602. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she arrived to the unit just prior to the deployment and was assigned as the assistant S-2. During the two weeks prior to the deployment, there was minimal Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) access, and she went to 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY 13602, to get a "picture of the enemy." The analysts in the S-2 section pointed to PFC MANNING as someone who knew what was going on. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that her initial impression of PFC MANNING was of a motivated analyst; however, she later noted that PFC MANNING's analysis missed the "so what" factor. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she subsequently used PFC MANNING for computer specific tasks at which he excelled, and she once sent him over to "plans" to help them with a computer issue and to make a program work. According to CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING's work product was good when he was given a specific task to do.

CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she deployed with the "trail" element and arrived at Forward Operating Base Hammer about the time of Transfer of Authority (TOA), which occurred on 15 Nov 09; however, she was originally supposed to be there on 15 Oct 09. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was assigned as S-2 Plans in the Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) until the S-2 was replaced by CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY 13602, who was "thrown into" the S-2 position. At that time, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she became the Assistant S-2 and continued on in S-2 Plans until Feb 10.

CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that PFC MANNING was an all source analyst focused on the Shia threat groups and assigned to the night shift. According to CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING's duties included "pulling names" in response to Requests For Information (RFI) received by the day shift. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) clarified that "pulling names" equaled receiving a report and pulling other reports for additional information on name(s) included in the report. According to CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) the intel analysts used the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) -Iraq database but had no need to use CIDNE-Afghanistan, with the exception of use for personal or professional development. The analysts also used QueryTree, which permitted SIPRNET searches using Boolean logic. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the S-2 section might have used the State Department's Net-Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database, and she would have encouraged its use for review of information originating from the U.S. Embassy Baghdad, particularly during the elections in Mar 10.

CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING asked her questions about Afghanistan, ostensibly because she had previously deployed there. Further, PFC MANNING pulled up at least one paper or article on Afghanistan in response to their conversations. Although this did not specifically further the 2nd BCT mission, she viewed it as professional development and thought "more people should be interested." CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she never saw any classified documents relating to Guantanamo Bay detainees in the brigade area.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

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CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related unit members could access other unit's Sharepoint portals, and she had used Sharepoint portals at the corps and possibly the division levels. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noted that information sharing was required to fulfill their mission. She also noted that CD burning was permitted as there was a requirement to share information with their Iraqi counterparts.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

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## DETAILS

About 1704 6 Jan 11 SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office; and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned to Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington, Fort McNair, DC 20024, interviewed SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) S-2 section, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Fort Drum, NY 13602. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she arrived at the unit on 28 Apr 08. According to SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING arrived at the unit in Aug 08, and she knew him as "Brad." Prior to the deployment, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she often gave PFC MANNING rides to Syracuse, NY, or to the bus station. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that during one trip to Syracuse, PFC MANNING picked up a "Zip Car" near Syracuse University. According to SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING told her he had friends in Boston, MA, and Washington, DC. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING told her about his boyfriend (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and that he associated with Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) students. According to SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING enjoyed talking to students at MIT, and others, and was pleased when he influenced someone to change their opinion because he felt they were better informed. He also stated he got beat up in school because he was a "scrawny little gay dude." SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as more "vibrant" when he went out. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that she listened to PFC MANNING and believes that is why he talked to her.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related during the Easter weekend of 2009, she accompanied PFC MANNING to the DC area, and PFC MANNING took her to the mall where he previously worked, the Starbucks where he had worked, and his neighborhood (his aunt's neighborhood in MD). SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING told her he went to functions in DC that certain famous people also attended; however, she was not sure if he actually attended the functions or simply went to the same locations where the functions were being held. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she took his claims "with a grain of salt." She further observed that PFC MANNING invested his money.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING often talked about computer programming and politics. He thought Mac computers were better; i.e., more secure from worms and viruses and had fewer "loopholes." PFC MANNING told her about being able to hide files and that he could make a second hard drive that was hidden. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also recalled PFC MANNING mentioning Zoosk (an online dating service) and Facebook (a social networking web site) and that he was once a paid employee of Zodo.

AGENT'S COMMENT: The second hard drive may refer to a Macintosh "disk image", which is a file that can be mounted like a virtual hard drive.

Regarding politics, PFC MANNING often discussed homosexuals in the military, and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed that he referenced an article that Secretary of State Hillary CLINTON wrote on the subject. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further described PFC MANNING as "fast-track" and "high speed" and that he wanted to be in the middle of everything. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING told her he was unofficially diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). SPC

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) observed that PFC MANNING was never wrong and would argue or leave a discussion. He also did not like criticism, and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she witnessed this behavior at work.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she completed annual Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army (SAEDA) and Operations Security (OPSEC) training during the winter of 2008. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not recall any formal training on Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) operations and related it was mostly on the job training. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as the "go to guy" for Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) information prior to deployment. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she utilized the SIPRNET about once a week prior to deployment, whereas PFC MANNING utilized the SIPRNET every day or every other day. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also noted that MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) S-2 Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC), HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, Fort Drum, NY 13602, was responsible for inspecting SCIFs and arms rooms within the brigade.

Further, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING had some behavioral incident prior to the deployment where he "spazzed out" or had a "hissy fit". SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed these incidents occurred with MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and possibly with another Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) and that there were at least two separate incidents; however, she did not think he was punished (by Article 15) for the incidents.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that during the deployment, PFC MANNING had a problem with taking too many smoke breaks and instead of going to breakfast, he would sometimes go back to his Containerized Housing Unit (CHU); she believed to check email. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned an incident during a shift change briefing when PFC MANNING froze with a pointer in his hand, which she had never seen before.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noted that after PFC MANNING returned from Environmental and Morale Leave (EML), he became more isolated, more weird, and paranoid, and "acted like he was always up to something." She noted he was also upset about (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noted PFC MANNING told her something was going to happen to him and that his career was ending, which she thought at the time related to him either "coming out or being found out." PFC MANNING showed her another Soldier's chapter paperwork that he pulled from the shared drive in the SJA or Commander's folder, which he was interested in because of his own situation. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she started distancing herself from him because she had other "drama" in her life.

Regarding her duties in Iraq, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she used the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE)-Iraq but had no use for CIDNE-Afghanistan. Further, she used Intelink occasionally, as well as Query Tree, and she possibly visited the CIA web site (i.e. Worldbook) for documents related to the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT area of operations. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) no recollection of using the State Department's Net-Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database. Regarding Query Tree and CIDNE, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related a Comma Separated Value (CSV) file could be exported from Query Tree and CIDNE, and she was taught the difference between CSV and EXCEL files during Distributed Common Ground System training and by PFC MANNING.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she never saw the Apache video in the SCIF, although there were music and movies on that drive. Further, neither she nor PFC MANNING ever left the Forward Operating Base, and although she had requested to, MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would not permit it. Regarding the arrest of civilians for distributing propaganda (which PFC MANNING claimed in online chats to have been a precipitating factor in his disclosures), SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) speculated PFC MANNING might have picked up the information on NIPRNET or SIPRNET after his return from EML. Although SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING's alleged disclosures as "stupid," she believed he had the technical skills to do it.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

282

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 1428, 6 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 4th Battalion/31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, 10230 North Riva Ridge Loop, Fort Drum, NY 13602 (formerly assigned to HHC, 2nd BCT), as he was identified as having worked with PFC MANNING and as having been the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) Night Shift Officer in Charge (OIC) while in Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he got to Fort Drum, NY in October 2009, after having finished his Officer Advanced Course. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was supposed to have become the S-2X within the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT; however, he was instead assigned to be the Night Shift Officer in Charge (OIC) within the SCIF while at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he arrived in Kuwait and was delayed approximately three weeks before being able to get to FOB Hammer. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he arrived at FOB Hammer about the middle to end of November 2009. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained his arrival was after the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) process had been completed with the previous unit, the 3rd BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was at FOB Hammer until 1 Jan 10, whereupon he was reassigned to the 4th Battalion/31st Infantry Regiment which was based at Combat Out Post (COP) Carver – where CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) became the Battalion S-2 Officer. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related when he arrived at FOB Hammer he began working with CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who he described as working multiple positions within the unit. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he also worked in the SCIF with PFC MANNING and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related several personal observations he made about personnel working in the SCIF, in that he described them as 'whining and crying' and that it was not just PFC MANNING who was complaining. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related his previous deployment in Iraq with an infantry unit and compared that with the situation in the SCIF, in that during his previous deployment the conditions were much more difficult. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he felt PFC MANNING was good at his job; however, PFC MANNING should not have been a soldier as he seemed to act like a child. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained you could not demand things from PFC MANNING as he had a 'soft skin' and was not receptive to commands. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also mentioned PFC MANNING having several outbursts while working in the SCIF. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned he was impressed with PFC MANNING's computer skills. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he believed PFC MANNING tried to avoid him because CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) tended to ask a lot of questions to understand how the SCIF functioned. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) subsequently theorized PFC MANNING may have felt these questions were an interruption from his work and would cause him to get frustrated. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained at shift change briefings PFC MANNING would choke in front of other personnel while providing briefings in a group setting. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he was in the SCIF during the incident where PFC MANNING flipped over a desk containing computer equipment. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as a 'weird kid', but noted that PFC MANNING did not act out in front of him. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained PFC MANNING may have been selective as to who he acted out in front of; although CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not identify a reason for PFC MANNING's pattern of behavioral problems. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related people in the SCIF otherwise got along well. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not have any interaction with PFC MANNING outside of the SCIF and that he believed PFC MANNING would associate with SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not elaborate on the nature of SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and/or SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) association with PFC MANNING.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

283

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001718

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he was supposed to be replaced by 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) as the Night Shift OIC within the SCIF. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about additional briefings and training he received, that he was 'read-on' for access to classified materials upon arriving in Iraq; however, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he did not remember receiving any Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) training. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about an incident in which PFC MANNING mentioned Iraqis being arrested for distributing printed materials containing propaganda, that PFC MANNING did not leave FOB Hammer during the time CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was assigned there and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) not remember any incidents involving the arrest of Iraqi civilians. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that within the unit there was an argument about whether analysts should be given the opportunity to leave the FOB and interact with personnel outside their unit and/or Iraqis while deployed. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated analysts did not leave FOB Hammer for mission related duties during the time he was assigned there. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he never saw PFC MANNING use the CIDNE database in any way he thought was unusual. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained the CIDNE data related to Afghanistan was not looked at unless people were bored. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he personally used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "WIRE" website, but did not remember using the U.S. State Department Net-Centric Diplomacy database for accessing State Department cables. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he personally would not have looked at any documents relating to Guantanamo Bay detainees while in Iraq and that he could not provide any information as to the sites or systems PFC MANNING may have used while in Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said when he heard of the incidents and/or investigation involving PFC MANNING he was surprised, but he related the allegations were believable. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not immediately provide any additional information related to this investigation.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** All personnel, unless otherwise mentioned, were assigned to the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division during the deployment of PFC MANNING's former unit in Iraq. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) made the comment that PFC MANNING was a non-smoker, which was in sharp contrast to numerous other personnel interviewed who made specific comments about PFC MANNING having been what many personnel described as a frequent smoker. Further, based on this statement by CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), it is believed his knowledge of PFC MANNING was limited to his time within the SCIF with PFC MANNING as he stated. Due to the timing of CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) arrival to FOB Hammer and his reassignment to COP Carver, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would have only likely have worked with PFC MANNING at FOB Hammer for about four to six weeks.

//////////////////////////////////// **LAST ENTRY** //////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE 6 Jan 11	EXHIBIT 283	

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1528, 6 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) B Company, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB), 10124 4th Armored Division Drive, Fort Drum, NY 13602 (formerly SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) as he was identified as having known PFC MANNING while they were both assigned at Fort Drum and they worked together during their unit's deployment to Iraq. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he arrived at Fort Drum in November 2007, and that his most recent deployment to Iraq was his first. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he initially met PFC MANNING in a smoking area outside their barracks building on Fort Drum, and remembered PFC MANNING seemed to be interested in talking about U.S. politics at the time. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he later went to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, LA for the second time in July 2009, and during this rotation at JRTC, PFC MANNING and himself worked opposite shifts. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he generally only saw PFC MANNING at handoff meetings during their time at JRTC. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained while at JRTC, PFC MANNING was the person who was in charge of making sure all the computers worked and that PFC MANNING was very good with computers. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he is not a 'computer guy' and didn't know much about computer systems beyond operating them. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also mentioned having attended a Distributed Common Ground System - Army (DCGS-A) course with PFC MANNING on Fort Drum prior to the deployment to Iraq. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he didn't interact with PFC MANNING prior to their unit's deployment to Iraq with the exception of the times mentioned, and those interactions were somewhat limited. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about what other types of training he remembered receiving prior to deployment, that MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had also given English and/or writing classes to personnel in order to help them in producing their future intelligence products. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he was part of the advance-party from his unit (B Company) which he described as the Military Intelligence Company or "MICO", and that he had departed Fort Drum for Iraq in October 2009; arriving at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer about 14 Oct 09 or 15 Oct 09. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also related he remembered conducting Information Assurance training, when asked about other training he received related to Operational Security (OPSEC) and information handling; however, SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he did not remember whether it was prior to or during the deployment. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related personnel from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 82nd Airborne Division, the unit his unit was replacing, briefed them on the current situation and other useful information upon his arrival at FOB Hammer; but SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated there was no formal training on the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) rules and regulations. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related while in Iraq he worked as an Intelligence Analyst focused on Shia Groups operating in Iraq, and that he primarily worked on the day shift opposite of PFC MANNING, who worked at night. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he went on his mid-tour leave approximately a week after PFC MANNING went on leave around the end of January 2010, but SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not provide any information related to PFC MANNING's leave activities. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING was having outburst problems while in Iraq and mentioned an incident in which PFC MANNING flipped a table containing computer equipment while being counseled by SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was his supervisor at the time. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he also witnessed an incident with PFC MANNING in which MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked PFC MANNING to move a projector screen. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related this caused PFC

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Jan 11

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

MANNING to become upset and walk out of the area. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) went after PFC MANNING and believed MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) verbally counseled PFC MANNING outside; however, SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not witness what happened after PFC MANNING walked out of the building they were in at the time. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he believed other unit members were afraid PFC MANNING might do harm to others. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would task PFC MANNING to do work, but the work often would not get done. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would leave issues involving PFC MANNING up to the Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs) to take care of, but SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) felt that generally, on a nightly basis, assigned tasks were still not getting completed by PFC MANNING. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related although the majority of work was not getting done by PFC MANNING, sometimes PFC MANNING would do something impressive. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he thought PFC MANNING was a good analyst when he wanted to work and that PFC MANNING could do excellent work. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that while conducting intelligence analysis activities in Iraq, he had personally used: IntelLink; QueryTree; ArcGIS; the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) - Iraq database; and generally anywhere else on the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network that was available - such as shared network folders or the SharePoint portals of other U.S. Army units which were accessible. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not use the CIDNE - Afghanistan database; information from U.S. State Department sites; nor did he access any documents related to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay while he was deployed in Iraq. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned remembering an Apache-like video on the 2nd BCT shared network drive which was similar to the video released on the Internet, but SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not make any conclusions as to whether it was the same video. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said, when asked about his office's workflow procedures, that he would get his intelligence analysis taskings from CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) the S-2 Officer, or SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) the S-2 Fusion NCO in charge. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated, when asked about an incident mentioned by PFC MANNING during his Internet chat conversations which discussed Iraqi civilians being arrested in relation to printed materials, that he did not remember any incidents involving Iraqis being arrested in regard to propaganda. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained PFC MANNING did not speak well during the briefings he would have to give at change-over meetings, in that PFC MANNING would stutter and/or have a difficult time in communicating. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING was a "disaster" at briefing others. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) allowed Specialists (Pay Grade E-4) to be in charge at night as both SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and himself were eligible and waiting to be promoted to Sergeant. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained PFC MANNING and himself both used the same computer, a Dell laptop computer, upon first arriving in Iraq and working on opposite shifts of one another. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the computer would work fine for himself, but by the next morning after PFC MANNING had used it, the computer would run slow and would need to be fixed. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING switched to using his own Alienware brand computer at some point during the deployment. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said, when asked about SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that PFC MANNING and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) may have worked together on creating some intelligence products while in Iraq and that he believed SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was also interested in politics. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not elaborate as to whether PFC MANNING and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) may have been friends. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not immediately provide any additional information pertinent to this investigation.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIG

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Jan 11

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

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## DETAILS

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** All personnel, unless otherwise mentioned, were assigned to the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division during the deployment of PFC MANNING's former unit in Iraq. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) personal email address was recently identified as having been hand written on a piece of notebook paper found within a box of PFC MANNING's belongings sent from the Kuwait Theater Confinement Facility (TCF) to PFC MANNING's home of record in Potomac, MD. The aforementioned box was sent as the result of out-processing procedures that occurred upon PFC MANNING's transfer from the Kuwait TCF to the Brig at Quantico, VA. It was further noted that IntelLink, QueryTree, ArcGIS, and CIDNE are all computer software systems or SIPR network-based websites involved in this investigation and are managed by various U.S. Government agencies.

////////////////////////////////// **LAST ENTRY** //////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

284

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001722  
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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROT NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 1842, 6 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) B Company, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB), 10th Mountain Division, 10124 North Riva Ridge Loop, Fort Drum, NY 13602, as he was identified in previous interviews of 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) personnel as being a potential friend and/or associate of PFC MANNING due to his reported technical knowledge of computers. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he'd been assigned to B Company, 2nd BSTB the entire time he was in the 2nd BCT after arriving at Fort Drum May 2008. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related Fort Drum was his second duty assignment in the U.S. Army as he had served a tour in Korea. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he first met PFC MANNING at a rotation to the Joint Training Readiness Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, in June 2008, where the 2nd BCT was training for deploying to Afghanistan. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) analyst during this JRTC rotation. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembered PFC MANNING telling him he was rich and/or had rich parents, and that PFC MANNING had also lived in England. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING seemed to be cocky and was really into knowing what other people were doing and what things were going on. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not know if PFC MANNING was good at his job. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING would ask him various random questions while he was walking into and out of the barracks on Fort Drum. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained this would occur when PFC MANNING was outside smoking cigarettes and usually talking about current events. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he never had any political discussions with PFC MANNING. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had no other interactions with MANNING after JRTC and before the deployment to Iraq. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related while in Iraq PFC MANNING mentioned what SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described as a 'stupid business plan' about creating hash tables. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained the idea PFC MANNING briefly discussed with him was to rewrite a program to essentially reverse engineer hashes in order to identify passwords related to those hashes. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he talked about LM Hashes (sometimes referred to as 'LanMan' or 'LAN Manager' Hashes) with PFC MANNING, but does not remember PFC MANNING asking about specific types of hashes - Message Digest 5 (MD5) or Secure Hashing Algorithm 1 (SHA1) hashes. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING further appeared interested in potentially building a computer to operate this proposed business, wherein people would send passwords and/or hash values for him to figure out how long would take to find the corresponding password or hash value. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told PFC MANNING this had already been done and was not a viable business plan as hash tables were already commercially available and it didn't really make sense as to what PFC MANNING was trying to accomplish. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had no idea why PFC MANNING asked him other than SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) being known as the 'computer guy' within the unit. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned PFC MANNING may have been trying to find someone else interested in the idea and/or PFC MANNING may have thought SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would have volunteered to work on this proposal; however, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not express any interest in the idea. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not talk extensively with PFC MANNING about this idea and in retrospect it was a minor discussion. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING never asked him about other programs for downloading information and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING never gave him the impression PFC MANNING knew anything about programming or scripting knowledge. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he and PFC MANNING sat together at

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

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U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Jan 11

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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## DETAILS

dinner in the dining facility while Iraq several times, but the conversation was otherwise unremarkable. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further recalled a time in which a recruiter at division was trying to recruit people for some type of advanced Information Technology assignment and was handing out a test to be taken by potential applicants. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was accepted to apply after taking a test, which contained questions on computer knowledge, but does not know if PFC MANNING took the test or not. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related a Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) may have more information as to the test and whether PFC MANNING took it. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) again related PFC MANNING seemed to know what he was talking about in regard to computers, but commented that if a person knows this information why would they be talking about it. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he thought PFC MANNING's knowledge of computers was questionable and PFC MANNING may have been trying to impress him. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING seemed like he often tried to impress everyone. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further said PFC MANNING was always intense and very serious. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he'd heard through intelligence channels about what PFC MANNING was alleged to have done in regard to the unlawful disclosure of Classified U.S. Government materials mentioned in this investigation. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he not believe this at first; however after thinking about it, he came to believe PFC MANNING could have done this. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he remembered seeing PFC MANNING with a command prompt window on PFC MANNING's computer screen at some point, but PFC MANNING would 'lock' the computer when others were around so SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he could not see what PFC MANNING was working on. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he believed PFC MANNING could have brought in software tools and/or other items into the SCIF very easily based on the atmosphere in the SCIF, and in a related comment, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mentioned an unidentified person he remembered listening to an iPod while in the SCIF. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he never discussed any scripting or programming with PFC MANNING other than what he has already mentioned. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING was very good with the software application ArcGIS and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had even gone to PFC MANNING to figure out a task using ArcGIS at one point. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he felt PFC MANNING was able to train on the software systems in use within the SCIF all day prior to deployment, whereas SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he was not provided this opportunity in his unit. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related an incident which occurred prior to the parliamentary elections being held in Iraq (the first week of March 2010). SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained PFC MANNING had found a report that apparently upset PFC MANNING. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the information PFC MANNING found in the report related to Iraqis, or possibly some Moroccans, being arrested at a printing press facility. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that attached to the report was some evidence of some type of propaganda which had been collected; however, this information was in Arabic. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related his unit had made a report about foreigners being arrested while he was working in the Current Operations section. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said PFC MANNING came into the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and had apparently had a translation of the evidence document completed by a Category 2 translator, which PFC MANNING showed to SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he read the evidence and essentially said, 'so what?' as the translated message did not seem to be very remarkable at the time. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING was very upset and outraged about the issue. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated in looking back that if there was a moment in which PFC MANNING may have snapped, this would have been it. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained everyone stonewalled PFC MANNING on the issue as no one thought was a big deal. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that according to a

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SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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Wikipedia article on the Internet which has been written since this investigation began, PFC MANNING reportedly told an officer about this report issue. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained the Wikipedia entry that mentioned this incident related PFC MANNING reportedly brought the report to the attention of an Army officer, who reportedly told PFC MANNING to go find some others to arrest. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did not know whether this information posted in the Wikipedia article was true, but suggested this was the type of comment he believed would have been said 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) or possibly CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING never came to him for anything else after this point. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related, when asked about PFC MANNING's abilities in being able to export data from military computer systems, that PFC MANNING was leaps and bounds ahead of him this aspect of working in the SCIF, although SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) admitted he did not have proof of this. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he believed PFC MANNING was trained how to export data as part of PFC MANNING's Advanced Individual Training (AIT) where he was taught Intelligence Analysis techniques; however SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was a different Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) as PFC MANNING and consequently did not learn this while at his own AIT. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING he felt had more book knowledge about computers versus himself, who had more hands-on experience with computers. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained he had never been in PFC MANNING's barracks room while they both resided on Fort Drum, nor had SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ever visited PFC MANNING's Containerized Housing Unit (CHU) while in Iraq. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) made a comment that he believed PFC MANNING was probably using the LINUX operating system on his personal computer, as PFC MANNING seemed like an open-source kind of guy. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he thought everyone had to go through various Operation Security (OPSEC) and/or country briefings while in Kuwait and prior to moving into Iraq. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he noted that PFC MANNING was always drinking Coke when it was available. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) when asked about the Apache video involved in this investigation, related he once searched for and later found a lot of games on the SIPR network, as well as an Apache-like video on the network shared drive after it had been released on Internet. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related other people were talking about the video and believed he found the video in a folder marked 'Public Affairs'. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he never heard PFC MANNING talk about the video. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that at some point during the deployment, games were not allowed to be on the SIPR network and consequently games started disappearing from computer systems. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that computers that ran the SIPR network were not locked down in that users had either local 'Power User' and/or 'Local Admin' rights on those machines. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) lastly mentioned he has spoken with CID investigators about PFC MANNING during the course of this investigation more than he has actually ever spoken to PFC MANNING. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not immediately provide any additional information pertinent to this investigation.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** Several minutes after the conclusion of the interview, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) returned and briefly spoke with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) wherein he related having been presented by PFC MANNING a business card for someone who worked for the Free Software Foundation. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he did not remember the individual's name that appeared on the card, but mentioned that he had researched the individual on the Internet after PFC MANNING had given him this card. It is noted that Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) a non-Department of Defense civilian and a person of interest within this investigation, is associated with the Free

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Software Foundation which is mentioned on his website, "freedomincluded.com". Further follow up investigation in regard to the Wikipedia site where SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he read comments in regard to an incident involving Iraqi civilians being arrested which upset PFC MANNING – the Wikipedia page published on PFC MANNING ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradley\\_Manning](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradley_Manning)) contained a link within the 'References' section of that page leading to a Wired.com article titled, "I Can't Believe What I'm Confessing To You: The Wikileaks Chats" (<http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/wikileaks-chat/>). Within this article are what appears to be a reproduction of Internet chat logs between PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). More specifically was an excerpt dated 25 May 10, 02:35:46 PM, wherein PFC MANNING reportedly makes statements relating to an incident where 15 detainees are being arrested by the Iraqi Federal Police for printing anti-Iraqi literature, and that an "officer" reportedly tells PFC MANNING how to assist in helping the Iraqi Federal Police find more detainees.

//////////////////////////////////// **LAST ENTRY** //////////////////////////////////////

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## DETAILS

About 1046, 7 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office; and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both of the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington, Fort McNair, D.C. 20024, interviewed SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) S-2 section, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div), Fort Drum, NY 13602. During the deployment to Iraq, SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was the Current Operations Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC), and she worked in the Tactical Operations Center. SSG IRVING related her shift was initially 0800-2000, but that changed to 1000-2200.

SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she was first introduced to PFC MANNING while at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA. According to SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING was good at running data and using the computer(s), and he was "awesome" at analysis, but he was not good at speaking about his results. She related that he focused on something and got tunnel vision, and that he would "space out" or "go off on a tangent" when one spoke with him. According to SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING briefed the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT leadership while at JRTC, which SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described as "slightly painful." SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not recall him ever briefing the Brigade Commander while in Iraq. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described an incident at JRTC when PFC MANNING "flipped out" on her. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she told him to step out of the TOC for a minute then come back in. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) NCOIC, S-2 Section, HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY 13602, said he would talk to him. At one point, PFC MANNING told her he was stressing out because he had so much on his plate. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related they had PFC MANNING building various products, and she thought the taskings were stressing him out.

SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she conducted Relief in Place (RIP) with a CPT and SSG; however, she was the only person working in the section until a junior Soldier who had been disciplined was assigned to her.

SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related an incident in which unit personnel were waiting around for shift change briefings and PFC MANNING took out the trash. The unit personnel were expecting someone else when PFC MANNING walked in the door. Everyone started laughing at the situation, but PFC MANNING thought they were laughing at him and began to get agitated. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) took him outside, and he came back in a bit calmer.

According to SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY 13602, was a stickler for military protocol and PFC MANNING often talked to other Soldiers as if they were his friends. Regarding the incident in which PFC MANNING assaulted SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she did not realize he was that stressed.

SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) as a "weird kid" and related he was consistent with his "weirdness." She did not recall a change in his behavior after his return from Environmental and Morale Leave. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING's shift change briefings as consistently bad and related he was the worst. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recalled watching the Apache video in the Secure Compartmented

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SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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Information Facility (SCIF) because someone found it while going through the "T" drive deleting unneeded information, which occurred before the video was released by WikiLeaks.

According to SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING never left the FOB. She recalled the arrest of some civilians for printing literature but provided no further information. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related when PFC MANNING left his computer, if he did not log off the computer or lock the screen, there would be bunch of windows open (Internet Explorer). SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not recall anything that resembled a command prompt window. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) confirmed there was no Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) access for their unit in Iraq.

///LAST ENTRY///

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## DETAILS

About 0800, 4 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received an email from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Distributed Common Ground System - Army (DCGS-A) Fusion Branch Tech Lead, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), 1710 SAIC Drive, McLean, VA 22102, in response to a previous request for information regarding PFC MANNING's potential use of Query Tree on the SIPRNET. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that PFC MANNING did have a Query Tree account but that no logs were available as the Query Tree system that was in place when PFC MANNING was in theater had been "decommissioned" and replaced with a newer system.

About 1515, 13 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with GS-13 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Chief, Information Assurance Division, Network Enterprise Center (NEC), Fort Drum, NY 13602 regarding any Acceptable Use Policies (AUP) PFC MANNING may have signed while assigned to Fort Drum, NY. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the current AUP was promulgated in February 2010 while PFC MANNING's unit was in Iraq and, therefore, would not have been signed by PFC MANNING or other members of his unit while deployed as AUPs are site/location specific. When asked if AUPs signed by PFC MANNING prior to his unit's deployment might be available, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the previous version of the AUP was a digital version signed via Common Access Card (CAC) and, in October 2009, the Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army, informed his office that a CAC-signed AUP was unacceptable. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated his office then stopped using the digital version as instructed and that it was no longer available. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated each unit was required to maintain copies of the AUPs signed by their assigned personnel, but he had spoken with CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) S-6 HHC 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div and determined that they had failed to maintain copies as required. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the current AUP was much more extensive than the old one that would have been in effect prior to the deployment of the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT as the older AUP primarily consisted only of standard Department of Defense wording whereas the current agreement included telework information, handling of certain types of media, appropriate use of computing resources, and more.

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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## DETAILS

About 0955, 14 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C); SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office; and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NMN) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, telephonically interviewed MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Operations Sergeant Major, 4th Battalion, 31<sup>st</sup> Infantry, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Fort Drum NY 13602, who was assigned as the First Sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, prior to his current assignment.

MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that prior to the unit's deployment to Iraq, he received occasional comments from MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division (10th Mtn Div), 10112 4th Armored Division Drive, Fort Drum, NY 13602 regarding PFC MANNING's attitude and personal problems but that PFC MANNING was not much of a problem prior to deployment to Iraq. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that PFC MANNING appeared to have no trouble during the initial month of the deployment to Iraq (October 2009) but that in November he started to "get worse". MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was told by MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that after his 12-hour shifts, PFC MANNING did not sleep much and drank lots of caffeine. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also stated that PFC MANNING appeared to have difficulty adjusting to a deployed environment which was common with some of the younger soldiers who had not yet experienced a deployment. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that most of his information regarding PFC MANNING came from MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who he saw on a daily basis.

MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that sometime in November or December 2009, PFC MANNING appeared to be "strung out", was not sleeping regularly, and then began to be late to work because of oversleeping. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that PFC MANNING flipped a table over out of anger while being counseled by his supervisor and had to be restrained by a warrant officer. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that he, along with SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) counseled PFC MANNING for about 45-60 minutes and referred him to Mental Health (Combat Stress) for evaluation. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not recall if the referral was command-directed or if PFC MANNING volunteered.

PFC MANNING went on mid-tour leave in January 2010 but MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not state whether PFC MANNING's attitude changed upon his return as MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) went on mid-tour leave immediately after PFC MANNING's return. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he believed PFC MANNING's mid-tour leave was "bumped up" due to stress but could not recall if PFC MANNING may have also asked to go on leave early.

MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) STATED he had considered a "fit for duty" evaluation of PFC MANNING and discussed it with MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) but could not recall if they had moved forward with scheduling the evaluation. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he planned for mental health counseling first to see if that would help prior to the "fit for duty" evaluation.

MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he returned from mid-tour leave on 4 Mar 10 and checked to see if PFC MANNING had gone to Mental Health for an evaluation as directed. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discovered that PFC MANNING had not gone for an evaluation and passed that information along to MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) incoming

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SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

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replacement, 1SG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) for action. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) felt he had given PFC MANNING the opportunity to work on resolving his problems but that PFC MANNING did not take the opportunity, indicating to MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that PFC MANNING did not have the desire to fix those issues that were preventing him from becoming a successful soldier.

MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he had heard of WikiLeaks prior to the allegations against PFC MANNING but had never visited the website. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further stated he had always viewed PFC MANNING as an "odd guy" but "not in a malicious or cagey way".

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1035, 14 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office; and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, telephonically interviewed SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY 13602, who was identified as having been PFC MANNING's roommate in Iraq.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did not know PFC MANNING personally prior to the deployment and that his only previous interaction with PFC MANNING was yelling at him during the unit's rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING was carelessly bumping sleeping soldiers in the head with his rifle while they were sleeping in a tent. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING "clearly stayed away from everyone in the smoking area."

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related PFC MANNING was his roommate from October 2009 until his arrest. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had heard rumors that PFC MANNING was gay prior to the deployment and that he made an initial effort to talk to PFC MANNING when they first became roommates (within the first week of the deployment) but PFC MANNING "shut him down" with a comment about two boyfriends having an argument.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) commented that PFC MANNING rarely took showers and stayed up the whole night when not working; mostly on his computer. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated they were both assigned to night shifts until SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) returned from mid-tour leave in early March 2010 and was assigned to a day shift. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he never borrowed CDs from PFC MANNING and that PFC MANNING had many CD-RWs in their Containerized Housing Unit (CHU) along with a microphone and expensive headphones. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) specifically related an instance in which he picked up the headphones that were lying on the floor which prompted PFC MANNING to get upset with him because they were expensive. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he noticed PFC MANNING had a removable hard drive and iPod Touch prior to PFC MANNING's mid-tour but that he did not see them upon PFC MANNING's return.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING was always mad and/or had a poor attitude. PFC MANNING told him that he could not wait to get out of the Army. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) often came to their CHU looking for PFC MANNING. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the only person he saw PFC MANNING associate with was PFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who would accompany PFC MANNING to the chow hall. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he had never heard of WikiLeaks.

////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

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289

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001732

Approved (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

1 FEB 77

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 1215, 14 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office; and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, telephonically interviewed MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Deputy Director, National Radio Frequency Communications, Buckley Air Force Base, CO 80047, who was previously assigned as the S-2, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY 13602. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he probably first met PFC MANNING in January 2009 when he was first assigned as the brigade S-2. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as "bright" and "high-strung".

MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described the pre-deployment mission of the S-2 section as maintaining awareness of current hot spots across the globe in support of the 2nd BCT's mission as the US Army's contingency brigade. At the time, the S-2 section was comprised of 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and PFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that he had PFC MANNING brief the brigade staff regarding the general world-wide situation on one occasion and that PFC MANNING had difficulty providing the briefing. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) surmised the difficulty was because PFC MANNING tried to think of everything in advance of saying it which caused him difficulty while briefing. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he could relate as he experienced similar difficulties while briefing. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) considered PFC MANNING to be the "numbers/data guy". MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he went to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with the unit (and PFC MANNING) but did not have any "one-to-one" interaction with PFC MANNING while at JRTC.

MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he never observed any behavioral problems with PFC MANNING, although he was told of "anger control" problems. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not remember any details but believed it was a single instance prior to deployment to Iraq. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that his general impression was that PFC MANNING had self-control problems and acted inappropriately when presented with stressful situations.

MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was deployed to Iraq around 15 or 16 Oct 2009 and functioned as the brigade S-2 until CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) took over as S-2 in the December/January timeframe. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated nothing "sticks out" about PFC MANNING during that time period. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that taskings for the analysts would go from him to either CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) or MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who would then disseminate them to the appropriate personnel. Taskings would not go directly to analysts. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he spent most of his time in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and not in the SCIF but was present for shift changes and would occasionally stop by the SCIF. He was not aware of any security incidents involving PFC MANNING during that time period. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did comment that PFC MANNING had difficulties briefing during shift change and, as previously mentioned, believed PFC MANNING "overthought things" which led to his difficulties.

MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) offered that he knew PFC MANNING was once a barista as that had been mentioned prior to the JRTC deployment by someone who joked that PFC MANNING would be the "coffee person". MAJ

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SI (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

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## DETAILS

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) never heard PFC MANNING say anything negative about the United States and that the only thing that stood out to him was PFC MANNING's "anger control issues." MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did hear that PFC MANNING punched PSC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) it had no direct knowledge of the incident as MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had already been reassigned at that point as was no longer in the TOC or SCIF on a regular basis.

MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that he never heard PFC MANNING discuss Wikileaks and that the first time he saw the "Apache video" was when he saw it on the television with his Iraqi counterpart. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not know at the time that the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT had a copy of the video until PFC MANNING was arrested.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SI

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1355, 14 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office; and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NMN) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, telephonically interviewed SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY 13602 as she was identified as having served with PFC MANNING during, and prior to, his deployment to Iraq. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that she arrived to the unit in March 2009. Her initial impressions of PFC MANNING were that he was "different", "uppity", and "not very social" although she indicated that the initial impression was not a strong one. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she did not go to the second Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation due to medical reasons and could not comment on the training received at JRTC or on PFC MANNING's performance.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that when the unit initially deployed to Iraq, she was the night shift Noncommissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) and supervised PFC MANNING but sometime in mid December 2009 – early January 2010, she was switched to days to fill the role of Targeting Analyst. At that time, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) came the night shift NCOIC. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING liked to search through the various computer databases and share what he found with fellow analysts. She also said he often had multiple instances of Internet Explorer open which frequently caused "hang ups" of his computer.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as very confrontational and said he liked to debate with Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) personnel, sometimes about the United States Government policy, but that she would not engage because she felt that she did "not have much to offer." SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that if she had to characterize his political views, she would describe him as on the "very extreme Democratic side." SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as "intrigued" about the culture in Afghanistan, specifically about grown men having sex with boys.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described the incident in which PFC MANNING assaulted her. She described PFC MANNING as having a "fuse" and that it normally takes a bit to set him off but felt that the events leading up to the assault happened in such a short time which may have caused him to react in the way that he did. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she was assigned to the day shift and was sleeping when the unit needed to find a specific file during the night shift. She stated she was awoken and went to the SCIF to locate the missing document. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she was asking questions of SCIF personnel about where they had already looked for the file and PFC MANNING started pacing, saying he had already looked for the file where she was looking. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) subsequently found the file for which she was searching and PFC MANNING began to argue with her. She responded with "fix your own shit" at which point PFC MANNING screamed, "No!" and charged her, punching her in the face. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) subsequently got out of her chair and tackled PFC MANNING.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that she was not overly surprised that the incident occurred as prior to shift change, she found PFC MANNING in the fetal position. At the time, she told MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CW2

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

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U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

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## DETAILS

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) "to be ready" because she knew some sort of incident was going to occur. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she believed something would occur as, on a previous occasion, she had found PFC MANNING curled into a fetal position. Later in that day, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was counseling PFC MANNING for being late when PFC MANNING screamed and "went after" SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) defended himself and PFC MANNING looked at an M-4 rifle about two feet away before turning his attention back to SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) intervened and put PFC MANNING in a headlock.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that PFC MANNING seemed more agitated prior to his mid-tour leave but upon his return, he seemed more friendly and talkative. She stated that he joked around about an Equal Opportunity complaint that had been made about the use of the terms "faggoty" and "gay". She also described him as being "more bold", using inappropriate sexual jokes and being more inclined to debate with officers. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did caveat her statement by stating that sexual humor was common in the SCIF but that PFC MANNING began to take a more active role in the use of inappropriate humor.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed she was the first in the SCIF to see the "Apache video" which she found of her own accord in a network folder. She related that she called CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) over to see the video. She did not believe that PFC MANNING reviewed the video with them at that time. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that for the next few days, there was discussion amongst various SCIF personnel about whether the video showed a camera or Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) launcher and whether the actions of the Apache crew were appropriate. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she could not guarantee, but believed PFC MANNING engaged in the discussions and was of the view that the actions of the crew were inappropriate if the object seen in the video was a camera and not an RPG. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told her that after the "Apache video" was put on the news, PFC MANNING went to CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and told her it was the same video as the one found on the network drive. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) responded with, "prove it" and PFC MANNING then compared the video shown on the news with the video found on the network (which SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described as the "N-drive").

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not recall an incident regarding multiple arrests at an Iraqi printing press as described in PFC MANNING's chat logs.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1505, 14 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) his office; and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NMN) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, telephonically interviewed MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Student, C Company, 442<sup>nd</sup> Signal Battalion, Fort Gordon, GA 30905. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was formerly assigned as the Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY 13602.

MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he took command of HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, in May 2009 and knew of PFC MANNING as one of his soldiers but did not have any personal interaction with him until they both flew back from Iraq together for mid-tour leave. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated they discussed PFC MANNING's future and MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) encouraged PFC MANNING to complete his education as PFC MANNING indicated a desire to become a math or science teacher. During their flight, PFC MANNING indicated to MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that he had saved a sum of money (NFI).

MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he recalled some disciplinary issued involving PFC MANNING but was unable to provide any details. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) thought PFC MANNING may have received non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for being "out of control" in the SCIF.

MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he officially left command in May 2010 but was essentially out of command as of March 2010. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) replaced him as the Commander, HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1551, 14 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected one (1) Compact Disc - Recordable (CD-R) disc from Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Incident Management, Office of the Director of National Intelligence/Chief Information Officer (ODNI/CIO) Intelligence Community Enterprise Solutions, 304 Sentinel Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701, which contained the Intelink log files containing the keywords "Assange", "Birgitta", "Iceland", "Jonsdottir", "Julian", "Reykjavik", "wget", and "Wikileaks" between October 2009 and June 2010. The evidence was collected on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 005-11.

////////////////////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

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U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 0812, 21 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), both assigned to Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington, Fort McNair, D.C. 20024, interviewed CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) formerly assigned to B Co, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Mtn Div), Fort Drum, NY 13602. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he arrived at the unit on 6 Feb 08 and was assigned as the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Platoon Leader and had little interaction with PFC MANNING prior to the deployment, which he described as "general Soldier interaction."

CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that during the deployment, he was assigned as a collection manager and worked in the Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), although he was sent to Baghdad as a liaison on multiple occasions. He described PFC MANNING as good with computers but not a good analyst; however, PFC MANNING's analysis was on par with other Soldiers. After CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY 13602, became the S-2, all the officers sat down to discuss Soldier standards; however, MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BC, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY 13602, objected to significant changes due the Soldiers already being stressed by the deployed environment. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) opined that PFC MANNING was MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) "pet project."

CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not have a lot of interaction with PFC MANNING but described PFC MANNING as a "meticulous Coke drinker." He further recalled that PFC MANNING often checked his stocks on the Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) computer. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he worked on all his vehicles himself, and PFC MANNING once told him that he travelled across the country and worked on his own vehicle as well. CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not believe PFC MANNING, which upset PFC MANNING.

According to CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING was generally uncomfortable speaking in front of people, and he was a target for "sharpshooting"; however, during one conversation among four or five Soldiers on the volcanic eruption in Europe, PFC MANNING became animated and began to discuss volcanoes. PFC MANNING was able to speak clearly about the subject, and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he actually learned something about volcanoes.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		DATE 21 Jan 11	EXHIBIT 294

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1004, 21 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), both of the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Military District of Washington, Fort McNair, D.C. 20024, interviewed SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) B Co (Military Intelligence Company (MICO)), 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Mtn Div), Fort Drum, NY 13602.

SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that he arrived at the MICO in Jun 08, and the first time he worked with PFC MANNING was at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, during the unit's second deployment there in Jul 09. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as an outstanding analyst, who was good with computers but timid and not good at public speaking.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he arrived at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq, in Oct 09. Though he was never assigned to the brigade, the brigade had tactical control over the MICO analysts. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was assigned as the night shift Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC), with then SPC MANNING and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), the Assistant S-2; CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) all of Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY 13602, often stayed late until CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY 13602, arrived and assumed duties as the night Officer in Charge (OIC).

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had problems with PFC MANNING personally and as a Soldier. After issues developed, CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could counsel PFC MANNING. During one counseling session, PFC MANNING was staring at SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) appropriately (aggressively). SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told PFC MANNING not to sit there and stare at him and that they were going to do the counseling correctly. PFC MANNING grabbed the table and flipped it. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that PFC MANNING did not approach him, but he was concerned because PFC MANNING was about two arms lengths from a weapons rack. PFC MANNING began to calm down, but then became upset again. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that he then moved PFC MANNING away from the weapons rack and CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) grabbed PFC MANNING from behind and held him until he calmed down.

AGENT'S COMMENT: There was no evidence that PFC MANNING attempted to grab a weapon.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that he left for Baghdad, Iraq, for liaison duties shortly after the incident but understood that PFC MANNING subsequently received a command referral to mental health. According to SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PFC MANNING later apologized to him and indicated he did not realize what he was doing. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed that PFC MANNING should have been removed from the SCIF after the incident.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed PFC MANNING spent too much time on research and not enough time on product. He described PFC MANNING as "socially inept" and said his conversations with PFC

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

MANNING involved either politics or computers. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he never saw PFC MANNING exhibit odd behavior on the computer or use a command prompt. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) id that personnel in the SCIF were told they could listen to music CDs that could not be written to, and he noted that PFC MANNING did listen to music in the SCIF. He stated that he never saw the Apache video.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that in Advanced Individual Training (AIT), he was taught Operations Security (OPSEC), classification level and marking of classified material and destruction requirements and that the SCIF had burn bags and boxes for Secret materials.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1400, 21 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received an email from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) President/CEO, NACON Consulting, LLC, 418 Third Street, Annapolis, MD 21403-2560 regarding PFC MANNING's Information Assurance (IA) training. NACON Consulting, LLC was the Department of the Army (DA) contractor which provided the on-line U.S. Army Information Assurance Virtual Training Classroom (IAVTC) that DA soldiers and employees utilized to complete non-mandatory IA training. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated he researched NACON's databases and determined PFC MANNING began the 2010 annual IAVTC training on 22 Apr 10 but did not actually complete the training.

He further researched the 8570.1 database which was used to track the required annual IA testing (administered by the Information Assurance Branch, Schoolhouse Information Technology, 15<sup>th</sup> Signal Brigade, Fort Gordon, GA 30905). The database revealed PFC MANNING completed the required annual IA testing on 5 Sep 08 and 31 Oct 09.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

21 Jan 11

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1106, 28 Dec 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one DVD (SECRET), purportedly containing classified files pertaining to the Gharani airstrike previously hosted on the SJA section of the U.S. Central Command Sharepoint server, which was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 193-10.

About 1319, 24 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one CD containing Open Source Center (OSC) audit logs, obtained from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), McLean, VA 20505, which was documented on DA Form 4137, EPCD, DN 009-11.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

24 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

297

CID INTERNAL USE ONLY - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

001743

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Exhibit(s) 298

Page(s) 001744 thru 01744c withheld:

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)

Permits withholding information that  
is classified for  
National Security purposes



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

Between 1100 – 1500, 23 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig – Quantico, Quantico, VA. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) subsequently determined PFC MANNING's only visitor was his cousin, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

About 1000, 24 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) which captured the recording of PFC MANNING's 23 Jan 11 visitation at the Marine Corps Brig – Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 008-11.

About 1100, 25 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the recording and determined both PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could be heard. The following is a brief summary of the recording: When asked how he was doing, PFC MANNING replied, "I'm fine." Asked again, PFC MANNING stated: "Despite what...I don't know." PFC MANNING later stated he was being treated "all right." During one exchange, PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked about the possibility of monitoring when Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) read out loud the monitoring noticed located inside the visitation booth.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

25 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

299

CID

1

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001745  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

REPORT NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 0800, 25 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the voice recording collected as evidence on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 177-10. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the recording of the visitation period from 11 Dec 10, wherein a conversation between PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was recorded. The following information was noted and may or may not be germane to the investigation moving forward:

- Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) immediately inquired how PFC MANNING was doing. PFC MANNING related he was good and was being treated very well. PFC MANNING related "it's not that bad" presumably referring to the USMC Brig. PFC MANNING specifically states "it's not a Russian gulag" and laughed jokingly.
- PFC MANNING indicated he was allowed to watch television
- PFC MANNING re-iterated he was doing OK and his last visitor was two or three weeks prior
- At one point while describing the USMC Brig, PFC MANNING stated "This is nothing like jail"; suggesting conditions at the USMC Brig were better than a typical jail. PFC MANNING further related the USMC Brig was nothing like the show "Lock Up" and that they were treated far better. PFC MANNING indicated because the guards were dealing with a population of individuals who have already been conditioned to take orders and do as they were told the guard's job was fairly easy.
- PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) spent a considerable amount of time discussing politics and the mid-term elections.
- PFC MANNING indicated he was running low on money and seemed irritated he was required to spend \$8.25 every week for a haircut.
- PFC MANNING related he recently watched a couple of football games. PFC MANNING related there was a schedule for television viewing and another prisoner was watching the games.
- PFC MANNING specifically stated he had no fear of "being shanked". PFC MANNING related the military justice system had its upsides. PFC MANNING related he showered alone and was alone in his cell and was therefore not in any danger
- PFC MANNING made a comment to Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) not to travel internationally with his laptop in a joking fashion. PFC MANNING specifically stated "Think you heard about what happened", presumably referring to the incident where Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was stopped and searched pursuant to crossing the border between the U.S. and Canada.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SI

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

25 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

300

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1 FEB 77

001746  
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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

REPORT NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

AGENT'S COMMENT: SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was not aware of any connection between Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and any of the individuals from Boston. This may or may not be relevant to the investigation.

- PFC MANNING discussed the process for accepting and rejecting mail. PFC MANNING indicated he could only accept mail from return addresses he could identify. PFC MANNING related he got a lot of mail from people he doesn't know and if he could not identify the return address the USMC Brig required the mail to be rejected and returned to sender

- PFC MANNING seemed to be in good spirits throughout the visit with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and was regularly laughing and telling jokes.

- PFC MANNING seemed lucid throughout the visit and seemed to have a firm grasp of recent political events.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

DATE

25 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

300

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

Run NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 1230, 25 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the Quantico Brig recording related to monitoring activities that occurred on 12 Dec 10, which was collected on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number 177-10. The recording contained a conversation between Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and PFC MANNING during visiting hours. Throughout the recording, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could be heard clearly; however much of PFC MANNING's half of the conversation could not be heard.

Throughout much of the recording, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discussed how PFC MANNING had reached mythical status, and several times asked him to give a quote that could be related to his supporters. PFC MANNING did not give a quote that could be heard, and said something to the effect of "I'm not quotable yet".

Several minutes of the conversation were devoted to how PFC MANNING became involved in politics and how he obtained political information from lobbyists and Washington, DC insiders. Much of the conversation was unintelligible but it seemed as if PFC MANNING used sex to get close to people in the know. This was determined primarily from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) response "It's harder for me to just sleep with people, because I'm hetero", and some other similar comments.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked PFC MANNING if he would like to hear national news related to his situation PFC MANNING instructed him not to use names. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) then began to speak about "Dr. No" who he said had recently been arrested. He related that Dr. No's "lunar base" had been mirrored by numerous supporters. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) continued to describe Dr. No's mythical status on the internet and related that as people began to understand Dr. No, they want to know more about Bradley Manning. He then pressed PFC MANNING again for a quote. No significant response from MANNING could be heard.

AGENT'S COMMENT: It was apparent from the conversation that "DR No" and his "lunar base" were pseudonyms for Julian ASSANGE and Wikileaks, who was arrested a few days prior on 7 Dec 11.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also asked PFC MANNING how upset he was about not having a pillow, to which PFC MANNING gave a partially unintelligible reply which sounded like "I've gotten used to it". Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told PFC MANNING that some people considered his treatment as torture; PFC MANNING'S response was not understandable.

PFC MANNING'S demeanor throughout the conversation was upbeat and relaxed, and he was often heard joking and laughing with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

S

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

25 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

301

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1 FEB 77

001748

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 1500, 31 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received the results for DODIG Subpoena 2011072-10771 served on Zip Car Inc. regarding PFC MANNING's Zip Car account (See Zip Car Account Information for details). The results indicated PFC MANNING had a Zip Car account from 3 Jan 09 - 26 Apr 10 and that the following Zip Car vehicle usage was associated with the account:

14 Feb 09	1800-2230	Rockville Metro	Rockville, MD
15 Mar 09	1730-2200	Stoneman Campus	Brandeis University, Waltham, MA
10-12 Apr 09	1400-1400	Shady Grove Metro	Gaithersburg, MD
6 May 09	1800-2200	Franconia-Springfield Metro	Springfield, VA
8-10 May 09	1800-2200	Twinbrook Metro	Rockville, MD
13 May 09	1800-2230	Franconia-Springfield Metro	Springfield, VA
15-17 May 09	1430-1430	2010 Crystal Dr	Arlington, VA
18-19 May 09	1730-2400	Franconia-Springfield Metro	Springfield, VA
21-23 May 09	2000-0800	Van Dorn Street Metro	Alexandria, VA
12-14 Jun 09	1500-2000	Waverly Lot	Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY
19-21 Jun 09	1200-1600	St. Paul/Thatcher	Brookline, MA
25-26 Jan 10	1100-1100	Maryland Ave/East Middle Lane	Rockville, MD
26-27 Jan 10	1600-1600	328 Bordley/Prudential Center	Boston, MA
1 Feb 10	1000-1800	Maryland Ave/East Middle Lane	Rockville, MD
2-3 Feb 10	1200-1130	Twinbrook East	Rockville, MD
3 Feb 10	1300-1700	Rockville Metro	Rockville, MD
3-5 Feb 10	1700-2200	Maryland Ave/East Middle Lane	Rockville, MD
8-9 Feb 10	1200-1900	Maryland Ave/East Middle Lane	Rockville, MD

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

31 Jan 11

EXHIBIT

302

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001749

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

## Exhibit 303

Page(s) 001750 thru 001774 referred to:

Department of Defense  
Office of Inspector General  
DoD IG FOIA Requester Service Center  
4800 Mark Center Drive – Suite 14L24  
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

Between 1100 and 1600, 30 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by his friend, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

About 1000, 31 Jan 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) which captured the recording of PFC MANNING's 30 Jan 11 visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 010-11.

Between 1200 and 1600, 1 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the voice recordings collected as evidence on EPCD DN 010-11, Item 1. Although the recording device seemed to be working properly, no understandable conversation between Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and PFC MANNING could be detected.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Digital Forensics and Research Branch Computer Crime Investigative Unit U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE 1 Feb 11	EXHIBIT 304	

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1 FEB 77

001775

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 1000, 7 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected the recorded conversation between PFC MANNING, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) President, Fitzgibbon Media, 1022 Spring Road NW, Washington, DC 20010, and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) during a visitation on 5 Feb 11, at the Marine Corps Brig, Quantico, VA. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) annotated the collection on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 013-11. A review of the recorded conversation revealed nothing of evidentiary value.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** It was noted that prior to the Brig recording made on 5 Feb 11, Brig security personnel advised Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (PFC MANNING's attorney) that visitation periods with PFC MANNING were being audio recorded. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) agreed to allow the visitation between PFC MANNING, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and himself to be audio recorded by waiving his right to a privileged conversation with his client. Subsequently, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had an unmonitored and unrecorded conversation with PFC MANNING in a separate room at the Brig.

//////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

7 Feb 11

EXHIBIT

305

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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001776



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1020, 7 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) re-interviewed SFC(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) former drill sergeant of PFC MANNING) to follow up upon statements made on 2 Sep 10 by SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) D Co, 305<sup>th</sup> Military Intelligence Battalion (MI Bn), Fort Huachuca, AZ (also a former drill sergeant of PFC MANNING). SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had related he overheard a conversation between SFC(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and other platoon sergeants intimating the chain of command should revoke PFC MANNING's security clearance and have him reclassified to another Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). SFC(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) called the conversation and described it as a casual conversation in the office with other non-commissioned officers. SFC(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING's behavior as a "red flag" and stated the gist of the discussion was that "when they were privates, they would have been sent to be a cook" if they had engaged in similar behavior. SFC(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not recall what other NCO's were present at the time of the conversation and stated that he did not remember the conversation being brought to the attention of the command. When asked to describe PFC MANNING, SFC(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was "really outspoken" and "seemed like he had something to prove".

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

DATE

7 Feb 11

EXHIBIT

306

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

001777  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

Between 0850 – 2230, 2 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the recordings of PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA, as indicated below:

18 Sep 10 – PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

It should be noted that it was difficult to hear the visitors' side of the conversation. PFC MANNING was asked about conditions at the brig and responded with, "Not bad...It is not Oz" (an apparent reference to the former HBO series about prison life). PFC MANNING said he saw his psychiatrist three times per week and talked to his attorney via phone. PFC MANNING related he read a lot but was not yet allowed to write whenever he wanted because of "caution, precautions". PFC MANNING stated it was "unusual" but that his "circumstances are not common" and that "they are not too bad"; he "understand[s] it all". He stated he noticed a sense of "institutionalization"; such as "why would you want to escape" when you get "free food". PFC MANNING stated he still received caffeinated beverages and seemed to be generally in a good mood and in good humor. He stated he did a lot of meditating, stretching, yoga, and breathing exercises. When asked how he was doing, he responded with, "emotionally, mood-wise...have not noticed a significant difference". PFC MANNING stated he got to watch television 2-3 hours per day, six hours on weekend, but did not necessarily get to choose what was on. When asked about the food, he said "it's not bad", "not gourmet level" but "above standards of a school cafeteria". When asked about the facility, he responded, "this is not that bad" and from what he understood, "this facility is a lot more strict than other facilities since it is Marine Corps". PFC MANNING stated said he would hopefully not have to go somewhere else and that "I would rather stay here for a year". PFC MANNING asked if he had become an internet meme (a term used to describe a concept or idea spread via the Internet). The response from his visitors was unintelligible. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and/or Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked PFC MANNING if he needed or wanted anything. PFC MANNING requested additional shampoo and also requested some books. He informed his visitors that it would be better and easier if they coordinated with his attorney. PFC MANNING commented that he paid his attorney a considerable amount and that if he told his attorney "to jump, he'll jump." PFC MANNING later said he was not directly paying his attorney but the attorney was getting paid. He also said his attorney's "future career" depends on the case. PFC MANNING stated his attorney was very smart and that he had "complete trust" in him. PFC MANNING further informed them that he did not receive any letters that were not privileged communication or from someone who was on his approved list. He stated that he would receive a notification for each of these types of letters and then decide whether to have them returned to the sender or destroyed. PFC MANNING stated that if he recognized the sender and wanted the letter, he could ask for it but that had only occurred on a couple of instances. He told his visitors that he could have all privileged mail so if they wanted to send him something, they should have their attorneys send it to him. One of the visitors discussed correspondence and/or online postings that he was archiving for PFC MANNING and PFC MANNING said that if it was getting to be too large of a volume, to get a

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

12 Feb 11

EXHIBIT

307

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001778

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

## DETAILS

storage unit for which PFC MANNING would reimburse him. The visitor responded that he already had a storage unit and PFC MANNING stated he could "totally reimburse you later" as he had "no funding issues whatsoever" and "there was no concern about raising enough money". He also discussed fundraising briefly. PFC MANNING discussed media relations and how the media will use public information and come to inaccurate conclusions and then use that information as "bait" to get information from individuals who have access to accurate information. He also discussed the history of media campaigns and efforts associated with modern conflict (WWII – present).

19 Sep 10 – PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). It should be noted that it was difficult to hear the visitors' side of the conversation. The discussion had little to do with the investigation or his conditions at the brig and revolved mostly around his personal history, people he knew, and his philosophical views on a variety of topics. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and/or Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discussed what they viewed as lacking public relations efforts on behalf of PFC MANNING, specifically by his attorney. PFC MANNING told them that the lack of a public relations effort was by design and that he trusted in his attorney. PFC MANNING appeared circumspect in his statements and mentioned that he hoped he was not "discuss[ing] too much."

25 Sep 10 – PFC MANNING was visited by (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The recording was quite difficult to hear (particularly Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) side of the conversation) and most of the early parts of the conversation could not be heard. The remaining conversation was also difficult to hear at times. The conversation did not appear to discuss matters of interest to the investigation.

Between 0825 – 1245, 3 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the recordings of PFC MANNING's visitation periods at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA, as indicated below:

19 Dec 10 – PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). Due to surrounding noise at the time of the recording, the audio was difficult to hear at times but it appeared that the conversation did not discuss matters related to the investigation.

2 Jan 11 - PFC MANNING was visited by (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The conversation was limited to family matters and did not discuss matters related to the investigation.

Between 0830 – 1130, 12 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the recording of PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA, on 25 Dec 10. PFC MANNING was visited by (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The audio recording of PFC MANNING was, at times, difficult to hear although Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) side of the conversation was generally clear. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked how everything was in jail to which

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

12 Feb 11

EXHIBIT

307

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

PFC MANNING responded that it was "dull". Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) commented on Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) comments to the media said that they were Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (PFC MANNING's lawyer) talking points. PFC MANNING responded with laughter. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told PFC MANNING that he had a lot of supporters on line and also stated that Mr. Julian ASSANGE did as well. PFC MANNING related that he had called (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and spoke to him for ten minutes (presumably in reference to his 24 Dec 10 phone call to Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)). Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told PFC MANNING to keep his spirits up to which PFC MANNING responded, "I have been through worse." Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related to PFC MANNING that he watching the television show "Lockup" (a reality show depicting the inner workings of correctional facilities) with his girlfriend and told her, "Bradley says it is better than Lockup. There is more control" in reference to PFC MANNING's detention conditions. PFC MANNING stated that just because there is more control does not mean that the people are less "anti-social". PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discussed Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and both agreed that he was a good choice as PFC MANNING's lawyer. The conversation primarily revolved around family, television shows, weather, and regional crime trends and was not specifically related to the investigation.

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

12 Feb 11

EXHIBIT

307

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001780

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

Between 1100-1500, 12 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). A subsequent review of the recording revealed that PFC MANNING could be heard clearly, however his visitors could not be heard at all. Near the end of the conversation, PFC MANNING stated several times "I'm alright", "I'm fine", "No Issues". Nothing else of significance was heard.

Between 1100-1500, 13 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). A subsequent review of the recording revealed PFC MANNING could be heard clearly however his visitors could not be heard. Much of the conversation revolved around money, PFC MANNING repeatedly told Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that he had plenty of money and that he had over \$150,000. PFC MANNING also asked (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) what was asked of her when individuals visited her last summer, apparently referring to investigators contacting her in reference to this investigation. Near the end of the recording, PFC MANNING answered an unheard question with "I'm good, it's very very clean here".

About 1005, 14 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) which captured the recordings of PFC MANNING's 12 and 13 Feb 11 visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 019-11.///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

DATE

14 Feb 11

EXHIBIT

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1 FEB 77

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Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1524, 11 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) obtained two Federal Magistrate Search Warrants from the Honorable (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, 401 Courthouse Square, Alexandria, VA 22314, in relation to digital media that was previously collected by written consent and was found to contain possible child pornographic material during the initial forensic examination of these items. The original written consents obtained from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not expressly include offenses related to child pornographic material being within the scope of offenses under investigation. Consequently the following Federal Magistrate Search Warrants were obtained:

Federal Magistrate Search Warrant, Search Warrant Number 1:11SW-47, was obtained for conducting/continuing the forensic examination (search) of a hard disk drive, Maxtor brand, Model 5T040H4, Serial Number "T4J8XNLC", which had been collected on 2 Nov 10, and retained as Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 162-10, Item 1. This item had been collected from the home of Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) per her written consent, after being identified as the property of PFC MANNING. Previously on 9 Dec 10, a Federal Magistrate Search Warrant was issued for conducting a search of a sealed container and digital media (which included this item) collected during the 2 Nov 10 search. Subsequently on 14 Jan 11, during the initial forensic examination of the abovementioned hard disk drive, a digital video file containing suspected child pornography was identified on this digital media. Because the previously obtained Search Warrant specified an examination of the drive for evidence related to the unlawful disclosure of classified information and related crimes, the examination was halted pending additional legal authorization(s). The Search Warrant, issued on 11 Feb 11, includes authorization to further seize and search for violations under 18 USC Section 2252, related to the receipt and possession of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors on the mentioned hard disk drive.

Federal Magistrate Search Warrant, Search Warrant Number 1:11SW-89, was obtained for conducting/continuing the forensic examination (search) of a hard disk drive, Western Digital brand, Model Raptor WD740, Serial Number "WMAKE1914292", which contained the forensic image of a hard disk drive, Hitachi Travelstar brand, Model HTS541080G9SA00, Serial Number "XKGYRDKG", the property of Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). This forensic image was obtained from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) personal computer with his written consent on 10 Aug 10, and was retained as EPCD, DN 118-10, Item 1. Subsequently on 6 Dec 10, during the initial forensic examination of the mentioned forensic image, it was found to contain five files (four digital video files and one digital photographic image) which were suspected to depict child pornography. Because the previously obtained written consent specified an examination of Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) hard disk drive and/or forensic image of that drive for evidence related to espionage and unauthorized access to a U.S. Government Computer, the examination was halted pending additional legal authorization(s). The Search Warrant, issued on 11 Feb 11, includes authorization to further seize and search for violations under 18 USC Section 2252, related to the receipt and possession of material involving the sexual exploitation of minors on the mentioned hard disk drive.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

14 Feb 11

EXHIBIT

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1731, 11 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) notified both SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned to the Digital Forensics and Research Branch (DFRB), CCIU, 9805 Lowen Road, Building 193, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060, that additional search warrants had been obtained in regard to the halted forensic examinations related to the digital media of PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) they had previously been conducting.

About 2135, 13 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) submitted an amended Forensic Examination Request to the DFRB in order to conduct/continue the forensic examination of the hard disk drive pursuant to the authority of Search Warrant Number 1:11SW-47, the property of PFC MANNING, collected from the home of Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) with her written consent on 2 Nov 10.

About 1138, 14 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) submitted an amended Forensic Examination Request to the DFRB in order to conduct/continue, pursuant to the authority of Search Warrant Number 1:11SW-89, the forensic examination of the hard disk drive containing the forensic image of Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) personal laptop computer, collected from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) with his written consent on 10 Aug 10.

//////////////////////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGN

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

14 Feb 11

EXHIBIT

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Exhibit(s) 310 and 311

Page(s) 001784 thru 001795

Documents

**SEALED**

by the

U.S. District Court  
for the Eastern District of Virginia



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 0748, 17 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one digital versatile disc (DVD) containing the document "us-intel-wikileaks.pdf" purportedly obtained from WikiLeaks, and the files "RB08-0617.pdf" and "RB08-0716", from the forensic computer via an email. The collection was documented on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number 020-11.///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

S (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

17 Feb 11

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

Between 0905 – 1035, 24 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) formerly a Distributed Common Ground System- Army (DCGS-A) contractor for L-3 Communications. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was stationed at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer, Iraq from July or August 2009 to December 2010 and was responsible for hardware, firmware, and software support for the DCGS-A systems at FOB Hammer.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that when he first got into theatre, he was shocked about the lack of security in the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) to include the FOB Hammer SCIF initially having a plywood door with only a standard doorknob (later replaced with a cipher lock). He also related that everyone had compact discs, cameras and iPods in the SCIF; this included both 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (MTN DIV) and its predecessor, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division (82<sup>nd</sup> ABN DIV). Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related personnel were later told not to bring these items into the SCIF but that the policy was not enforced. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noticed there was no Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) leadership on the night shift when 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> MTN DIV was deployed at FOB Hammer. He stated the unit eventually assigned a female staff sergeant as the night shift Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge (NCOIC) but was not sure if that was before or after PFC MANNING was arrested. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did state that he saw no noticeable difference between the security posture of the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> MTN DIV and the security posture of the 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 82<sup>nd</sup> ABN DIV.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there were 44 DCGS-A computers at FOB HAMMER and that they were used as the primary Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) computers by the analysts and other personnel. The users would log in and authenticate with the network via Active Directory which was created and maintained by the unit G-6 which would provide access to domain and network resources (i.e. network backbone). They would then have to log on to the DCGS-A server with a different login and password. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described the functionality of the DCGS-A system and related that each installation had a local server that was replicated to the "brain" which was located at Camp Slayer, Iraq. The replication process had a delay so users would often just use the internet browser to directly access the various available databases and information sources on the SIPRNET rather than using DCGS-A to do so. Local users could not store information directly on the DCGS-A servers so any such information would be stored either on the users' local drives or on local servers maintained by each unit. In the case of the 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> MTN DIV, the local server was the "T-drive". Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated some of the databases available via DCGS-A which included Oil for Food and the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) but stated it did not include the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database of the US State Department.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) estimated that one DCGS-A computer would need to be rebuilt each month due to various issues. He further related some users would work in a DOS window because some of the earlier

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

SI (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

DATE

24 Feb 11

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

generation laptops had problems with the CD drives and soldiers would access the drives via DOS rather than Windows Explorer. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did not recall PFC MANNING ever using a DOS prompt. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that soldiers could not install software on the DCGS-A systems as they were not administrators. Only a DCGS-A administrator could install additional software that had not been pre-installed. Users could request non-authorized software be installed and occasionally would do so, but it would have to be approved by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) before it was installed. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was never asked to install *wget* and did not install it on any DCGS-A systems.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as a "stereotypical social invert" "trying to fit in". Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING would often make an "off comment" that would cause conversation to stop when he tried to participate in group discussions and that PFC MANNING was a "different dude" who did not have many friends. He related PFC MANNING did not appear to have any real friends and that "no one refused to talk to him but no one went out of their way to talk to him" either. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he believed SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would have been PFC MANNING's closest friend "if [he] had to guess". Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) heard of PFC MANNING's "outburst" (the incident in which PFC MANNING flipped over the table) but did not witness it. He characterized PFC MANNING's briefings as "short and to the point" and that PFC MANNING did not seem to be nervous while briefing. PFC MANNING was one of the better analysts from what Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) heard from others and the unit sought out PFC MANNING's expertise at manipulating data extracted from the various systems and databases. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also related PFC MANNING told him he had a computer repair business prior to joining the US Army. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further described PFC MANNING as a "self-professed computer genius" and related PFC MANNING said, on several occasions, that "people would be amazed if they knew what I could do" in reference to his computer skills. This statement was made several times both before and after the March 11, 2010 elections in Iraq. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) felt that PFC MANNING was "talking out of his butt". Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not notice a change in behavior after PFC MANNING's Environmental and Morale Leave (EML) but that PFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> MTN DIV, did notice a change in behavior and brought it to the attention of the unit leadership and also asked to be moved to the day shift, away from PFC MANNING. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed the change in behavior was brought to the attention of MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) or CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C).

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he had to re-image PFC MANNING's computer more often than other computers at FOB Hammer because SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who worked the opposite shift of PFC MANNING and shared the computer, asked Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) to do so. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that PFC MANNING or SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would complain that the computer was "too slow" and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would then ask them if they wanted him to try to fix the computer or rebuild it. PFC MANNING never asked him to rebuild the computer to his recollection. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) would often ask him to just re-image the computer because PFC MANNING was always "tinkering with the computer" and "doing stuff". Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that "on the whole", PFC MANNING did not act any more suspicious than anyone else and that his use of CDs and an iPod was not out of the ordinary.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGN (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

24 Feb 11

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there was one laptop configured for the National Security Agency Network (NSANET) that was actually outside of the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) area of the SCIF. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the computer was a DCGS-A laptop that was connected to the NSANET via a cable that went into the SCI area of the SCIF. The laptop was on a table just outside of that area. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that the computer was used by 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and "Chief" (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI). Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had created local user accounts on the computer for the two users but that they would need actual NSANET domain accounts to be able to access and utilize the NSANET and its resources. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was not responsible for NSANET user accounts and believed the users would have to request them through the unit G-6. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the computer was powered off "99% of the time" and that 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) used it more often than Chief (b)(6)(b)(7)(C).  
 ///////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
 U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

24 Feb 11

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

Between 1315 - 1415, 24 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), both assigned or attached to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, interviewed SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), Charlottesville, VA 22911 as SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was PFC MANNING'S squad leader while he was stationed at Fort Drum, NY (FDNY). SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he arrived at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div), Fort Drum, NY (FDNY) in June 2006 and departed FDNY via a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move in July 2009.

SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that PFC MANNING arrived at the unit sometime in 2008 and SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) then SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) became his squad leader. The squad consisted of PFC MANNING, PFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) later married and became SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (FI)). SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) PCS'd before the unit was deployed to Iraq.

SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that company in-processing consisted of interviews with the unit commander and first sergeant and issuance of a barracks room and linen. There was essentially no in-processing of the S-2 section until the deployment of the Distributed Common Ground System- Army (DCGS-A) systems at which point soldiers needed to obtain a login and password from the Division System Security Officer (SSO). In order to receive such an account, users had to be "read-on" and watch the requisite security videos for each classification of information. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) so related that DCGS-A users underwent a formal, two-week course provided by a Mobile Training Team (MTT) for which each student received a certificate. There was no Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) training provided at the unit as SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated that training was provided "downrange". SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the unit received one 16-hour Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) training course that was provided to the unit by an MTT from the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and that he believed PFC MANNING attended the course.

SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that the section did not use the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) often except for monthly Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 35F training where he would task members of the section to prepare products based upon information pertaining to possible areas of operation (Afghanistan and Iraq). PFC MANNING occasionally had to provide briefings to S-2 section personnel but never to the BCT commander, COL (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING got better with his briefings as he conducted more. He described PFC MANNING as an "IT freaking genius" and a "data mining fool", but that his analytical skills were "not great". SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the unit never used the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database of the US State Department or the CIA Wire while he was assigned to FDNY.

SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he heard of PFC MANNING "flipping out" but never witnessed such an occurrence although he was instructed to take PFC MANNING to behavioral health on one occasion, believed to be around January 2009. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as "anti-social" and said other soldiers

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

S. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

24 Feb 11

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

were overt about giving PFC MANNING "a hard time" because of his sexual orientation but SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) felt it was more due to PFC MANNING's behavior than being gay. While PFC MANNING experienced difficulty, SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there was another gay soldier who was respected by his peers and explained the difference was that PFC MANNING was "annoying". As an example, SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that PFC MANNING and the other gay soldier "hung out" together a couple of times and, despite the fact that the other soldier was known as a guy that anybody would get along with, the soldier related PFC MANNING was too annoying and he could not stand him.

SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had discussions with MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Non-Commissioned Officer In Charge (NCOIC), S-2, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, FDNY, about whether to deploy PFC MANNING. MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked him if he felt PFC MANNING was "ready for deployment" and SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that PFC MANNING was getting better analytically but that there was still the potential for disciplinary problems. Overall, there was nothing to prevent PFC MANNING's deployment at that time. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) he was not surprised about PFC MANNING "wiggling out" in Iraq as he had heard about all of the incidents, both in garrison and when the unit was deployed, from other unit members. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he knew PFC MANNING had certain "buttons that could be pushed", e.g. challenging him about his computer skills. However, SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there were no indications PFC MANNING ever wanted to subvert or undermine the United States or to hurt himself or others. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) said he was "not shocked" that PFC MANNING used his computer knowledge to get around security measures".

SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he had asked PFC MANNING numerous times why he had joined the Army since PFC MANNING led unit members to believe he was from a family "with money". SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) felt he never received a good answer and that PFC MANNING acted as though he felt "something was owed to him by everyone".

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

24 Feb 11

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

Between 1100 and 1500, 26 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) A subsequent review of the recording on 26 Feb 10, revealed PFC MANNING and his visitor, previously identified as Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), could both be heard clearly. The following is a brief summary of the recording: PFC MANNING indicated he was not feeling very well and had a cold; PFC MANNING and his father discussed his mother's previous visit; Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discussed his efforts to find an Information Technology job in the D.C. area; PFC MANNING indicated he was financially fine and that his net worth was \$100,000.00; PFC MANNING indicated he was physically fine and not whining about his conditions at the Quantico Brig; and PFC MANNING and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discussed all the inaccurate information being reported in the various news outlets.

Between 1100 and 1500, 27 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) President, Fitzgibbon Media, 1022 Spring Rd NW, Washington, DC 20010, and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). A subsequent review of the recording on 27 Feb 10, revealed PFC MANNING and his visitor, previously identified as Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could all be heard clearly. In the first part of the recording, PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The following is brief summary of the recording: PFC MANNING indicated he was not feeling very well and had a cold; Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) informed PFC MANNING that he had launched the Bradley Manning Advocacy Fund; Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discussed PFC MANNING's various supporters; they asked if PFC MANNING wanted any changes to his visitation list to which he replied he did not require any changes right now; they discussed news and politics; and PFC MANNING related the food at the brig was good and that he got to exercise. In the second part of the recording, PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) at which time Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) departed. The following is brief summary of the recording: PFC MANNING indicated he was still not feeling well, and they discussed miscellaneous topics including movies, jobs, gas prices, and bowling.

About 0930, 28 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) which captured the recordings of PFC MANNING's 26 and 27 Feb 11 visitation periods at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 023-11.

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

28 Feb 11

EXHIBIT

315

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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001802  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

On 16 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received the results of DODIG Subpoena 2011073-10771 which was served on the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), 600 5th Street NW. Washington. District of Columbia 20001, for records pertaining to the WMATA SmarTrip card found in PFC MANNING's possessions. The subpoena results indicated the card was not a card registered to a specific person but did show records of its usage in the DC Metropolitan area (See Subpoena).

Between 1140 - 1505, 19 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by his cousin Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and his mother (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) last known address (b)(6)(b)(7)(C).

Between 1145 - 1505, 20 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by his cousin Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). Brig personnel also indicated that two other individuals (possibly with British accents) attempted to visit PFC MANNING but that they were not on the approved visitors list and were denied access. The two individuals were identified as Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) and Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI).

About 1036, 22 Feb 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) which captured the recordings of PFC MANNING's 19 and 20 Feb 11 visitation periods at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 021-11.

Between 0935 - 1530, 1 Mar 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the digital recordings of PFC MANNING's 19 and 20 Feb 11 visitation periods at the Marine Corps Brig Quantico, VA. The review revealed the following:

19 Feb 11 - Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING looked "darker" to which PFC MANNING responded that he had been outside the past two days. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked what he was doing outside and for how long to which PFC MANNING responded, "walked around" "for perhaps an hour." PFC MANNING said he could "disclose that" when pressed further for how long he was outside and what he did. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked if PFC MANNING had been watching TV to which he responded "of course", "local stuff", "whatever is on". When asked about his money situation (in reference to his account at the brig), PFC MANNING responded "very good"; he did not need "to be replenished". Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked if PFC MANNING had any books and PFC MANNING said he had "about ten books" to read so he had something to do during the day. They also discussed other issues

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

1 Mar 11

EXHIBIT

316

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001803

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

not pertinent to this investigation. There was no apparent discussion or disclosure of classified information. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not participate much in the conversation.

20 Feb 11 – PFC MANNING's side of the audio recording was difficult to hear but it appeared that he and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discussed issues not pertinent to this investigation. There was no apparent discussion or disclosure of classified information. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not participate much in the conversation.

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

1 Mar 11

EXHIBIT

316

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001804

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

## Exhibit 317

Page(s) 001805 thru 001817 referred to:

Department of Defense  
Office of Inspector General  
DoD IG FOIA Requester Service Center  
4800 Mark Center Drive – Suite 14L24  
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

Between 1100 – 1500, 21 Nov 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig – Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING's only visitor was Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

About 1205, 23 Nov 10, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one DVD, which contained the recording of PFC MANNING's 21 Nov 10 visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig – Quantico. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document, Document Number 169-10.

On 2 Mar 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) completed the review of the recording of PFC MANNING's visitation, which disclosed nothing of probative value. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) discussed a border search conducted by Customs and Border Protection (which occurred on or about 3 Nov 10, at Chicago O'Hare International Airport). During the discussion Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) lamented that fact that his computer and digital media were detained, and he discussed the fact that he needed to find a way to get a computer back into the country. He went on to suggest pre-positioning "a computer for each continent" and a "lock-box in Prague."

AGENT'S COMMENT: It was unclear if Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was joking; however, it appeared that he considered implementing the courses of action to some degree.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		DATE 2 Mar 11	EXHIBIT 318

CI (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) OFFICIAL USE ONLY – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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001818  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1000, 8 Mar 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Database Engineer, Information Assurance Branch, Schoolhouse Information Technology, 15<sup>th</sup> Signal Brigade, Fort Gordon, GA 30905, who was identified as the point of contact for the Department of Defense (DOD) Information Assurance (IA) training database. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that US Army users who needed to complete annual IA training would complete the training module provided by the Information Assurance Virtual Training Classroom (IAVTC) and receive a certificate from the IAVTC for completion of the training module. Users would then have the opportunity to take the certification test, hosted by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) organization, which was a requirement for all DOD personnel.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related users would authentic via Single Sign-On meaning, for example, that US Army personnel would be required to log in to their Army Knowledge Online (AKO) account in order to complete the test. The process would appear to be seamless to the user as they would enter their credentials on the testing website and it would then authenticate to the AKO server. The authentication could be done either via AKO username and password or Common Access Card (CAC). Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related it could not be determined which method was used by PFC MANNING for authentication and also that his organization did not maintain logs of the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of individual users connecting to the training database.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) researched the training database and provided PFC MANNING's IA training history:

'Exam Start 10/31/2009 10:53:10 PM' Score of 80 'Exam End 10/31/2009 11:04:51 PM'

'Exam Start 9/5/2008 11:25:03 AM' Score of 76 'Exam End 9/5/2008 11:36:37 AM'

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

8 Mar 11

EXHIBIT

319

94  
1 FEB 77

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001819  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

Between 1100 and 1600, 13 Mar 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) President, Fitzgibbon Media, 1022 Spring Rd NW, Washington, DC 20010, and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) A subsequent review of the recording on 13 Mar 11, revealed PFC MANNING and his visitors, previously identified as Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could all be heard clearly. PFC MANNING reassured Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that an examining Psychiatrist at Walter Reed Medical Center, Washington, DC, told PFC MANNING that if there were any concerns PFC MANNING would be in Ward 54 and not Quantico.

About 1800, 13 Mar 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) which captured the recording of PFC MANNING's 13 Mar 11 visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, VA. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 030-11.

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

13 Mar 11

EXHIBIT

320

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1 FEB 77

00182

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

**AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT**

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0006-11-CID321

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## DETAILS

About 1122, 28 Mar 11, this office received a Request For Assistance (RFA) from the Washington Metro Resident Agency (WMRA), Computer Crime Investigative Unit (CCIU), Fort Belvoir, VA 22060 to attempt to locate a "Cheat Sheet" reportedly provided to Advanced Individual Training (AIT) students attending the Intelligence Analyst course at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Center Of Excellence (USAIC&COE), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.

About 1155, 28 Mar 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Officer In Charge (OIC), Intelligence Analyst Course, USAIC&COE, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613 who related there was no "Cheat Sheet" provided to students of the course, however there was several slides in the current Plan Of Instruction (POI) which provided information on useful websites. The students are free to copy down the material and utilize for their benefit. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided copies of the pertinent slides via SIPRNET e-mail as some of the slides were classified.

About 1230, 28 Mar 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Contract Instructor, Intelligence Analyst Course, USAIC&COE, who was an instructor during the period of time PFC MANNING attended the course.. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that even at the time PFC MANNING attended the course there was no "Cheat Sheet" provided to students however they were given in class demonstrations of beneficial websites which would be useful during the course of their job related activities. Specifically Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related they were shown the CENTCOM, Afghanistan, Iraq and NGA websites. He could not recall if the State Department website was visited but it would not be outside the realm of possibility for that site to be visited to demonstrate the type of material available to the students.//LAST ENTRY//

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Arizona Branch Office, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613

DATE

28 March 11

EXHIBIT

321

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

001821

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1040, 5 Apr 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received an email from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Information Assurance Branch, Schoolhouse Information Technology, 15th Signal Brigade, Fort Gordon, GA 30905, containing the pool of test questions that those who took the mandatory annual Information Assurance (IA) exam would have been presented with. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated that the pool of questions provided was the same for both the 2008 and 2009 dates upon which PFC MANNING completed his mandatory annual IA exam. The questions were provided in a spreadsheet format.

About 1042, 8 Apr 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received an email from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) which contained a screenshot of the IA exam questions in the order and format that would have been presented to test takers (See Exam Questions for details).

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

8 Apr 11

EXHIBIT

322

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001822 Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)



## Information Assurance User Portal

### DoD Information Assurance Awareness Exam

Answer the questions to the best of your ability. Do your own work.

1. Which of the following statements best describes IA?

- a. ☐ Awareness of potential threats to information systems
- b. ☐ Integrated capability to detect and react to threats in a timely manner
- c. ☐ Measures that protect and defend information and information systems
- d. ☐ Maintaining a consolidated telecommunications infrastructure

2. A document repository is down when you attempt to access it. Which IA principle is being violated?

- a. ☐ Confidentiality
- b. ☐ Authentication
- c. ☐ Integrity
- d. ☐ Availability

3. If your coworker is able to access your 401K account to check your balance which secure system property is being violated?

- a. ☐ Confidentiality
- b. ☐ Authentication
- c. ☐ Integrity
- d. ☐ Availability

4. Which term refers to a secure system's ability to protect against the unauthorized modification or destruction of information?

- a. ☐ Confidentiality
- b. ☐ Authentication
- c. ☐ Integrity
- d. ☐ Nonrepudiation

5. According to the U. S. Department of Justice what type of fraud is one of the fastest growing white-collar crimes?

- a. ☐ Pyramid schemes
- b. ☐ Internet fraud
- c. ☐ Online gambling
- d. ☐ Telephone transfer fraud

6. Both internal and external threats can bring down a system. Which of the following represents an internal threat?

- a. ☐ Hackers
- b. ☐ Terrorist group
- c. ☐ Disgruntled user
- d. ☐ Protesters

7. One easy way to protect your computer from internet threats is to:

- a. ☐ Set your browser to accept cookies
- b. ☐ Visit only websites that use ActiveX or JavaScript code
- c. ☐ Avoid casual or unnecessary Internet browsing at work
- d. ☐ Install software to prevent Denial of Service Attacks

EXHIBIT 323  
001823



8. Natural threats to information systems include all of the following except:

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- a. ☐ Fire
- b. ☐ Poor wiring
- c. ☐ Insufficient cooling
- d. ☐ Hackers

9. Which of the following vulnerabilities is most likely to be exploited by an external threat to the infrastructure?

- a. ☐ Floods
- b. ☐ Software flaws
- c. ☐ Insufficient cooling
- d. ☐ Disgruntled employees

10. Theo receives an e-mail from his bank while at work. The e-mail emphatically states that he must verify his personal information immediately or his account will be closed. He clicks the link provided in the e-mail and enters all of his information online. This is an example of:

- a. ☐ Email attachments
- b. ☐ Cookies
- c. ☐ Mobile code
- d. ☐ Phishing

11. Kendall receives an e-mail stating that a leading computer company is giving away free computers asking her to forward the e-mail to 20 of her closest friends. What should Kendall do?

- a. ☐ Delete the email instead of forwarding it
- b. ☐ Forward the request to her friends and co-workers
- c. ☐ Forward the request to her security point of contact
- d. ☐ Run her virus protection software

12. Walt found a feature in his e-mail that allows him to automatically download attachments. He thinks this will give him faster access to the attachments he gets. Using this feature can:

- a. ☐ Make e-mail management more difficult
- b. ☐ Create peer-to-peer threats
- c. ☐ Eliminate viruses from his computer
- d. ☐ Activate a virus associated with an attachment without his knowledge

13. All of the following are examples of malicious code except:

- a. ☐ Viruses
- b. ☐ Trojan horses
- c. ☐ Worms
- d. ☐ Cookies

14. Lauren gets an e-mail with an attachment from the director of her agency. It has a file attachment with an unfamiliar file extension. Lauren should do all of the following except:

- a. ☐ Verify that the sender sent the email and attachment
- b. ☐ Be suspicious of this e-mail and attachment
- c. ☐ Open the attachment
- d. ☐ Call the help-desk for advice on handling this

15. Ryan receives an e-mail that states the Internet is being cleaned up and that he should leave his computer powered-off for 24 hours after receipt of this message. After careful review of the message contents and verifying the information with the help desk he realizes this is:

- a. ☐ A hoax
- b. ☐ An attempt at social engineering
- c. ☐ An email used for phishing
- d. ☒ A multi-level marketing plan

EXHIBIT 323  
001824

16. Which of the following best describes PKI?

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- a. ☐ A card that allows you to access DoD information systems
- b. ☐ A card that allows you to access classified information on the SIPRnet
- c. ☐ A system for encrypting sensitive information
- d. ☐ An infrastructure that allows the DoD to issue digital certificates to authorized users

17. Agnes wants to make sure that she knows which steps to take to avoid spillage. You advise Agnes to do all of the following except:

- a. ☐ Check all emails for possible classified information
- b. ☐ Properly mark and store all removable media
- c. ☐ Store classified data on her PDA when traveling
- d. ☐ Ensure all file names and subject headers identify the sensitivity of the information

18. Wanda is at work on the clock and is working on her private commercial business. She receives a reprimand from her supervisor. What should Wanda have known:

- a. ☐ Her organization is prohibited from monitoring her activities on her work computer.
- b. ☐ Her organization is permitted to monitor her computer for possible misuse.
- c. ☐ The warning banner she saw when she logged into her computer is directed only to management people in the department.
- d. ☐ Even when you log onto a DoD computer you retain all rights to workplace privacy.

19. All of the following are acceptable procedures for backing up classified information except:

- a. ☐ Back classified information up daily.
- b. ☐ Label backups with sensitivity labels.
- c. ☐ Store backups in your desk drawer.
- d. ☐ Store backups at an approved secure location

20. The only acceptable use in this list for any DoD computer asset is:

- a. ☐ Viewing or downloading pornography
- b. ☐ Gambling on the Internet
- c. ☐ Conducting research for a work project
- d. ☐ Conducting private commercial business

21. According to the Army Best Business Practice (BBP) user-level generated passwords should be changed a minimum of every

- a. ☐ 30 - 45 days
- b. ☐ 60 - 90 days
- c. ☐ 90-150 days
- d. ☐ 6 months - annually

22. A user password should consist of a combination of at least 2 uppercase, 2 lowercase, 2 numbers, 2 special characters

- a. ☐ True
- b. ☐ False

23. Defense in Depth (DiD) encompasses a physical and logical structure that requires a layering of security policies, procedures, and technology mechanisms to protect network resources, from the desktop to the enterprise, within and across the enterprise architecture. DiD elements focus on what three areas?

- a. ☐ People, operations and defense of the environment.
- b. ☐ People, organizations and environment.
- c. ☐ Units, perimeter security, operations.
- d. ☒ People, perimeter security, defense of the environment.

24. A user is not responsible for protecting information not authorized to be released for public disclosure.

- a. ☐ True  
b. ☐ False

0028 10-CID221-10117

25. Which of the following is allowed IAW AR 25-2?

- a. ☐ Installation of software, configuration of an IS or connecting any ISs to a distributed computing environment with prior approval.  
b. ☐ Modification of the IS or software, use of the IS for any other manner other than its intended purpose, or adding user-configurable or unauthorized software.  
c. ☐ Efforts to strain, test, circumvent, or bypass network or IS security mechanisms or to perform network or keystroke monitoring.  
d. ☐ Disabling or removing security or protective software and other mechanisms and their associated logs from IS.

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To send your answers, click on the Send Answers button.

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

REPORT NUMBER

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## DETAILS

Between 1100 and 1530, 10 Apr 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) recorded PFC MANNING's visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, Quantico, VA. Upon completion of the visitation period, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was informed by brig personnel that PFC MANNING was visited by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) and Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). A subsequent review of the recording on 11 Apr 11 revealed PFC MANNING and his visitors, previously identified as Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could all be heard clearly, but held no evidentiary value.

About 0842, 11 Apr 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) which captured the recording of PFC MANNING's 10 Apr 11 visitation period at the Marine Corps Brig - Quantico, VA. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 044-11.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SI (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

11 Apr 11

EXHIBIT

324

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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001827

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1220, 11 Apr 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, coordinated with Ms (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Data Transfer Officer, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), Bldg 10803 Parkridge Circle, Reston, VA 20191, to obtain the log files for the JIEDDO web server. About 1243, 11 Apr 11, Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided a DVD-R containing the log files to SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who collected the DVD-R as evidence. The collection was documented on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document, Document Number #045-11.

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGN

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

11 Apr 11

EXHIBIT

325

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001828  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Exhibit(s) 326

Page(s) 001829 thru 01829b withheld:

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)

Permits withholding information that  
is classified for  
National Security purposes

Exhibit(s) 327

Page(s) 001830 thru 01830a withheld:

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)

Permits withholding information that  
is classified for  
National Security purposes

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

Report Number

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 0800, 22 Apr 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one Compact Disk (CD) containing access logs from the Army Counter Intelligence Center (ACIC), from the CCIU forensic computer, which was documented on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 051-11.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

22 Apr 11

EXHIBIT

328

1 FEB 77

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001831  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1325, 3 May 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office; and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) both assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 210 A Street, Suite 300, Fort McNair, DC 20319, telephonically interviewed SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Bravo Company (B Co), 57<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Signal Battalion (ESB), 11th Signal Brigade, Fort Hood, TX 76544 (formerly assigned to HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (2 BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div), Fort Drum, NY (FDNY) 13602).

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she arrived to FDNY in March 2007 and was assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Special Troops Battalion (2 BSTB), 2 BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, FDNY, as a supply clerk. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she knew of PFC MANNING while the unit was at FDNY but that she did not have much interaction with him.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she deployed to Iraq in November 2009 as a late arrival due to the potential need for surgery, which she eventually did not need. She stated she occasionally talked to PFC MANNING during the deployment when delivering supplies to the S-2 section or if she saw him in passing while he was in the smoking area. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not smoke but stated her path of travel routinely took her by the smoking area where she would often see PFC MANNING. Those interactions were limited to pleasantries and did not include in-depth discussions of any topics of note. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING did not appear to have any friends and was always by himself, usually in the smoking area.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as smart with computers. When asked what she based that assessment upon, she stated she never witnessed his computer skills but made the assumption because most S-2 soldiers were good with computers. She related that PFC MANNING would often utilize the personal computer of SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Supply Room, HHC, 2 BSTB, 2 BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, FDNY, to surf the internet with SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) permission. After about a week of being assigned to the Supply Room, PFC MANNING began bringing in headphones and listening to music on SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) computer which SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could hear despite the headphones. She stated she did not observe what he was doing on the computer.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated there was a SIPRNET computer in the Supply Room but SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was the only one to use it. She never witnessed PFC MANNING using the SIPRNET computer in the Supply Room.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related her first conversation with PFC MANNING occurred when he was assigned to the Supply Room after the assault on SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). She stated PFC MANNING would tell her about how many bank accounts he had and asked her if she had a savings account. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she did not want to discuss her personal finances with PFC MANNING and deflected his questions about those matters. She related that over several conversations, they discussed PFC MANNING's background which he had described as "dysfunctional". He related to SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that his mother used a lot of drugs and kicked him out of the house. PFC MANNING further related to SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that he then went to

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

S (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

3 May 11

EXHIBIT

329

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001832  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

live with his aunt. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING described his motives for joining the army as wanting "to do something different". SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING never made any comments either for or against the United States.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that about two days prior to PFC MANNING "leaving" the Supply Room for the last time, she was informed that PFC MANNING was not allowed to have access to any electronic devices to include computers, iPods, etc. At the time, she did not know why the restrictions were in place because she assumed PFC MANNING was assigned to the Supply Room because of the assault on SPC

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C). She also related that PFC MANNING asked her if she regretted joining the military and told her that he "did some messed up stuff" but did not provide further details about the "stuff" was. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked if PFC MANNING felt he could handle the consequences of his actions and he said yes but was upset that he could not talk to his family because of his actions. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) then stated to PFC MANNING that his actions must have been serious given those consequences and asked why he chose to do what he did to which PFC MANNING responded "because everyone needed to know the messed up stuff the army was doing." After PFC MANNING was escorted out of the Supply Room for the last time, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she had no further contact with him.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she was later tasked with inventorying PFC MANNING's personal items located in his Containerized Housing Unit (CHU). During the inventory, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 2 BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, FDNY, PFC MANNING's roommate and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) friend, was present and indicated to her that PFC MANNING did not get along with anybody and there were rumors that PFC MANNING was gay. She stated she did not believe the rumors until she found items in PFC MANNING's possession regarding gender reassignment surgery. She stated they also found a copy of PFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) NFI) Enlisted Record Brief (ERB) with PFC MANNING's possessions. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated she thought it odd that PFC MANNING would be in possession of PVT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) RB as she was not aware of a pre-existing friendship between the two. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that PVT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was re-deployed in late December 2009 or early January 2010 to be separated from the Army because he could not adjust to the Army and was a disciplinary problem. She related he had been caught shoplifting prior to the unit's deployment and then pointed a loaded shotgun at a supervisor while deployed. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PVT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was "know to hack bank accounts". When asked to clarify the statement, she said PVT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had been assigned to the Supply Room prior to his re-deployment and they had several conversations. PVT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) told her he used to work for a bank prior to joining the army and could hack bank accounts although he never demonstrated that ability to her. She thought he was just bragging. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) never saw PFC MANNING and PVT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) together as PVT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was re-deployed long before PFC MANNING was assigned to the Supply Room.

////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

DATE

3 May 11

EXHIBIT

329

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001833

Approved

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361  
ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

Between 12:48 and 13:15, 27 Apr 11, SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) utilized wget.exe to automate the downloading of 766 .PDF files pertaining to Guantanamo Bay detainees from the following classified (SECRET) webpage:

b(1)

SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) utilized the same version of wget.exe that was previously identified during the forensic examination of PFC Bradley E. MANNING's primary SIPRNET computer, in the bradley.manning user profile. Further, an examination of the Intelink logs revealed numerous files downloaded via wget.exe (by a user of PFC MANNING's primary SIPRNET computer), which allowed SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) to create a small program (script) to automate the downloading of content. A forensic image of the files downloaded by SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was subsequently created with the EnCase forensic program.

EXAMINER's NOTE: It is believed the script and methodology used by SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) to download the files in question from the classified Intelink site are similar to those most likely utilized by PFC MANNING to obtain the same documents in March 2010.

At 1550, 27 Apr 11, SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected a digital video disc (DVD) as evidence containing an EnCase Logical Evidence File (LEF) of the files downloaded from the classified Intelink site, seized on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 053-11, Item 1.

Verification MD5

089a980a70bef0cc1858bcb1f6fd71d0

About 2400, 4 May 11, SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) downloaded 768 posted Guantanamo Bay .PDF files from the website WikiLeaks.ch (a mirror website for WikiLeaks.org) onto a CCIU forensic computer.

**KEEP US STRONG**

**GITMO FILES**

**The Guantanamo Files**

On Sunday April 24, 2011 WikiLeaks began publishing 779 secret files from the notorious Guantanamo Bay prison camp. The details for every detainee will be released daily over the coming month.

**Prisoners indexed by their Internment Serial Number (ISN)**

2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57
58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65
66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73
74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81
82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89
90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97
98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105

Files released so far: 763/779

The Guantanamo Files

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By Name

By ISN

Policy Files

Cover Story Acknowledgments

E.C. Thruout Prisoners

JTF-OWMD Threat Matrix

DET ONE GOF

Screen shot of the WikiLeaks.ch web page concerning the Guantanamo Files

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

ORGANIZATION

Digital Forensics and Research Branch, Computer Crime  
Investigative Unit U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

DATE

5 May 11

EXHIBIT

330

SIGN (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 34

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361  
ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

At 0800, 5 May 11, SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected a DVD as evidence containing an EnCase LEF of the files downloaded from Wikileaks.ch, seized on EPCD DN 060-11, Item 1.

Verification MD5

f8f088f3f23fa709a299f624b01063d2

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

SI (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

ORGANIZATION

Digital Forensics and Research Branch, Computer Crime  
Investigative Unit U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

DATE

5 May 11

EXHIBIT

330

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1 FEB 77

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Approved (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 35

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 2000, 5 May 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) downloaded the file *cablegate201105050833.7z* from the website [www.wikileaks.ch](http://www.wikileaks.ch). According to the website, the file was purported to contain all of the Department of State cables released by WikiLeaks as of 5 May 11.

About 0830, 6 May 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) utilized FTK Imager 3.0.0.1443 to create hash values of the *cablegate201105050833.7z* file and its uncompressed contents. The file *cablegate201105050833.7z*, its uncompressed contents, and the hash value lists pertaining to both were burned to a Digital Versatile Disc (DVD).

About 0845, 6 May 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one DVD containing the file *cablegate201105050833.7z*, its uncompressed contents, and the hash value lists pertaining to both. The collection was documented on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document, Document Number 062-11.

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

DATE

6 May 11

EXHIBIT

331

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1 FEB 77

001836  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 0800, 22 Apr 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, received, via email from Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Director of Investigations, 902d Military Intelligence Group (MI Grp), Fort Meade, MD 20755, log files (SECRET) pertaining to the Army Counter Intelligence Center (ACIC). The log files were transferred to a Compact Disc (CD) which was collected as evidence on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 051-11.

About 0837, 19 May 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) containing CENTAUR logs (SECRET) which was sent to this office via Federal Express tracking number 7947 6477 5239 by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The collection was documented on DA Form 4137, EPCD, DN 070-11.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

DATE

19 May 11

EXHIBIT

332

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001837  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROUTED TO

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 0730, 26 May 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, interviewed Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C).

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was a former soldier assigned to HHC, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (2 BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div), Fort Drum, NY (FDNY). Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was identified during the interview of SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 2 BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, FDNY, as a self-admitted computer hacker. Additionally, a copy of Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Enlisted Record Brief (ERB) was found on one of PFC MANNING's computers.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he joined the US Army in January 2008 and completed One Station Unit Training (OSUT) as an 11C – Indirect Fire Infantryman (Mortarman). He was initially assigned to 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry, 2 BCT, FDNY in the May/June 2008 timeframe. Sometime after his initial assignment, volunteers were requested to serve on the Protective Services Detachment (PSD) for the Commander and Command Sergeant Major of the 2 BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, during the unit's upcoming deployment (initially designated to be to Afghanistan but later changed to Iraq). Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated he volunteered and was assigned to HQ Platoon, HHC, 2 BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, FDNY, in November 2008.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) deployed to Iraq in October 2009 and was redeployed back to FDNY in December 2009 and separated from the US Army due to failure to adapt/misconduct issues which he described as an inability to "get along" with his unit first sergeant. Prior to redeployment, he was assigned to the Supply Room, HHC, 2 BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, FDNY, for approximately one week. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that during the time in the Supply Room, he related to personnel that he had previously been involved in banking institution hacking. Upon further questioning, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated he had been employed by a technical services company named Robert Half Technologies during 2006-2007 and worked on a contract for Wachovia Bank in Charlotte, NC, where he was initially assigned to work on the roll-out of Wachovia's new Blackberry technology. Shortly after beginning the contract, he was approached to also conduct penetration testing under contract for Wachovia and did so for approximately three months.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was asked if knew PFC MANNING and related he knew of him in garrison at FDNY and stated he would occasionally exchange pleasantries with him when on CQ or Staff Duty. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as a "good kid" that everyone knew was gay, which he believed caused everyone to pick on PFC MANNING. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was of the opinion that this treatment caused PFC MANNING to take the actions he did in releasing classified information to Wikileaks. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING's actions as traitorous ("the biggest military traitor of all time") but also stated he got along with PFC MANNING. He stated he was not surprised that PFC MANNING "did something" because of being "picked on" but was flabbergasted when he heard of the allegations. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he never socialized with PFC MANNING off-duty but would see him in garrison and then at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer when deployed to Iraq and would occasionally talk with him in passing. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described himself as a computer geek and related that he and PFC MANNING would occasionally discuss new technologies but never discussed computer security, encryption, etc. Rather, the conversations usually revolved around the newest computer processors, hardware, etc.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

26 May 11

EXHIBIT

333

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001838  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that while deployed to Iraq, he was assigned to "watch the TOC" [Tactical Operations Center] which was a regular duty and on one occasion (date unknown) had a conversation with PFC MANNING in which PFC MANNING related to him that he was in trouble with his sergeant for using Instant Messaging for personal reasons while on his government computer (NFI). He stated PFC MANNING was obviously frustrated but did not "freak out" about the issue. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he never saw PFC MANNING engage in any behavioral outbursts. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he never discussed WikiLeaks with PFC MANNING and did not know why PFC MANNING would have a copy of his ERB on his computer.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was familiar with WikiLeaks prior to this incident, but that he never provided WikiLeaks with information.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

26 May 11

EXHIBIT

333

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001839  
Approved



CLASSIFIED

Exhibit(s) 334

Page(s) 001840 thru 01840d referred to:

Defense Intelligence Agency  
ATTN: DAN-1A (FOIA)  
200 MacDill Blvd  
Washington, DC 20340-5100

AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0106-11-CID055-

0028 10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

DETAILS

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION: On 14 June 11, this office received a request for assistance from Computer Crime Investigative Unit, Washington Metro Resident Agency, to conduct interview of Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional (JRCF).

About 1030, 21 Jun 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, interviewed Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) at the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was contacted by phone and remained on speakerphone during the entire interview. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was asked and replied to all questions on the questionnaire and his answers were recorded on the questionnaire.

About 1225, 21 Jun 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 22134, 571-305-4483, on the completion of the interview and no further action was required by this office.

////////////////////////////////////Last Entry////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION
SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		Fort Leavenworth CID Office 801 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
SIGNATURE	DATE	EXHIBIT
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)	21 Jun 11	335

CID FORM 94-E

1 Oct 95

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<b>AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT</b> <i>CID Regulation 195-1</i>	ROI NUMBER 0110-11-CID055-
	0028 10 - CID221-10117 PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

DETAILS

**BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:** On 22 Jun 11, this office received a request for assistance from SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Computer Crimes Investigation Unit (CCIU), 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 22134, requesting this office provide a escort for a meeting between Inmate Bradley MANNING, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 (FLKS) and his Lawyer.

About 1200, 22 Jun 11, Investigator (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, coordinated with and conducted escort duties with CCIU.

About 1500, 22 Jun 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated nothing further was requested of this office.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		Fort Leavenworth CID Office 801 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027	
SIGN (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE 22 Jun 11	EXHIBIT 336	

CID FORM 94-E

1 Oct 95

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AUTOMATIC TERMINATION (Para 13, AR 340-16)  
(When Data is Entered)

001842

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

Between 0800-0830, 8 Jun 11, Investigator (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Military Police Investigations (MPI), Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, collected as evidence two DVDs containing the recording(s) of PFC MANNING's visitation, which occurred on 21 May 11. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 088-11.

About 0800, 28 Jun 11, Investigator (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one DVD containing the recording(s) of PFC MANNING's visitation, which occurred on 25 Jun 11. The collection of evidence was documented on DA Form 4137, EPCD, DN 095-11.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

DATE

28 Jun 11

EXHIBIT

337

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001843

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1550, 13 Jul 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected one (1) DVD-R disc from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Site Lead for Information Technology, 902nd Military Intelligence Group, 4552 Cooper Avenue, Fort Meade, MD 20755, which contained log files related to this investigation. DVD-R collected on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 099-11.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noted at the time of collection, the contents of the DVD-R were not able to be verified and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was unable to provide a complete explanation as to the context of the files. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noted SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, had previously coordinated with personnel at the 902nd Military Intelligence Group to provide log files related to this case.

About 1000, 14 Jul 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Digital Forensics Research Branch - CCIU, in order to make a working copy of the DVD-R disc and obtain the Message Digest 5 (MD5) Hash Values for each of the log files which were contained in two folders "Hits" and "Hits\_Other\_Subnets" on the DVD-R disc.

### Folder "Hits":

File Name	Hash Value
ex100214.log	056d2e22cf4ef011cb7dd64c59732202
ex091229.log	23a0f88b6464ea86f1911ad8fa696733
ex091217.log	4bd0607994cfbb9d4b1b3023303b36a5
ex100317.log	5c6faf2f89ea8da324ee7270016830da
ex100308.log	77423e50c86f2e148f2243d18516395e
ex100316.log	780fd4d5bab3c7a2335cc3d1eab1215
ex091201.log	8598f20aaa3902460badcaf892b7f311
ex091119.log	96e37f1cf3d3a1552cc47b302c9ae401
ex100301.log	ebcbc446221d607911e3e15333df2b58
ex100315.log	f4347c504552a032b529cb46d2f15aac

### Folder "Hits\_Other\_Subnets":

File Name	Hash Value
ex100209.log	1314ab8f1f03cbea64904debdb9c7392
ex091221.log	24ec56715f1f487d354e2bf760b3c893
ex091214.log	75a56d00983f7e72a77844f69ebad002
ex100302.log	834a9d2d0a3fcd28b1be200f549a8a67
ex100211.log	9028aaa276ca011e14cd34d31ab54bdc
ex100207.log	bf065a90438affef8cb2d2cca9d8909e

//////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

S (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

14 Jul 11

EXHIBIT

338

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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001844  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1450, 18 Jul 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, interviewed Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Confinement Facility (JRCF), 830 Sabalu Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66048 who had reported to his attorney that PFC MANNING had confessed to him. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he had come in contact with PFC MANNING through the Inmate Advisory Council (IAC). Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was the maximum custody inmates' IAC representative and was taken to the pre-trial inmate area by guards to discuss potential IAC issues with the pre-trial inmates. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that after explaining the purpose of the IAC, he asked PFC MANNING who he was and why he was at the JRCF. PFC MANNING allegedly responded with, "I sold information to WikiLeaks". Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that shortly after MANNING stated he sold info to Wikileaks, the guards realized Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) should not have been in the pre-trial area as the pre-trial inmates were to have their own IAC representative and took him away. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) if he was sure PFC MANNING stated he "sold" the information and Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was positive. The interview of Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was recorded.

AGENT's COMMENT: Each unit in the JRCF has an IAC representative who is taken around by the guards and allowed to meet with each inmate one-on-one (with the guard present but generally out of earshot). Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and PFC MANNING were in the same Secure Housing Unit (SHU) but the inmate was in maximum custody while PFC MANNING was in pre-trial. They should have never been allowed to come in contact with each other but Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated that the SHU guards brought him around to all max custody inmates and then to pre-trial as the IAC representative before they realized their error.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

18 Jul 11

EXHIBIT

339

1 FEB 77

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

0123-11-CID055-

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CID Regulation 195-1

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION: About 1515, 14 Jul 11, this office received a Request for Assistance from the Computer Crimes Investigative Unit (CCIU) Washington Metro Resident Agency, Quantico, VA 22134 (QVA), to interview Pre-Trial Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Joint Regional Correctional Facility (JRCF), Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 (FLKS).

About 1545, 14 Jul 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) using the information worksheet provided by CCIU. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was in pre-trial with Inmate MANNING who he believed to be somewhat arrogant, and was unsure if any information Inmate MANNING disclosed was classified. (See Worksheet)

AGENT'S COMMENT: Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not wish to fill out the worksheet and requested SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) write as he dictated. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) looked over the worksheet at the conclusion of the interview to ensure nothing he said was improperly annotated or paraphrased.

About 1230, 18 Jul 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CCIU, QVA, who stated nothing further was requested of this office.//LAST ENTRY///

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)	Fort Leavenworth CID Office
Spe	801 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	Date: 18 Jul 11 Exhibit: 340
CID Form 94 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE	

End 1

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23-11-0088

0028 10-CID221-10117

The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command is conducting a criminal investigation involving a matter of national security. You have been identified as someone who may have information relevant to this investigation. Please answer all questions to the best of your ability.

Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: JRCF

Cell/Home Phone: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

Different than other pre-trial inmates.

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

Has attitude problem in morning. Very hesitant when communicating with cadre. He tests the cadre. Very immature. Blatantly homosexual.

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

Not sure.

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

Me for a long time. I was curious about his caliber of person. I socially interacted with him. Nobody other than me that I know of.

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

Never seen him play chess with anyone else. No association with anyone else.

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

He seems normal to me.

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

He likes to talk like he's smart. He typically tries to make people think he's smart. Unsure if anything he has talked about has been classified.

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1055, 19 Jul 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E) this office, interviewed Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was identified in an article published in the Guardian newspaper and New York magazine as an individual with whom PFC MANNING engaged in online chat sessions prior to deployment to Iraq.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated PFC MANNING initiated contact with him in February 2009. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING had found his YouTube channel *zjemptv* on the internet and contacted him via AOL Instant Messenger. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated they primarily discussed computers and PFC MANNING's background and life in the US Army and stated PFC MANNING did not discuss any information with him that he believed to be classified.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the communication stopped in August 2009 when he changed his AOL Instant Messenger name as the increased popularity of his YouTube channel caused him to receive too many messages to respond to. He did not provide his new screen name to PFC MANNING so PFC MANNING had no way to contact him.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did not know who the gender-identity counselor mentioned in the magazine article might be and that the contents of all the chats were published online by the Guardian newspaper and New York magazine.

AGENT's COMMENT: Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) YouTube personality is a transgendered woman named (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The interview of Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was audio-recorded.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

19 Jul 11

EXHIBIT

342

1 FEB 77

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Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

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0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

Between 1730-1840, 30 Aug 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) downloaded the "Cablegate" archive from [www.wikileaks.org](http://www.wikileaks.org). The archive contained all Department of State cables released by WikiLeaks as of that date. A subsequent review of the contents of the archive revealed that source information had not been redacted from all of the files, thereby exposing sources of information to possible reprisal.

About 0735, 31 Aug 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) transferred the file containing the DoS cables downloaded from WikiLeaks (*cablegate-201108290338.7z*) to a Digital Versatile Disc (DVD). About 0745, 31 Aug 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected the DVD as evidence and documented the collection on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document, Document Number 132-11.

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SI (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

31 Aug 11

EXHIBIT

343

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROY NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1405, 31 Aug 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received an email via SIPRNET from Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), with 14 attached text files containing Intelink log files pertaining to specific search terms.

About 0850, 1 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) transferred the 14 Intelink log files to a Digital Versatile Disc (DVD). About 0915, 1 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected the DVD as evidence and documented the collection on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document, Document Number 135-11.

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SI (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

1 Sep 11

EXHIBIT

344

1 FEB 77

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001850  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 0700, 1 Sep 11, the undersigned searched the Internet using a convert connection for the cables.csv file believed to contain all of the classified cables in the possession of Wikileaks. A search for the file cables.csv revealed the following website  
[https://thepiratebay.org/torrent/6644172/Wikileaks\\_Cables\\_Full\\_Unredacted\\_and\\_Decrypted\\_%28cables.csv%29](https://thepiratebay.org/torrent/6644172/Wikileaks_Cables_Full_Unredacted_and_Decrypted_%28cables.csv%29) which was a bit torrent site used to share files. The .torrent file downloads a file named z.gpg-decrypte.7z. The z.gpg-decrypte.7z file appeared to be the decrypted version of file z.gpg (found here <http://193.198.207.6/wiki/file/xyz/z.gpg>) and decrypted using the password "ACollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince\_1966\_ToThe\_PresentDay#". The website <http://193.198.207.6/wiki/file/xyz/z.gpg> was discovered in the forum part of thepiratebay.org web page. The password was discovered from the book written by David Leigh (<http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/09/01/its-done-bruised-egos-lead-to-the-release-of-uncensored-wikileaks-cables/>) WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange's War on Secrecy. The password decrypts z.gpg to a .7z extension file. The .7z extension file than can be uncompressed and the file which was uncompressed was cables.csv.

About 1340, 1 Sep 11, the following items were seized as evidence and placed on a DVD as Item #1, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number 134 -11:

1. Wikileaks\_Cables\_Full\_Unredacted\_and\_Decrypted\_(cables.csv).6644172.TPB.torrent (containing the bit torrent link to file z.gpg-decrypte.7z)
2. Webpage.txt (containing [https://thepiratebay.org/torrent/6644172/Wikileaks\\_Cables\\_Full\\_Unredacted\\_and\\_Decrypted\\_%28cables.csv%29](https://thepiratebay.org/torrent/6644172/Wikileaks_Cables_Full_Unredacted_and_Decrypted_%28cables.csv%29))
3. pwd.txt (contains ACollectionOfDiplomaticHistorySince\_1966\_ToThe\_PresentDay#)
4. original\_location\_z.gpg.txt (containing <http://193.198.207.6/wiki/file/xyz/>)
5. z.gpg (encrypted .7z file)
6. z.gpg-decrypte.7z (unencrypted .7z file containing cables.csv file)

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Digital Forensics and Research Branch Computer Crime Investigative Unit U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE 1 Sep 11	EXHIBIT 345

CID FORM 94  
1 FEB 77

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001851  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0152-11-CID055-  
0028 10-CID221-10117

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DETAILS

**BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:** On 22 Aug 11, this office received a Request for Assistance from the Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit (CCIU), USACIDC, 27130 Telegraph Road E0233, Quantico, VA 22134, to conduct a witness interview of Pre-trial Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 (FLKS).

About 1310, 23 Aug 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who stated Inmate Bradley MANNING, Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS, was normally a quiet person and just recently began to leave his cell on a normal basis to play cards and watch television with the other pre-trial inmates. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated Inmate MANNING more recently had begun to approach him, in passing, and state he needed to speak with Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) later on. On 19 Aug 11, Inmate MANNING sat near Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) during recreation time in front of the television and began to talk about how he was going back to Great Britain, or wherever he was born. Also, that he knew quite a bit and had some type of affiliation with the DEA in the past and there had been information leaks since back then. Inmate MANNING expressed he was tired of the Bureaucracy. He also spoke with Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) several times on 20 Aug 11 and 21 Aug 11, and stated what he did was only the tip of the iceberg and there were others involved. Inmate MANNING stated he could not understand why he was the only person getting in trouble and did not do anything but to tell the truth. On 21 Aug 11, Inmate MANNING specifically stated there were other people involved and again stated Wikipedia (Wikileaks) was only the tip of the iceberg. Also, that he was tired of Americans getting arrested and the Government covering it up. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated in the last day or two the JRCF has plugged in the television so inmates have to wear headphones to watch television so they have been talking less frequently. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) denied any of their conversations may have involved classified information and stated several times Inmate MANNING indicated he should not tell anyone about their conversations by making statements such as "it's no one else's business." On 23 Aug 11, Inmate MANNING talked about his job as an Analyst for the Army and how he tracked troop movements. Inmate MANNING made a statement that he felt Army movements could result in innocent lives being lost.

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he originally joined the Army and met his wife, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 362<sup>nd</sup> Engineer Company, Fort Benning, GA 31905, in Advanced Individual Training. He proposed to her on the last day of his training and she accepted. He then PCSed to Fort Riley, where she joined him shortly afterwards since she graduated later. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was not at Fort Riley long before he went Absent Without Leave. He stated he suffers from memory loss and has been diagnosed with multiple personalities. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he would have blackouts and suffer headaches and on the first night at the JRCF he was restrained due to an outburst. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he has not suffered from these symptoms after that incident as the JRCF doctors began to prescribe him medication. One of the side effects of the medication is he has poor memory and writes things down to remember them. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) detailed an example of his memory loss that he cannot recall his two children's names frequently and has to be reminded by his wife. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the other pre-trial inmates at the Joint Regional Correctional Facility are aware of his memory loss and when

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		Fort Leavenworth CID Office 801 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE	EXHIBIT	
	6 Sep 11	346	

CID FORM 101-1

1 Oct 95

001852

<b>AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT</b> <i>CID Regulation 195-1</i>		ROT NUMBER 0152-11-CID055-	
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<b>DETAILS</b> <p>they play cards, have to instruct him on the game rules again. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did not even know about Wikipedia (referring to Wikileaks) and did not know who Inmate MANNING was until told by another inmate. When interviewed he read from two handwritten pages of notebook paper torn from a Composition book and stated he was keeping notes so he would not forget what Inmate MANNING said to him and hid the note pages within his folded medical profile and kept them in his pocket so the other inmates would not find out. He knew Inmate MANNING was an important person and someone might be interested in what he was saying to Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). Also, Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the reason he was willing to speak with CID was because he was patriotic but also because he wanted to help his own situation. He was facing two counts of Desertion with intent not to return and had not even had his Article 32 hearing yet. He was unsure how this would help him and but wanted to keep other inmates from the facility from finding out he was talking with CID. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he would continue to take notes on the conversations with Inmate MANNING and provide information to CID. He also thought Inmate MANNING was getting more comfortable talking to him with time.</p> <p>About 1032, 31 Aug 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Military Police Investigations, JRCS, FLKS, who stated a few weeks ago an Observation Report was submitted because Inmate MANNING tried to place a bar code on an envelope he wanted to mail. When interviewed Inmate MANNING stated he was trying to see if the bar code would work, that he wanted to mail to be identified as certified because it could be scanned and would be mailed more quickly than regular mail. Inmate MANNING was very up front about creating the bar code and stated he had experience in a mail room before and then explained how the binary numbers worked to create a bar code. As a result of this incident, Inmate MANNING was not written up or punished.</p> <p>About 1040, 31 Aug 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who stated he was starting to become uncomfortable with the information Inmate MANNING was providing to him. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated Inmate MANNING was speaking to him more frequently now and providing more information. Inmate MANNING told Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) he illegally obtained images from the cameras attached to the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that were called a name that started with a "P" and provided these to a truck driver who took them to VBC. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained VBC was the Victory Baghdad Camp (correctly identified as the Victory Base Complex in Iraq). Inmate MANNING did not provide details on what the media was or who it was given to, either civilian or military truck driver. Additionally, Inmate MANNING was not sure what happened to the media once it was out of his hands but was adamant his Chain of Command knew what he was doing and there were other conspirators since the information was passed to someone at VBC. Inmate MANNING would not say exactly what base he was at in Iraq when he released the information but frequently talked about Camp Loyalty and Hammer, along with VBC. Inmate MANNING made the comment he knew he was coming here before he was moved, but did not clarify if he was talking about coming to Fort Leavenworth or coming to the United States to be detained. Inmate MANNING was starting to come out of his "shell" more and when the other pre-trial inmates would give him a hard time he was starting to defend himself more and make sarcastic comments back. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated Inmate</p>			
TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		Fort Leavenworth CID Office 801 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		DATE 6 Sep 11	EXHIBIT 346

CID FORM 94-E

1 Oct 95

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<b>AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT</b> <i>CID Regulation 195-1</i>	ROI NUMBER 0152-11-CID055-	
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<p><b>DETAILS</b></p> <p>MANNING had a lot of animosity built up and would hide it well until he started to talk about what he did or what was going on. Inmate MANNING was also very suspicious and commented he knew the JRCF Guards were recording his every move and likely since he was talking to Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) family would be investigated. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noted Inmate MANNING called his lawyer every business day as he was listed on the daily appointments report.</p> <p>Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) allowed his three pages of notes taken since Inmate MANNING started to talk to him, be photocopied. (See Photocopies)</p> <p>About 0648, 6 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CCIU, who requested this office coordinate with Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and inform him his assistance would not be needed any further. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) requested no further investigative activity.</p> <p>About 1327, 6 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) conducted an exit briefing with Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and stated no further assistance would be needed by USACIDC. Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did not have any questions and did not feel his time had been wasted.///LAST ENTRY///</p>		
TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Fort Leavenworth CID Office 801 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE 6 Sep 11	EXHIBIT 346

CID FORM 9-11  
1 Oct 95

001854  
Excel 1

0028 10-CID221-10117

0162-11-CID055

8/19/11

I went up to Manning and said "I know who you are now even with my bad memory and I want you to know my mother supports you in what you did" he answered "what I didn't do anything but tell the truth that's not illegal" then I walked away

8/20/11

was talking to Manning said he wanted to talk to me later"

8/20/11 Manning stated to me he worked for the

DEA and it has been going on since then? Because as he put it he was fed up with the bureaucracy!

8/21/11

He dose not know why he is the only one getting in trouble for it others were involved?

8/22/11

wanted to know if I wanted to know how many people were killed in celebratory fire over xmas while we were watching news

8/21/11

He's tired of seeing Americans get arrested for stuff the government dose also



8/21/11

Manning stated he wanted to talk later?

8/21/11

Stated staff to wikipedia was just tip of iceberg!  
Should talk to me about it next later!

8/24/11

Manning stated US knew where bin Laden was  
for awhile and did nothing about it till their own  
regime was taken care of

8/24/11

We were supplying weapons to foreign fighters

secretly

8/24/11

Staff/information was flown out of WBC? victory Baghdad complete  
he would hand it off to another guy first who took it all

8/25/11

stated Chair of Command knew he thought?

Passed out troop sizes and location

Suspected location of high priority targets due to aerial location  
coordination and we did nothing to act on intel and let high  
priority targets escape instead of striking

→ my family is BEING WATCHED

THIS WIKI LEAKS JUST A DIVERSION  
FROM THE REAL CRIME?

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROUTING SLIP

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1406, 6 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected one (1) Compact Disc - Recordable (CD-R) from Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) System Administrator, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), P.O. Box 2756, Washington, DC 20013. The CD-R reportedly contained log files related to CIA computer systems allegedly accessed by PFC MANNING. CD-R was retained on DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 0137-11.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) noted at the time of collection, the contents of the CD-R were not able to be verified. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further noted that SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, had previously coordinated with personnel at the CIA to provide these files.

About 1550, 6 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Special Agent in Charge, Digital Forensics Research Branch - CCIU, in order to make a working copy of the CD-R and obtain the Message Digest 5 (MD5) Hash Values for each of the files which were contained in three folders on the CD-R, named: "httpd\_logs", "database\_queries", and "production\_logs".

Folder "httpd\_logs":

### File Name

ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-02-20.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-02-21.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-02-23.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-02-24.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-02-25.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-02-27.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-01.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-02.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-04.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-08.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-09.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-11.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-12.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-15.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-19.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-20.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-21.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-22.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-23.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-24.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-25.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-27.culled

### Hash Value

56789ed6d65382404ee6998edadd37a8  
c5ef1cc1071d08531df16d70f0833582  
bf64322134221471c449e4d8a7fe01a7  
8a8d884c313c1ea6a2f71ac3ee9f8500  
2e14f90729dcd8cf64646e245270e13a  
382406bcadfad6760d2e566c78c9e31ab  
7670c5ec2dc9f4c6249f462126ca99da  
2410fcf60737e206621b0b7c31a9e7b2  
1ce7f533c587bf5c3a59f7dae11674da  
7a2c87f1db94545bad242708211a9903  
108cc898e954c11b9800e27ff1f20690  
5a6c4f85c2b42d63bbd804c76a2877dd  
26e618eee047f9319ca770f27721f386  
36540e0dd3626be220a552083925a46f  
f445553ce13bab1195a1a9a23fd001f1  
ef6e60766561f8fa244265e257fb1f69  
84dc9222025d30866387fc56e3da3263  
144731ed4139c77791a869b6165aea6a  
7928b26008d239d4de46a4f10df80d61  
bb7967cab7f64a39c4bd22f1d160ec56  
be027e3d23865f3ddbbe53fcc78ee81f  
6112a12122369a0830e1cfe61ae397b7

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Sep 11

EXHIBIT

348

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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001858  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROF NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-28.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-29.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-03-30.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-04-27.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-04-08.culled  
ciawire-production.httpd.log.2010-04-03.culled

96371bba04e33bcd48df9e2228b0ea3e  
afd8c7bd78c75927ff5a7ae4ef77ee6b  
113b1bb431f9bddcdd9dbed228730bc2  
68e1c44ffdd9bcd98fa03500814be534  
1c46997ac38675aea32ce1d91e8c2f77  
ae6d4eb913a66155b2e15ddf9c99899f

### Folder "database\_queries":

#### File Name

sql\_dvs\_documents\_users.lst  
sql\_documents.lst  
sql\_document\_views\_documents\_earliest.lst  
sql\_document\_views.lst  
sql\_searches.lst  
sql\_users.lst

#### Hash Value

55ed0458f72e1e17b902c624b9512a4d  
71a39744713e32299f162c7826b59450  
c44a9dc1d12ff78630dfa145a079914d  
09b2910994ca53e9e569c51d92ffc60a  
fb2bdc23bb45a5b2e59691bf7ba81ae6  
06d837d3198b97823f114f4322146be1

### Folder "production\_logs":

#### File Name

production.log.20100303.culled  
production.log.20100401.culled  
production.log.20100615.culled

#### Hash Value

f8ecdff3fd8d9badc3cd52a4720b60e59  
803bda74765900825d0ce4763b570b0e  
03402acb726e12c52ba332ec00a58495

//////////////////////////////////// LAST ENTRY //////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGN

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Sep 11

EXHIBIT

348

CLASSIFIED

Exhibit(s) 349

Page(s) 001860 thru 01860e referred to:

Defense Intelligence Agency  
ATTN: DAN-1A (FOIA)  
200 MacDill Blvd  
Washington, DC 20340-5100

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1530, 20 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received the results of DODIG Subpoena 2011352 for PFC MANNING's education from Montgomery College, 900 Hungerford Drive, Rockville, MD 20850.

A review of the education records revealed PFC MANNING was enrolled at Montgomery College for the Spring 2007 semester where he took four courses. He passed two, withdrew from one, and failed another. He had no outstanding debt due to the college and there were no documented security incidents involving PFC MANNING.

The documents did not reveal any information of investigative value.

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

20 Sep 11

EXHIBIT

350

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001861

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

## Exhibit 351

Page(s) 001862 thru 001868 referred to:

Department of Defense  
Office of Inspector General  
DoD IG FOIA Requester Service Center  
4800 Mark Center Drive – Suite 14L24  
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1100, 27 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, PO Box 2756, Washington, DC 20013, who provided a printout containing the user information for PFC MANNING's Open Source Center user accounts *bmannings* and *bradass87*. The printout was collected as evidence and the collection documented on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document, Document Number 149-11.

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

27 Sep 11

EXHIBIT

352

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1615, 29 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) D co, 229<sup>th</sup> MI Bn, Defense Language Institute (DLI), Monterey, CA, who was formerly assigned to B co, 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div), Fort Drum, NY (FDNY).

### JRTC:

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he arrived at FDNY in November 2008, and was assigned to the Military Intelligence Company (MICO) which was B co, 2 BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div as an interrogator. He first met PFC MANNING when the unit deployed to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, in preparation for the unit deployment to Iraq. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was detailed to the brigade Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) to function as a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Analyst and worked in the SCIF with PFC MANNING. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related their desks were in proximity to each other. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the analysts were "coddled" in his opinion compared to other soldiers as they did not have to meet physical training standards and did not have to clean the unit areas like other soldiers. He further related PFC MANNING was the "go-to analyst" in the SCIF and that the officers and the rest of the analysts relied heavily upon him for analysis. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated his conversations with PFC MANNING while at JRTC were work-related.

### Iraq:

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) deployed to Iraq with B co, 2 BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div in October 2009 and was once again detailed to the brigade Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) to function as a Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Analyst. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) worked in the top secret area of the SCIF but worked with PFC MANNING as the all-source intelligence analysts would frequently ask him for HUMINT and he would frequently ask the all-source intelligence analysts for information that would support his mission. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that none of PFC MANNING's requests for information seemed unusual. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he primarily went to PFC MANNING with requests as he felt PFC MANNING was the most capable analyst.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described the SCIF as heavily dependent on SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and PFC MANNING because other analysts lacked the ability or training to perform their jobs. He stated there was little NCO supervision and that MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) "held [the analysts] close" and acted more as a mentor with nobody filling the traditional NCO role. He further stated there was a rather informal atmosphere between the officers and junior enlisted.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did not witness the "table incident" in which PFC MANNING flipped a table over while being counseled by his SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) nor did he witness the incident in which PFC MANNING assaulted SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). However, SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated it seemed that every weeks "something happened" to which PFC MANNING "flew off the handle". SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as "easily shaken" and stated he believed that PFC MANNING was viewed as a

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGN

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

29 Sep 11

EXHIBIT

353

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Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

useful "weapon that was hard to control" that "if you could point it in the right direction, great" but "make sure the recoil does not get you". When asked to clarify, he stated that PFC MANNING was viewed as talented at his job but difficult to control and prone to outburst. He stated PFC MANNING was kept at a distance personally and that a concerted effort was made to "not rattle him".

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING did not associate with his peers and that he could not tell if it was because PFC MANNING was ostracized by his peers or if he chose to not associate with them. SPC

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he engaged PFC MANNING in conversation as he found him intriguing. SPC

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was interested in psychology and wanted to try to "figure out" PFC MANNING.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING told him he was frustrated as he did not belong in the Army and should instead be at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) with his "hacker friends". SPC

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he believed PFC MANNING treated his job as though it was an academic pursuit rather than a job and did not appreciate the real-life effects their mission had on people. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) believed PFC MANNING felt disdain towards those around him and extended that disdain toward the US Government and he wanted to prove that he should be with the "academic elite". SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that if PFC MANNING was not caught, "it goes without saying" that he would have revealed himself as he wanted to "be a part of something bigger". He further related he believed PFC MANNING would be happier in prison and known for the leaks than if he was not identified as the leak and nobody knew who he was.

SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he vaguely remembered the "printing press" incident but that he did not discuss the incident with PFC MANNING. He further stated that the incident did not seem to make much of an impression on PFC MANNING at the time.

////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

29 Sep 11

EXHIBIT

353

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# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 0820, 24 Oct 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Security, Army Knowledge Online (AKO), Fort Belvoir, VA 22060, to obtain any available log files pertaining to PFC MANNING's AKO account. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the only log files still available were the Light Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) log files pertaining to PFC MANNING's account which he had previously pulled when he first heard of the allegations against PFC MANNING. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided those log files to SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) for review.

A review of the two sets of log files, bradley.manning.xls and bradley.manning.xls, revealed they covered the time periods 21 Feb 10 - 1 Jun 10 and 8 Mar 10 - 16 Jun 10, respectively. Internet research via Domain Dossier revealed all of the IP addresses that accessed PFC MANNING's AKO account during the covered time periods were either IP addresses registered to the US Department of Defense or to commercial companies that provided commercial satellite internet access to individuals in Iraq (e.g., commercial internet access to soldiers in their CHU's). Further, the same IP's were used to access PFC MANNING's Gmail account (see AIR of SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 13 Aug 10) indicating PFC MANNING was likely the individual using those IP addresses.

AGENT's COMMENT: A review of the LDAP logs provided by Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) revealed they were the same log files provided to SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and collected as evidence on EPCD, DN 120-10. It should be noted that the hashes did not match but the contents appeared to be the same.

Further, during the discussion with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) he indicated that when this investigation was initially reported, he accessed the files stored in PFC MANNING's AKO-S account to see if any files may have been related to this investigation. He stated that none of the files stored in PFC MANNING's account were related as they were all related to PFC MANNING's education. Once the call with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was terminated, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) briefed CCIU OPS (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) regarding Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) actions which were clearly outside of the scope of a service provider. SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated similar activity by AKO security personnel had been documented in CCIU RDF 0019-10CID221 Tab and referred to the AKO Director for action deemed appropriate. As Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) actions in this case occurred at the same time as those in the RDF, no further action is needed at this time.

////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

S (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

24 Oct 11

EXHIBIT

354

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1 FEB 77

001872

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 1440, 25 Oct 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (who was formerly assigned as a SSG to 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div), Fort Drum, NY (FDNY).

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he deployed to Iraq as a staff sergeant with 2BCT in October 2009 as a 35M - Human Intelligence Collector where he was assigned to several locations, of which he could not remember the names, and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was reassigned to FOB Hammer around March/April 2009 due to a disagreement with his unit first sergeant which he described as being due to race and religion. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was originally assigned to the 2BCT SCIF for about 4-5 weeks but was then reassigned to the Tactical Operations Center of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Brigade Special Troops Battalion (2BSTB), 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not recall engaging PFC MANNING in any specific conversations but did relate that they engaged in small talk. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he would often visit the 2BCT SCIF to visit his friend SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and that is when he would see PFC MANNING. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he believed PFC MANNING was labeled a "shit bag" because of being late to work on multiple occasions and stated that once a person is labeled in such a manner, it is difficult to get people to change their perceptions. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he had heard of PFC MANNING's outbursts but did not witness them.

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated, "call him a hero, call him a martyr, call him whatever you want, but I think he was just an angry dude. His motives were not noble."

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was administratively reduced from staff sergeant to sergeant for ineffectiveness and from sergeant to specialist for failing a physical fitness test. He characterized the first reduction as being a result of the disagreement with his first sergeant and the second as a result him desiring a separation from the Army. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated that upon the unit's return to Fort Drum, NY, he donated money to the Free Bradley Manning movement and received stickers which he then passed out to unit members. He stated he did so to "ruffle feathers" and hopefully hasten his separation.

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

25 Oct 11

EXHIBIT

355

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001873

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1045, 3 Nov 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) his office, coordinated with Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) US Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Virginia, 2100 Jamieson Avenue, Alexandria, VA. AUSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided a Compact Disc-Recordable (CD-R), which had been sent to her office by Facebook, Inc, 1601 S. California Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94304, in response to Federal Magistrate Search Warrant 1:11SW509, to SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

The CD-R, which was sent to AUSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) office via United Parcel Service (UPS) tracking number 1Z 07V 4W7 A4 9215 2029, was purported to contain the contents of PFC MANNING's Facebook account. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) viewed the contents of the CD-R utilizing AUSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) computer and confirmed the CD-R contained the following .pdf file which appeared to contain the contents of PFC MANNING's Facebook account.

*switchboard.642858205.310552885625627.1319237177.pdf*

About 1100, 3 Nov 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected the CD-R as evidence. The collection was documented on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document, Document Number 113-11.

////////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

DATE

3 Nov 11

EXHIBIT

356

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001874

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Exhibit(s) 357

Page(s) 001875 thru 001881

Documents

**SEALED**

by the

U.S. District Court  
for the Eastern District of Virginia

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1110, 14 Nov 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Contractor, Intelink, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 304 Sentinel Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701, who provided eight DVD-R's containing Intelink log files for October 2009 – June 2010. The log files were purported to be all Intelink log files for that period, regardless of user.

About 1115, 14 Nov 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected the eight DVD-R's as evidence. The collection was documented on a DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document, Document Number 167-11.

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

14 Nov 11

EXHIBIT

358

94

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001882

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1520, 6 Dec 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one hard disk drive, 1.5TB Western Digital, model number WD15EARS, serial number WMAZA4103500, purportedly containing a DD image of a Dell Optiplex 96, serial number DWR2BIC1, U.S. Government desktop computer from Brookhaven National Laboratory, assigned to Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) NFI, from SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, Washington DC, on Evidence Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 179-11.///Last Entry///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Dec 11

EXHIBIT

359

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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001883

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)



## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361

ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

## DETAILS

**Basis for Investigation:**

On 07 Dec 11, SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received a written request from SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street Northwest, Washington DC 20535 to conduct a preliminary examination of the digital media seized as Item I, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 179-11. Item #1 consisted of a United States Department of Energy, Brookhaven National Laboratory computer which was assigned to Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and utilizing the Linux operating system. Specifically it was requested to examine the file b.zip to determine if it was same file identified as the file BE22 PAX.zip originally located on EPCD, DN 123-10, Item #1, which was a classified U.S. Army computer.

**Examination Date and Contents:**

Between 08 Dec 11 and 09 Dec 11, SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) conducted a preliminary investigation of the computer in question. All times shown in this preliminary report are in relation to Eastern Standard Time (EST -5:00 UTC) unless otherwise noted.

A review of the Acquisition and Verification hash values showed they did match, see Figure 1 below.

MD5 Acquisition Hash Value: b3fefe178c3e2c7bf577a21a6c8f93d9  
 MD5 Verification Hash Value: b3fefe178c3e2c7bf577a21a6c8f93d9  
 SHA1 Acquisition Hash Value: 0720ce13812dea2b7b7336b74c057d9636bdc80f  
 SHA1 Verification Hash Value: 0720ce13812dea2b7b7336b74c057d9636bdc80f

Figure 1, the acquisition and verification hash values

**Pertinent Information:**

Examination of the file system determined there was only one user account named kupo.

Examination of the file \home\kupo\b.zip revealed it was created at 11:28:25, 15 Dec 09. A comparison between b.zip and BE22 PAX.zip revealed they did not have the same hash value, see Figure 2 below.

EPCD, DN 179-11, Item #1, b.zip: c2ba26766091b62526c57b4bc9ac69ae  
 EPCD, DN 123-10, Item #1, BE22 PAX.zip: a07f7a4c3ba6301748af6b18da2b1b41

Figure 2, the hash values of the files in question.

Examination of the two zip files revealed they both were password protected zip files and they contained a file named BE22 PAX.wmv. Examination of the file BE22 PAX.wmv from both zip files revealed they had the same hash value, see Figure 3 below.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION
SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		CCIU-Digital Forensics and Research Branch
		U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22136
S (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE	EXHIBIT
	09 Dec 11	360

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361  
ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

## DETAILS

EPCD, DN 179-11, Item #1, b.zip (BE22 PAX.wmv): 35c8b3cafe8e341457ffbf329cedeeb4  
 EPCD, DN 123-10, Item #1, BE22 PAX.zip (BE22 PAX.wmv): 35c8b3cafe8e341457ffbf329cedeeb4

Figure 3, the hash values of the files in question.

In an attempt to determine what the user kupo was doing with the file b.zip the \home\kupo\.bash\_history file was examined. The .bash\_history file disclosed it was a history of the commands typed into the computer for the user kupo. There are no times and dates associated with individual commands. It was disclosed there were 54 commands issued which concerned the attempted decryption of the file b.zip, see Figure 4 below for a partial list.

```
./fcrackzip -p -D -u ../b.zip
./fcrackzip -p D8.DIC -D -u ../b.zip
./fcrackzip -p D8.DIC -D -u ../b.zip
./fcrackzip -p D8.DIC -D ../b.zip
./fcrackzip -p dic-0294.txt -D ../b.zip
./fcrackzip -p dic-0294.txt -D -u ../b.zip
./fcrackzip -p dic-0294.txt -D ../b.zip
```

Figure 4, partial list of the command issued concerning decryption

In an attempt to determine how the classified file b.zip arrived onto this computer, an examination of the file \home\kupo\.bash\_history revealed there were 73 SSH (Secure Shell) connections to IP address 173.68.194.47. It is of note there were two SCP (Secure Copy) sessions to the IP 173.68.194.47 downloading the files d8.zip and dic-0294.zip which appeared to aid the user kupo in the decryption effort, see Figure 5 below for a partial list.

```
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
scp 173.68.194.47:~/d8.zip ./
scp 173.68.194.47:~/dic-0294.zip ./
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
ssh 173.68.194.47
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
ssh -Y 173.68.194.47
```

Figure 5, partial list of connections initiated by the user kupo.

The file \home\kupo\CODE\fdcrackzip-1.0\D8.DIC was a text file dictionary of words used to help decrypt files, see Figure 6 below for segment of the file.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

ORGANIZATION

CCIU-Digital Forensics and Research Branch  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22136

DATE

09 Dec 11

EXHIBIT

360

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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Law Enforcement Sensitive

Approved 001885

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361  
ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

## DETAILS

```

ni-bb a-lhi-sr a. a00 a1 a2 a20 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a
ak aakmal aakroos aakuang aal aalberts aaltje aal
aax aay aaz aazq ab aba ababa aback abacus abad
arrows abarsis abasa abased abasemen abases aba
bey abbey's abbeys abbi abbie abbot abbot's abbo
abdel-sa abdelazi abdelmad abdolrah abdelran abd
oduct abducted abductio abductor abducts Abdul s
abulbeth abelian abellabella abellera abelmam
ag abeu abey abeyance abeyant abez abf abg abgre
ciasaph abiathar abib abico abicos abid abida ab
abilena abilitie ability ability' abiletta abima

```

Figure 6, partial contents of the file D8.DIC

The file \home\kupo\CODE\fdcrackzip-1.0\dic-0294.txt was a text file dictionary of words used to help decrypt files, see Figure 7 below for segment of the file.

```

sl sh sn sa sb sc sd se sf sg sh si
td te tf tg th ti tj tk tl tm tn to
ui uj uk ul um un vo up uq ur us uc
vn vo vp vq vr vs vt vu vv vx vy
ws wt wu wv wx wy wz xA xB xC xD
xu xv xu xx xy xz yA yB yC yD yE yF
zA zB zC zD zE zF zG zH zI zJ zK zL
C A&K A&H A&D A&P A&R A&T A&W A&X A'B
A/A A/B A/C A/D A/E A/F A/G A/I A/L
A&N A&R A&V A&X A&I A&S A&U A&W A&X A'
AGt AGv AHn AHr AHs AHu AHw ATr AIs AT

```

Figure 7, partial contents of the file dic-0294.txt

## Summary:

The file \home\kupo\b.zip contained the exact same file copy of the file BE22 PAX.zip which was a classified password protected zip file containing a video named BE22 PAX.wmv. The file BE22 PAX.zip was originally located on classified server available only to users of the SIPRNET. This preliminary examination could not determine the source of the file b.zip, however it was likely the IP address 173.68.194.47 was involved. Further the user of the U.S. Government computer (kupo) had actively attempted to decrypt the password of b.zip.

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		CCIU-Digital Forensics and Research Branch	
SIC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22136	
		DATE	EXHIBIT
		09 Dec 11	360

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1030, 16 Dec 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence two Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) containing the Al-Sahab video production "Thou Art Held Responsible Only for Thyself" Part 1 and Part 2, from Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Project Manager, Global Video Program, Open Source Center, 930 Dolly Madison Blvd, McLean, VA 22101, which was documented on Evidence/Property Custody Document, Document Number 185-11. ///Last Entry///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

16 Dec 11

EXHIBIT

361

CID USE ONLY – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

001887  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER 0028-10-CID221-10117

0152-11-CID012-

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 0930, 20 Dec 11, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) came to this office reporting that he was friends with PFC Bradley MANNING, and had information that may be relevant to the ongoing Article 32.

About 1254, 20 Dec 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who provided a sworn statement wherein he stated he was assigned to the same unit as PFC MANNING in Fort Drum, NY. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he talked to PFC MANNING about being gay and also went to numerous gay bars with PFC MANNING. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further stated the statements being made by PFC MANNING that he was harassed and made fun of because he was gay are not true. (See Sworn Statement for details)

On 20 Dec 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided a copy of the statement to the Trial Counsel, for the PFC MANNING Article 32, at the Fort Meade Court house.

On 20 Dec 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Coordinated with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) US Army Criminal Investigations Command, Computer Crime Investigative Unit and briefed him on all aspects of this investigation. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) realted as of this time, no further information was needed, and requested the originals of the statement and AIR be sent to him at US Army Criminal Investigations Command, ATTN: Computer Crime Investigative Unit, 27130, Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 22134.

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION:

68<sup>th</sup> Military Police Detachment (CID), 3<sup>rd</sup> Military Police Group (CID),  
Fort Meade, MD 20755

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

20 Dec 11

EXHIBIT

362

SWORN STATEMENT

0028 - 10 - CID221- 10117

File Number: 0028 - 10 - CID221- 10117  
 Location: Fort Meade CID Office, Fort Meade, MD  
 Date: December 20, 2011 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
 Time: 1254 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
 Statement of: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
 RANK: CIV  
 SSN: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
 Org / Address: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

I, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:  
 While stationed at Fort Drum, NY, I met Bradley Manning when he was assigned to HHC, 2 BCT, 10 MTN DIV, also the unit I was assigned to. I worked in the S6 shop while Manning worked in the S2 office. I was in the unit for a total of 3.5 years. During this time it was common knowledge of the most of the unit that I was gay, along with at least a total 5 personnel in the unit. No one in the unit ever made negative comments, made us feel like outcasts or different in any way. The general attitude in the unit, was keep work and play separate and never bring your personal life to work. One evening Manning approached me in the laundry room of the barracks, at 10124 and asked me, in a very confident sure tone, about a personals account/profile that I had on gay.com. He said "What is ARCWSIMD," my profile name. He tried to pronounce the letters, which are said individually, and I didn't recognize it. He went to his room wrote it on a scrap piece of paper and said what is this. I asked where he found this and he said a personals site and I knew what he meant. I told him that each letters is said and it's not a word. We conversed about being gay and the local gay scene and I offered to take him to the local gay bar in town, Clueless. I, as the whole unit knew, except key senior leadership to include the COL and CSM level, worked at the bar and had many friends there. I was even questioned by the then the NCOIC of the S-6 shop SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) about my affiliation with the bar. I took Manning out at least twice that I can remember specific events for. First time we went, he hung out and had what I would say was a good time, interacting with other patrons and having good conversations with everyone. He never looked uncomfortable or asked to leave or made any indications that he wanted to leave. During this night I mentioned and pointed out a usual customer, named (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was a male that thought he was a female and was either being chaptered or had been chaptered out of the Army for gender identity issues along with other reasons. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was in the process of living a year as a female before he could opt for surgery. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was an outcast at the bar and made fun of and shunned by the majority of the patrons. Manning was part of a conversation that between friends was making fun of and laughing at (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). He laughed at the jokes and agreed with comments made. He never looked like he felt awkward or stood up for (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) as a person or as a concept. The second night that we went out the same general atmosphere of having fun, a few drinks and conversing with customers/friends happened. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) came out again and same comments as always were made within the group of friends. Later that night, I was asked about Manning's relationship status by a close friend of mine, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). We talked about it and I mentioned it to Manning the next day. At the end of the night, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and I went back to (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) house on (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Manning being underage and sober drove us back there and then took my car (b)(6)(b)(7)(C).

INITIALS (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

PAGE 1 of 2

EXHIBIT 363

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001889  
 en12

SWORN STATEMENT IN C. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT 68<sup>th</sup> Military Police Detachment,  
Fort Meade, MD, DATED: December 20, 2011, CONTINUED:

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) back to post and I took a cab to post the next morning. Manning and myself had many conversations about our personal lives and work lives. We talked about who else in the unit was gay and just being gay in the Army. He never talked about getting out or being upset with the way he was treated in the unit.

Q: SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

A: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Q: Was MANNING ever made fun of because he was gay?

A: Not to my knowledge.

Q: Did he ever complain about being made fun of?

A: Not to me, I never heard about him complaining.

Q: Did MANNING ever indicate that he was confused about his gender identity?

A: No he didn't. He even made fun of (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who was going through that process.

Q: Are the words of this narrative and the answers of this statement in your own words?

A: Yes.

Q: Is there anything you want to add to this statement?

A: No. ///END OF STATEMENT/// (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

#### AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HAVE HAD READ OR HAVE READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to, before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20th day of Dec 2011, at 68<sup>th</sup> Military Police Detachment, Fort Meade, MD.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10, United States Code, Section 936

(Authority to Administer Oaths)

INITIALS

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

PAGE 2 of 2

EXHIBIT 363

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001890

encl 2

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 0755, 11 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one compact disc (CD) containing the file "manning1.ods" pertaining to sender email address, recipient email address, and message date for email messages preserved in PFC MANNING's AKO-S account, via email from the account (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)@us.army.smil.mil" assigned to Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) AKO Security Mail Administrator, AKO, Fort Belvoir, VA, from the forensic computer on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 002-12.///Last Entry///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

11 Jan 12

EXHIBIT

364

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

001891  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 0916, 17 Jan 12 (AST), SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Arizona Branch Office (AZBO), Computer Crime Investigative Unit (CCIU), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613, coordinated with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Acting Operations Chief/Senior Analyst, Networkiness Division, NETCOM Army Cyber Command, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he searched their databases for the "wget" application and determined a Certificate of Networkiness (CoN) has never been issued for the "wget" application. Additionally, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there has never been a request submitted to obtain a CoN for the "wget" application. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related a CoN is the operational assessment of systems, applications, and/or devices to determine security, interoperability, supportability, sustainability, usability, and compliance with Federal, DoD, and Army regulations. A CoN is approved or denied as a result of the analysis of a particular application and what sort of impact it may have on the Army Network. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related applications that are part of an accredited system, the DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP), will receive a CoN. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related a CoN is basically a permission slip to use a particular application.

About 1735, 23 Jan 12 (EST), SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E) this office, coordinated with LTC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Program Manager, Distributed Common Ground System - Army (DCGS-A), Intelligence Fusion, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005. LTC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related "wget" was authorized for use on the Server components of the system, but not on the user system, the Basic Analyst Laptop (BAL). LTC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the BAL is the only system PFC MANNING was authorized to use. LTC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related "wget" as an individual application does not have a CoN but was deployed on the Server systems as a subcomponent of other applications, CYGWIN and RedHat Enterprise Linux, both of which have CoNs. LTC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reiterated that "wget" has never been authorized to be installed by PM DCGS-A on the BAL. LTC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there were no user requests or Technical Bulletins to install "wget" onto the BAL. DCGS-A provided a copy of the CoN for the BAL which covers the time frame PFC MANNING was in Iraq and for CYGWIN and RedHat Enterprise Linux. (See CoNs).///Last Entry///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

23 Jan 12

EXHIBIT

365

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

001892

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**  
**Certificate of Networkiness (CoN)**

NETC-TD

FOR DESIGNATED APPROVING AUTHORITY Deputy to Commander/Senior Technical Director/Chief Engineer

## DECISION PAPER

Product: Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) 3.1 with WSS 3.1 and BAL 3.1

Cert#: 200906160

Use: Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare &amp; Sensors (PEO IEWS), Program Manager DCGS-A has requested a Certificate of Networkiness for DCGS-A 3.1.

Recommendation: **Approve**

## Factors:

## a. Background:

DCGS-Army is the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) gateway to Joint, Interagency, Allied, Coalition, and National data, information, intelligence, and collaboration. DCGS-A comprises of two integral parts: Basic Analyst Laptop (BAL) and Workstation Suite (WSS) whose primary mission are to support multi-disciplined intelligence analysis through dynamic fusion of single-source and all-source intelligence, not to include any C2 capabilities. Their Information System (IS) provide collaborative intelligence information gathering, analysis and dissemination in support of the DCGS-A mission and Department of Defense (DoD) activities.

## b. Facts:

- (1) DCGS-A has an Authority to Operate (ATO) with an expiration date of 22 June 2012.
- (2) On March 2, 2009, USCENTCOM Chief Information Officer (CIO) approved an Area of Responsibility (AOR).

## c. Restrictions:

- (1) The ISR Tool 4.4.0 CoN is restricted based on its service/port combination (1521/ORACLENET) compliancy that is not a DoD listed ports. It is also restricted to its configuration as documented in IST 4.4.0 P4 Security Review Document dated 6 Jan 09, which includes SSL.
- (2) DoD has mandated that all tactical and garrison environments will be Microsoft Vista and Host Based Security System (HBSS) compliant by 31 Dec 09. Should the Program manager (PM) and/or Program Executive Office (PEO) not meet this mandate; a waiver may be requested from the Technical Planning, Programs, and Integration Division-Army Golden Master. All waivers must be on file by 31 Dec 09.

d. CoN Type: Limited

e. Functional Category: System

This CoN will expire: 6/22/2012

## POC:

(520) 538-2299 DSN: 879-2299

Email: [army.networkiness@us.army.mil](mailto:army.networkiness@us.army.mil)

## DAA Additional Comments:

It is the responsibility of the Program Manager to ensure that any change in threat, vulnerability, configuration, hardware, software, connectivity, or other modification is reported to Army Networkiness to determine its impact to this Certificate of Networkiness. The Program Manager is responsible for ensuring that an updated Memorandum of Agreement or System Level Agreement is in place for each fielding of this system.

Approver: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Senior Executive Service (SES)

Designated Approving Authority (DAA) - Army

Digitally Signed by (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

8/20/2009

X (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

( 28 - 10 - CID221- 10 ) 17

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**Certificate of Networkiness (CoN)**

NETC-TD

FOR DESIGNATED APPROVING AUTHORITY Deputy to Commander/Senior Technical Director/Chief Engineer

**DECISION PAPER**

Product: Cygwin, Version 2.5

Cert#: 200904700

Use: RCERT-CONUS will use Cygwin as a framework to allow use of many Linux applications/services under a Windows operating system. RCERT-CONUS requires the use of the Cygwin library and its associated application to provide interoperability with the various Unix based systems in operational use.

Recommendation: **Approve**

**Factors:**

**a. Background:**

Cygwin is a set of powerful tools to assist developers in migrating applications from UNIX/Linux to the Microsoft Windows platform. Cygwin delivers the open source standard Red Hat GNU gcc compiler and gdb debugger on Windows. In addition, it provides for a standard UNIX/Linux development environment on Windows including APIs and command shells. The Cygwin.dll library, included with Cygwin, delivers the interesting subset of UNIX SVR4, BSD, and POSIX APIs to enable quick ports of UNIX/Linux applications to the Windows platform.

With Cygwin, administrators can login remotely to any PC, fix problems within a Posix/Linux/UNIX shell on any Windows machine, and run shell command scripts. Sophisticated shell command scripts can be created with standard shells, such as sed or awk. Standard Windows command line tools can even be intermixed within the UNIX/Linux shell script environment to administer the Windows system. UNIX/Linux system administrators have developed a large toolbox set of management scripts for their UNIX/Linux machines. Cygwin provides the ability to continue using these scripts on Windows machines.

**b. Facts:**

**c. Restrictions:**

None.

**d. CoN Type:** Enterprise

**e. Functional Category:** IT Utility & Security

This CoN will expire:

**POC:**

(520) 538-2299 DSN: 879-2299

Email: [army.networkiness@us.army.mil](mailto:army.networkiness@us.army.mil)

**DAA Additional Comments:**

It is the responsibility of the NEC to test this application, once installed on the network, in accordance with all applicable Security Technical Implementation Guidelines, and this recommendation is made based on the ability of the NECs to configure this product, once on their networks, to be fully compliant. This Certificate of Networkiness is not valid should the version no longer be supported or if not compliant with the most current Army Golden Master baseline.

Approver: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Senior Executive Service (SES)

Designated Approving Authority (DAA) - Army

Digitally Signed by (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

8/27/2009

X (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**  
**Certificate of Networthiness (CoN)**

NETC-TD

FOR DESIGNATED APPROVING AUTHORITY Deputy to Commander/Senior Technical Director/Chief Engineer

**DECISION PAPER**

Product: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.X, Kernel 2.6

Cert#: 200905573

Requestor: The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has requested a Certificate of Networthiness (CoN) for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.X to be the operating system on a web server on the SIPRNet.

Recommendation: Approve

**Factors:**

**a. Background:**

RedHat Enterprise Linux 5.X will serve as the operating system for a web server on the SIPRNet using the Enterprise Linux Apache-based HTTP Server. The ARCIC AWD configuration will use MySQL, included with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 and available from ACERT, to store data. PHP 5.2.9 will be used for generating dynamic pages. This web site will be for outgoing information dissemination only in support of Task Force Odin. Twice monthly, new information will be submitted and approved for release, then the administrator will add data to the database, making it available on the web site to TFO members.

**b. Facts:**

FIPS 140-2 Certificate Number# 815

**c. Restrictions:**

**d. CoN Type: Enterprise**

**e. Functional Category: Business & Finance**

This CoN will expire: 3/31/2014

POC: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Director  
 (520) 538-1199 DSN: 879-1199  
 Email: [army.networthiness@us.army.mil](mailto:army.networthiness@us.army.mil)

**DAA Additional Comments:**

It is the responsibility of the NEC to test this application, once installed on the network, in accordance with all applicable Security Technical Implementation Guidelines, and this recommendation is made based on the ability of the NECs to configure this product, once on their networks, to be fully compliant. This Certificate of Networthiness is not valid should the version no longer be supported or if not compliant with the most current Army Golden Master baseline.

Approver: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
 Senior Executive Service (SES)  
 Designated Approving Authority (DAA) -  
 Army

**Digitally Signed by (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)**

11/5/2009

X (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Exhibit(s) 369

Page(s) 001896 withheld:

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)

Permits withholding information that  
is classified for  
National Security purposes

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 0800, 7 Dec 11, SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Military Police Investigations, Midwest Joint Regional Confinement Facility (MJRCF), 830 Sabalu Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, collected as evidence one Compact Disc (CD) containing the recording of PFC MANNING's visitation on 24 Sep 11, on Evidence Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 183-11. The evidence was received by this office on 15 Dec 11, via registered mail, RR224 154 846 US.

AGENT'S COMMENT: A subsequent review determined the recording to be corrupted.

About 1330, 18 Jan 12, SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence one digital versatile disc (DVD) containing the recording of PFC MANNING's visitation on 24 Sep 11, on EPCD, DN 013-12. The evidence was received by this office on 30 Jan 12, via registered mail, RR 224 154 863 US.///Last Entry///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

30 Jan 12

EXHIBIT

370

CID FORM 94

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001897  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-2010-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

About 0630, 25 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E) this office, telephonically interviewed CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 19th Expeditionary Support Command, Daegu, Korea APO AP 96218, regarding User Agreements for Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPR) and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) accounts in Iraq. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was part of the Advance Party for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Infantry Division (2/10th MNT DIV), Fort Drum, NY, and deployed for Iraq in Oct 09. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was a Signal System Support Technician and was responsible for the servers assigned to the 2/10th MNT DIV. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was not responsible for user account creation. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the Information Management Officers (IMO) were responsible for creating user accounts. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there were approximately six IMOs, but could not remember any of their names. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the Non-commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) was SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI). CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the standard procedure in the rear was for User Agreements to be obtained before any user accounts were created but was not sure if that practice was being followed in Iraq as he was not involved in creating the accounts. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he does not have a copy of any User Agreement used by the 2/10th MNT DIV and did not know where the User Agreements were for the accounts created in Iraq. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he replaced CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI), and was replaced by WO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI). CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he never meet PFC MANNING. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) deployed from Iraq in May 10.

About 1241, 25 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), Headquarter Headquarters Company (HHC), 2/10th MNT DIV, Fort Drum, NY, who related he was the Automation NCOIC and supervised the IMOs within the unit. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he deployed with the 2/10th MNT DIV to Iraq in Aug 09 – Oct 10. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related part of his duties in Iraq was to create NIPR and SIPR accounts for soldiers. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated before a NIPR or SIPR account can be created the user must first sign an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) user agreement form. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated the AUP form was used to create the NIPR/SIPR account and without it, an account could not be created. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated while in Iraq all the AUP forms were maintained on file with the Help Desk. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI), SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI), and SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) were in charge of Help Desk operations. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related two of the unit's IMOs were SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI), and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI). SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related when the unit redeployed in 2010, all paperwork generated in Iraq was physically destroyed and all AUP forms should have been burned. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not have a copy of the AUP form that was used in Iraq, but stated the AUP form that was used was stored on the unit's share drive, which was confiscated by law enforcement. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not know PFC MANNING personally and did not have any long conversations with him. SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not remember personally creating a NIPR/SIPR account for PFC MANNING, but stated if PFC MANNING had an account then he must have signed an AUP form.

About 1030, 26 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 2/10th MNT DIV, Fort Drum, NY, who related he was one of the IMOs responsible for creating NIPR and SIPR accounts for soldiers within the unit, while the unit was deployed to Iraq. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related a signed AUP user

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro Resident Agency, CCIU  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

8 Feb 12

EXHIBIT

371

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Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

agreement had to be signed by the soldier requesting the account and by the soldier's supervisor in order for an account to be created. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did not remember personally creating any account for PFC MANNING nor did he know who created the accounts for PFC MANNING. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he believed the AUP was re-worded at least one time during the deployment to include the banning of thumb drives. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING would have had to sign two AUP forms, one for a NIPR account, and one for a SIPR account. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he believed the AUP used in Iraq came from the Fort Drum Network Enterprise Center (NEC), and has been used by the unit since the deployment. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he does not know what happened to any of the signed user agreements. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he may have a copy of the AUP in his external hard drive at home. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) was the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the IMOs and believed that MSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) may have been PFC MANNING's supervisor at the time. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also related SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) have left the military.

About 1515, 26 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 514th Signal Company, Camp Roberts, CA, who related he was one of the IMOs who deployed with the 2/10th MNT DIV, Fort Drum, NY. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was certain that there were AUP forms signed by PFC MANNING; however, he does not know the whereabouts of the forms. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was sure about this because without the form and a supervisor's signature an account could not be created. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not remember personally creating a NIPR/SIPR account for PFC MANNING and does not know who created it for him, because accounts were created in en masse. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he believed the unit's Help Desk should still have copies of the AUP forms used in Iraq.

About 1209, 27 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received from SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) a copy of the 2nd BCT SIPR AUP form that was used by the 2/10th MNT DIV while they were deployed to Iraq. A review of the form revealed a supervisor's signature was required for any soldier with the rank of E-7 and below. (See SIPR AUP)

About 1328, 27 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Headquarters Headquarter Company (HHC), 2/10th MNT DIV, Fort Drum, NY. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) is currently the NCOIC of the Help Desk for 2/10th MNT DIV. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related all signed AUPs were scanned and digitally stored on the unit's internal server. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related all originals are scanned and then destroyed. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the digital copies are destroyed after a year. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided a copy of the Fort Drum NIPR AUP. A review of the form revealed it was last updated in Feb 10. (See NIPR AUP)

About 1700, 30 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 2/10th MNT DIV, Fort Drum, NY, who related he worked in the server admin section while in Iraq and was not in charge of the IMOs or Help Desk. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) was in charge of the entire section to include the unit's IMOs. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated when the investigation into PFC MANNING started CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) pulled PFC MANNING's AUP forms from the Help Desk and held onto them. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he thought CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) turned over PFC MANNING's AUP forms to investigators.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro Resident Agency, CCTU  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

8 Feb 12

EXHIBIT

371

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Approved \_\_\_\_\_



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1850, 31 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 39th Signal Battalion, Headquarters Headquarter Detachment, Chievres, Belgium, APO AE, who related he did not have any copies of the AUP forms that were used by the 2/10th MNT DIV while the unit was deployed to Iraq. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not know if the unit kept old AUP forms. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not know who created a NIPR/SIPR account for PFC MANNING.

About 1009, 8 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who related he was on leave during the incident involving PFC MANNING and stated when he came back from leave everything had already taken place. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembered hearing CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) say that he would retrieve PFC MANNING's AUP form, and just assumed that he had pulled the form. CW2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he saw an AUP form that PFC MANNING had signed that was dated before the deployment on the share drive.///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)		ORGANIZATION Washington Metro Resident Agency, CCIU U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE 8 Feb 12	EXHIBIT 371	

CID (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) OFFICIAL USE ONLY – LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

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001900

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Exhibit(s) 372 and 373

Page(s) 001901 thru 001908 referred to:

Directorate of Human Resources  
Administrative Services Division  
Attn: IMNE-DRM-HRR (FOIA-PA)  
10720 Mt. Belvedere Blvd.  
Fort Drum, New York 13602-5045

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

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## DETAILS

About 1700, 10 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Deputy Program Manager, Distributed Common Ground System - Army (DCGS-A), Intelligence Fusion, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided a copy of the Version Description Document (VDD) for the Basic Analyst Laptop (BAL), dated 1 Oct 09. (See VDD)///Last Entry///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

10 Feb 12

EXHIBIT

374

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001909  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

**Version Description Document (VDD)  
For**

**Basic Analyst Laptop  
(BAL)**

**Distributed Common Ground Systems – Army  
Software Version 3.1 Patch 3  
(DCGS-A V3.1 P3)**

**1 October 2009**



**DCN: 149015, Rev 1**

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**Revision History**

Revision	Date	Page(s)	Para.	Description of Change
Original	February 17, 2009	N/A	N/A	Initial release
1	October 1, 2009	N/A	N/A	Release of new Image with Re partition of Drives, with SQL, Data Base hardening and configuration changes

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## 1. Scope

### 1.1 Identification

This Version Description Document (VDD) describes software release V3.1 P3 being developed at the direction of the Project Manager DCGS-A for use in the DCGS-A V3.1 P3 Basic Analyst Laptops (BALs), which include Dell M90, M6300, and the Alienware (A51M). Two other Client platforms are the Dell M490 Workstation, T5400 Desktop. The BALs, Workstation and Desktop software version will be authorized to process up to Secret Collateral information and connect to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) in accordance with AR 25-2 Information Assurance and Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 8500.2 Information Assurance (IA) Implementation.

### 1.2 System Overview

The A51M, M90 and/or M6300 are high-end laptop computers with a 17" monitor capable of displaying high-resolution graphics. The Dell 490 Workstation and T5400 Desktop with the V3.1P3 SW is used within the DCGS-A fixed site baseline. Microsoft Windows XP Professional (Service Pack3) utilized as the operating system. The A51M, M90, M6300, Dell 490 and T5400 provide the Army a client workstation for use by DCGS-A analysts.

Note: The A51M, M90, M6300, Dell 490 and T5400 is classified because of a file change within the Query Tree Multi Functional Work Station (MFWS) Plug-In and the change to the high water marking.

### 1.3 Document Overview

This VDD documents the release tested and type-accredited with the DCGS-A V3.1 P3 Collateral components in the DCGS-A laboratory environment at Fort Monmouth, NJ, released to the Central Technical Support Facility (CTSF), Fort Hood, TX; and then released to operational users for site accreditation.

## 2. Referenced Documents

Field Service Engineer (FSE) Training Guide, Part # 3.1.03.1002.C, dated 1 October 2009 prepared by I2WD, Fort Monmouth NJ.

Note: All referenced documents are resident in the Software Engineering Center (SEC) Software Control and Reference Office (SCRO).

## 3. Version Description

### 3.1 Inventory of Materials Released

Software for the DCGS-A V3.1 P3 BAL is installed at the Software Integration Lab (SIL) onto the laptop's hard drive. Consequently, no media will be delivered with the DCGS-A V3.1 P3 BAL. All updates are provided through download from digital media.

25 Hard Drives and 3 DVDs containing software and documentation for DCGS-A Version 3.1 P3 is resident in the Software Engineering Center (SEC) Software Control and Reference Office (SCRO) reference on paragraph 3.2. BAL Media Listing.

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### 3.2 BAL Media Listing

CM Control Number	SCRO CINCODE	Date of media	Destination	Created By	Contents	Media Type
DCGS0303	N/A	4-Nov-09	SEC IFS/ SCRO	SEC SCIF	DCGS-A V3.1P3 - M90 and/or M6300; Alienware (A51M); Dell 490 Workstation and T5400 Desktop Client image - Secret	1 HD
DCGS0318	N/A	1-Oct-09	SEC IFS/ SCRO	SEC SCIF	DCGS-A V3.1 P3 - APP1, APP2, IOP, MDC & BALs Image	1 set of 1 HD

### 3.3 Software Description

The following is a list of DCGS-A V3.1 P3 Client SW detailed software information:

NOTE: The Client SW listed can be loaded on the five platforms that include Dell M90, M6300, A51M, Dell M490 Workstation and the Dell T5400 Desktop. Once the SW is loaded onto the platform, the appropriate drives are loaded. The i2 Analysis Notebook (ANB) is loaded on the system without an active software license, if the user chooses to use ANB; the user will procure the license. The Axis Pro capabilities are in the DCGS-A MFWS V3.1.

BAL Software	Version	Vendor	Function/Component
Acrobat Reader 9	9.1.2	Adobe	PDF file reader
Adobe Flash Player Plug-in	10.0.32.18	Adobe	Adobe Flash is the authoring environment and Flash Player is the virtual machine used to run the Flash files
Adobe Flash Player 10 Active X	10.0.22.87	Adobe	Flash Player
Alert Services Client Runtime (ALTCLT)	4.53.5	Future Skies	Alert Service Application
ArcGIS Desktop	9.2.1500	ESRI	Geospatial data management and presentation
ArcMap	9.2	ESRI	Geospatial data management and presentation
ArcGIS Military Analyst (Military Analyst 9.2 SP2)	9.2.401	ESRI	Geospatial data management and presentation
ArcGIS Military Overlay Editor 9.2 (SP1)	9.2.0.430	ESRI	Geospatial data management and presentation
CECOM_MapShapes	1.00.0000	Overwatch	
Chart Scrapper	7.2.0.1	Novel Application	Data Movement tool



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BAL Software	Version	Vendor	Function/Component
C2R	4.70.9	GOTS/PD CS	Address Book Services
C2R Planner	1.00.0000	GOTS/PD CS	Address Book Services
CMP	4.7.0.6	GOTS/PD CS	Common Message Processor
DB Importer	7.1.0	Novel App Inc.	DB Importer
DCGS-A Configuration Assistant	1.3.0 20090504	I2WD	Post clone assistant
DCGS-A MFWS V3.1	6.2.6.1077	Overwatch	Multi function Workstation DCGS-A APP Framework SDK; v 1.7.13
DCGS-A_V3.1_Full	6.2.0.1035	Overwatch	Multi function Workstation
DCGS-A Multimedia Plugin	1.0.0	BAH	Multi function Workstation
DCGS-A Web Folder Plugin	2.0.0	BAH	Multi function Workstation
DCI (DOS Client Interface)	5.1.5.0	Future Skies	
DCGS-A Weather IWEDA Client Tri-Service IWEDA -20061129	6.4.2.8	Army Research Lab	Weather effect decision aid
Digital Topographic Support Systems (DTSS) 9.0 6 Rendering Package	9.0	Northrop Grumman	To provide critical, timely, and accurate digital and hardcopy geospatial information
DIB Client Adapter	1.3	CSP Tech	Installer for the Viper DIB Client Adapter
GeoRover for ArcGIS	3.10.0000	SAIC	Geospatial software product extensions or "plugins" to ArcMap
GeoRover Coordinate Viewer Extension	1.0.2	SAIC	Geospatial
GeoRover Digital Data Tracker Extension	3.2.5	SAIC	Geospatial
GeoRover License Manager	1.1.0	SAIC	Geospatial
GeoRover Locus Track Extension	3.2.4	SAIC	Geospatial
GeoRover Zoom Tools Extension	3.2.4	SAIC	Geospatial
Ground Tactical Communication (GTCS)	4.7.0.9	GOTS/PD CS	Message Transport Protocol

BAL Software	Version	Vendor	Function/Component
Google Earth EC	4.2.205.5730	Google	Virtual globe, map and geographic information
Grid Extractor	1.2		
i2 Analyst Notebook 6	6.055.1022	i2	Link & Timeline Analysis tool w/ graphical representation
i2 Online Link 6	6	i2	i2 Online iLink is a feature of Analyst's Notebook 6 that optimizes online data research and analysis. It enables real-time access to online data providers.
i2 Chart Reader 6	6	i2	Charts Reader
i2 Chart Reader 7	7.0.7	i2	Charts Reader
i2 Image Files	6	i2	Image Editors
i2 Visual Notebook	6	i2	Visualization software, streamlines investigations
i2 Spelling Checker	6	i2	Image Editors
IIS URL Scan Tool	2.0		
IME Pass Client			
IME WWF Client			
JAVA™ 6 Update	1.6.0.60	Sun Micro	Program language compiler and environment
Live Update 3.2	3.2.0.68	Symantec	Software Update Tool
Microsoft .NET Framework 3.0 SP1	3.1.21022	Microsoft	Environment for building, deploying, and running web services and other applications
Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0 SP1	2.121022	Microsoft	Environment for building, deploying, and running web services and other applications
Microsoft .NET Framework 1.1	1.1.4322	Microsoft	Environment for building, deploying, and running web services and other applications
Microsoft Compressive Client 1.0 for Window XP	1.0	Microsoft	
Microsoft Office Professional Plus Edition 2007	12.0.6215.1000	Microsoft	Electronic office tools
Microsoft Office 2003 Web components	11.0.6558.0	Microsoft	Allows embedding and linking to documents
Microsoft Office XP Web components	10.0.6619.0	Microsoft	Allows embedding and linking to documents

BAL Software	Version	Vendor	Function/Component
Mozilla Firefox	3.0.5	Mozilla	Web Browser
MS SQL Server 2005	9.2.3042.00	Microsoft	Database
MS SQL Server 2005 Backward Compatibility	8.05.2004	Microsoft	Database
MS SQL Server 2005 Books On-Line (English)	9.00.1399.06	Microsoft	Database
MS SQL Server Native Client	9.00.3042.00	Microsoft	Database
MS SQL Server Setup Support Files	9.00.4035.00	Microsoft	Database
MS SQL Server VSS Writer	9.00.4035.00	Microsoft	Database
MS User Mode Driver Framework Feature Pack 1.0	1.0	Microsoft	Build #5716
MSXML 6.0 Parser	6.10.1129.0	Microsoft	Text parser
MSXML 4 SP2	4.20.9818.0	Microsoft	Text parser
MSXML 4 SP2	4.20.9870.0	Microsoft	Text parser
MSXML 4 SP2	4.20.9848.0	Microsoft	Text parser
02 Micro Smartcard Driver	2.26.0000	02 Micro Electronics, Inc.	
OZ776 SCR CardBus	1.1.4.2	02 Micro Electronics, Inc.	
Psi	.12	GNU	Collaboration Tool
Python	2.4.1	Open Source	Object Oriented programming language
QuickTime	7.64.17.73	Apple	Audio and video file player
Query Tree MFWS Plugin	1.3.8	I2WD	MFWS Plugin
Roxio Activation Module	1.0	Roxio	Digital Media Software
Roxio Creator Audio	3.5.0	Roxio	Digital Media Software

BAL Software	Version	Vendor	Function/Component
Roxio Creator Copy	3.5.0	Roxio	Digital Media Software
Roxio Creator Data	3.5.0	Roxio	Digital Media Software
Roxio Creator DE	3.5.0	Roxio	Digital Media Software
Roxio Creator Tools	3.5.0	Roxio	Digital Media Software
Roxio Drag-to-Disc	9.1	Roxio	Digital Media Software
Roxio Express Labeler 3	3.2.1	Roxio	Digital Media Software
Roxio Update Manager	6.0.0	Roxio	Digital Media Software
Shared Add-in Extensibility update for MS.Net Framework 2.0	1.0.0	Microsoft	
Shared Add-in Support Update for MS.Net Framework 2.0	1.0.0	Microsoft	
Sigma Tel Audio	5.10.5210.0	SigmaTel	Digital audio processing
Smart Link 56k Voice modem			Voice modem
Sonic Cine Player Decoder Pack	4.2.0	Sonic Solutions	
Symantec AntiVirus	10.1.8000.8	Symantec	Virus detection
SQLXML 4	9.00.4035.00	Microsoft	
Synaptics Pointing Device	7.13.2.0	Synaptics	Pointing device
Threat Mapper 1.1 for ArcGIS Desktop	1.1		
Windows Internet Explorer 7 - 20070813.185237	7.0.5730.13	Microsoft	Web Browser
Windows Media Player 11	11.0	Microsoft	Media Player CD, DVD, streaming audio & video
Windows Media Format 11 Runtime	11.0	Microsoft	Media Player
Windows XP SP3	2008.0414.031535	Microsoft	
WinZip	10.0 (6685)	Winzip Computing LP	File compression
Xalan - Endorsed	1.00.0000	Overwatch	XML processing package

### 3.4 Possible Problems and Known Errors

See ReadMe document for DCGS-A V3.1.0P3 Multi-Function Work Station (MFWS) and Interoperability (IOP) Server, dated 17 February 2009, I2WD SIL.

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### 3.5 Adaptation data

Not applicable

### 3.6 Related Documents

#### 3.6.1 Post Clone Procedures

Refer FSE Training Guide in Section 2, Referenced Documents

#### 3.6.2 Installation Procedures

DCGS-A V3.1.0P3 Multi-Function Work Station (MFWS) and Interoperability (IOP) Server ReadMe.doc, dated 17 February 2009, I2WD SIL

DCGS-A V3.1P3, Update Image Restore ReadMe.doc, dated 1 October 2009, I2WD SIL

#### 3.6.3 Technical Bulletins

TB-DCGS 09-10087 – re: Workstation vulnerabilities fixes, 17 February 2009

TB-DCGS 09-10097 – re: DISA Gold/POA&M data, 17 February 2009

NOTE: TB-DCGS 09-10087 and TB-DCGS 09-10097 were implemented in the software baseline delivered to CTSF on 17 February 2009, and are under Application 2 server.

The following **Technical Bulletins** applies to the V3.1P3 SW baseline after 17 February 2009 delivery to CTSF:

TB Number	Configuration Systems	Title/Topic	PM DCGS-A Approved
DCGS 09-10094	MDC	Undeployment of DIB brain Adapter and /or PW update to xpipeline account; also adds DIB and portal versioning	11-May-09
DCGS 09-10095	IOP	IOP office 2007	11-May-09
DCGS 09-10099	MSMQ service on BALs	Fixes problem sending USMTF and PASS messages from BAL in standalone mode. (4 March 2009)	14-May-09
DCGS 09-10100	APP1	Fixes APP1 homepage / baseline map problems (6 March 2009)	11-May-09
DCGS 09-10101	APP1	Fixes publishing Graphics to DIB problem (4 March 2009)	11-May-09
DCGS 09-10104	BAL	Adds Ft. Hood Maps to BAL (23 March 2009)	7-May-09
DCGS 09-10106	BAL	Fixes problem with SWB1 IWEDA Client (31 March 2009)	11-May-09
DCGS 09-10107A	BAL & IOP	QT plugin ver1.3.8.1 update - allows working with BOTH OIF and OEF data (09 April 2009)	12-May-09
DCGS 09-10108	MDC	Adds Ft. Huachuca Mini brain link to MDC portal (17 April 2009)	11-May-09
DCGS 09-10111	IOP	Fixes problem clearing the TED DB after a training event (20 April 2009)	7-May-09
DCGS 09-10112A	APP1, APP2, MDC, IOP, BAL	Configuration Assistant Update to v1.3.0 (5 May 09)	14-May-09
DCGS 09-10113	APP1	NAI fix for Firefox	11-May-09

TB Number	Configuration Systems	Title/Topic	PM DCGS-A Approved
DCGS 09-10115A	BAL	Fix for sending TED entities to Google Earth	18-May-09
DCGS 09-10116	BAL	Changing permission settings for DCGS-A User folder	7-May-09
DCGS 09-10120	MFWS	Allow the operator to enter a full non-western name in QuickForms and/or the Properties plugin without incorrectly mapping them to middle and last name fields	28-May-09
DCGS 09-10122	IOP, BAL	Applies to all v3.1 P3 DCGS-A DCGS IOP servers and BALs systems. It edits registry values to allow for the workflow between Google Earth and MFWS to be successful	3-Jun-09
DCGS 09-10123	BAL	Provides corrections to the DIB plug-in of the BAL MFWS. The TB corrects issues with the DIB usage found in the SIL Bug Tracker	15-Jun-09
DCGS 09-10126	IOP, BAL	Server Vulnerability Fixes. Hides DIB & Query Tree data drivers from the users display within Google Earth	3-Aug-09
DCGS 09-10128	APP2	Server Vulnerability Fixes. Users are unable to convert ANB7 charts to ANB6 charts	
DCGS 09-10129		Python 2.4 win32 extensions install	3-Aug-09
DCGS 09-10131B	MSG, SDE	Server Vulnerability Fixes (LISTA 0.7.5) for P3 & P5 systems (Red Hat 5 / 32 BIT)	21-Aug-09
DCGS 09-10132	BAL	Add mlRC chat to BAL baseline	24-Aug-09
DCGS 09-10133	BAL	Add correct ESRI Arc Desktop 9.2 License to Baseline for use of Tracking Analyst	2-Sep-09
DCGS 09-10134	BAL	Firefox Flash installation	2-Sep-09
DCGS 09-10137A	APP1	JBOSS windows service fix	10-Sep-09
DCGS 09-10147	APP1, APP2, MDC, IOP, BAL	Microsoft Windows Server / Workstation Vulnerability Fixes - SAT v1.2.1b	23-Sep-09
DCGS 09-10148	BAL, IOP	MFWS Merge Relationships, Deleted Entity Manager Updates	9-Oct-09
DCGS 09-10149A	MDC	JBOSS windows service fix (startDIBoss.cmd / wrapper.dll)	27-Oct-09
DCGS 09-10152	BAL, IOP	Removal of duplicate IIS Web folders from C:\DCGS directory	16-Oct-09
DCGS 09-10153	BAL, IOP	Issues Discovered in OIF and OEF_17 Feb 09 Image	23-Oct-09
DCGS 09-10155	MSG, SDE	Server Vulnerability Fixes - LISTA v0.7.7 (RHEL5 / 32 BIT) i386	27-Oct-09
DCGS 09-10157	APP1, APP2, IOP, MDC, BAL	Microsoft Windows Server / Workstation Vulnerability Fixes - SAT v1.2.1	3-Nov-09
DCGS 09-10159	BAL, IOP	Issues discovered in OIF and OEF (OW_P7) This TB supersedes TB 10153	6-Nov-09

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**3.6.4 *Overwatch MFWS Release 6.2***

DCGS-A V3.1, MFWS release 6.2, Document number: 102168, dated 15 January 2009, Overwatch  
Textron Systems

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### 3.7 COTS Software Sites

- 3D analyst (ArcGlobe)
  - <http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/extensions/3danalyst/index.html>
- Acrobat Reader
  - <http://www.adobe.com>
  - <http://www.esri.com>
- Analyst Notebook
  - <http://www.i2.co.uk>
- Java
  - <http://java.sun.com/>
- Microsoft
  - <http://www.microsoft.com/>
- Netscape
  - <http://www.netscape.com/>
- Roxio
  - <http://roxio.com>
- Symantec
  - <http://www.symantec.com/index.htm>
- Winzip
  - <http://www.winzip.com/>
- WS\_FTP
  - <http://www.ipswitch.com/>

### 3.8 Hardware Description

The following is a list of DCGS-A V3.1 P3 BALs hardware information:

Component	Description
Alienware Laptop - Model A51M	3.8 GHz, 2GB RAM memory, 17" display with high resolution graphics.
Dell Laptop - Model M90	2.33 GHz Intel Dual Processor Core, 3.25GB RAM memory, 93.1 GB hard drive, with NVIDIA graphics card, DCD-RW Optical Drive, Network Interface Card and a 17 inch display with high resolution graphics.
Laptop - Model Dell M6300	2.5 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo T9300, 4GB DDR2-667 SDRAM (2 DIMM), NVIDIA Quadro FX3600M 512 MB, 160 GB 7200RPM Hard Drive, Std Touchpad, 8x DVD+/- & Roxio Creator , and a 17" wide screen WUXGA LCD.
Dell Precision 490 Workstation	1st Processor: Intel XEON DUAL CORE Processor 3.00GHZ, 2MB L2 Cache; 2nd Processor: Intel XEON DUAL CORE Processor 2.80GHZ, 2MB L2 Cache; 4GB, DDR2 ECC SDRAM Memory, 400MHZ; NVIDIA FX 4500 512MB 2 DUI OR GA 1st Hard Drive: 80GB Serial ATA 7200RPM Hard Drive w/Databurst Cache, Non-Raid, Precision 470/670; 2nd Hard Drive: 80GB Serial ATA 7200RPM Hard Drive with Databurst Cache Raid; Floppy Drive: 3.5, 1.44MB; 48X/32X CD-RW/DVD



Component	Description
	Combo. 0028 - 10 - CID221- 10117
Dell Precision T5400 Desk Top	1st Processor: Quad Core Xeon Proc X5450, 3.00GHz, 2X 6MB L2 Cache, 1333MHz; 2nd Processor: Quad Core Xeon Proc X5450, 3.00GHz, 2X6MB L2 Cache, 1333MHz, 4GB, DDR2 ECC SDRAM Memory 667MHz, 4X1GB; NVIDIA Quadro FX3700 512MB dual DVI Graphics Card; 160GB SATA, 10K RPM Hard Drive with 16MB DataBurst Cache; CD-ROM or DVD-ROM Drive: 16X DVD+/-RW.

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER 0028-10-CID221-10117  
0004-12-CID321

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## DETAILS

About 1050 (AST), 17 Jan 12, this office received a Request For Assistance under Report Of Investigation (ROI) 0028-10-CID221-10117 from the Washington Metro Resident Agency (WMRA), Computer Crime Investigative Unit, Quantico, VA, who requested this office: obtain a roster of students who attended classes with PFC MANNING during Advanced Individual Training (AIT) at Fort Huachuca, AZ; obtain a list of instructors for the classes PFC MANNING attended; obtain a copy of the school policy regarding missing classes ; and a copy of the Student Evaluation Plan (SEP)/Lesson Plan for the 35F10 Course Version 1.

About 1145 (AST), 17 Jan 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with CW3 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Course Manager, 35F10, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ, and requested copies of the aforementioned documents be provided to this office. CW3 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) he would gather all the required documentation and provide them to this office.

About 1300 (AST), 6 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CW3 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) met at the Staff Judge Advocate's office where CW3 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided copies of the following documents and signed an Attestation Certificate: A copy of the 35F10 SEP, a memorandum listing the names of the instructors who were present during the time period PFC MANNING attended AIT, and a by name roster of the students who attended AIT with PFC MANNING.

About 1300 (AST), 13 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and CW3 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) met at the Staff Judge Advocate's where CW3 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) provided a digital versatile disc (DVD) containing two files pertaining to the Plan Of Instruction (POI) and Lesson Plans, Version 1 for the 35F10 AIT class which was attended by PFC MANNING and signed an Attestation Certificate.

//////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY//////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

ORGANIZATION

Arizona Branch Office, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613

DATE

13 Feb 2012

EXHIBIT

376

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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Law Enforcement Sensitive

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
001924

Exhibit(s) 377

Page(s) 001925 thru 001928 referred to:

US Army Garrison  
ATTN: IMWE-HUA-HRQA  
14 Rhea Avenue  
Fort Huachuca AZ 85613-7004

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

ROI NUMBER

0025-12-CID609

0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION: SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Special Agent-in-Charge, Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, Russell-Knox Building, 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 22134 requested this office verify the dates PFC Bradley MANNING, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) NFI, was in Kuwait during the month of February 2010.

About 1415, 14 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Strength Accounting Clerk, U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) G-1, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO, AE 09366 (CAKU) who accessed the Joint Asset Movement Management System (JAMMS), which detailed PFC MANNING scanned out of Ali Al Salem, Kuwait on 11 Feb 10 and arrived in Camp Hammer, Iraq on 11 Feb 10. PFC MANNING remained in Iraq until 30 May 10. (See Report)

About 1448, 14 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and provided a digital copy of the JAMMS Report pertaining to PFC MANNING. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) requested this office have an Attestation Certificate signed by the clerk who provided the JAMMS Report and have the certificate notarized. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further requested this office obtain a new JAMMS report from October 2009 through May 2010.

About 1430, 15 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Paralegal, Staff Judge Advocate, CAKU and SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) to complete the Attestation Certificate. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) signed the certificate validating her knowledge of the records she provided from JAMMS. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) signed and sealed the certificate with a Federal Notarial Seal. (See Certificate)

About 1630, 15 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) reviewed the JAMMS report from October 2009 through May 2010. The report revealed PFC MANNING first signed into Camp Buehring, Kuwait on 12 Oct 09 and remained until 26 Oct 09. The report detailed PFC MANNING arrived into Iraq on 28 Oct 2009 and remained in Iraq until 22 Jan 10. The report further stated PFC MANNING departed Kuwait into Iraq on 11 Feb 10 and remained in Iraq until 30 May 10. (See Report)

About 1830, 15 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and provided him with copies of all enclosures via email. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated no further investigative activity was necessary from this office at this time. ///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Camp Arifjan CID Office

Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO, AE 09366

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

15 Feb 12

EXHIBIT

379

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001929 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Exhibit(s) 380

Page(s) 001930 thru 001940 referred to:

Department of the Army  
U.S. Army Human Resources Command  
ATTN: AHRC - FOIA  
1600 Spearhead Division Avenue Dept 103  
Fort Knox, KY 40122-5100

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

About 1530, 9 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Contract Instructor, General Dynamics, Fort Huachuca, AZ, 85613. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he is a Contractor with General Dynamics and is assigned to E CO, 305<sup>th</sup> MI BN, at Fort Huachuca. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated he served previously in the Marine Corp from 2000 to 2005 and held the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 0231, All Source Intelligence Analyst. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the 0231 occupational series is the Marine Corp equivalent of the Army's 35F MOS. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he has been employed as a contract instructor at Fort Huachuca since Sep 07. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he has been teaching the 35F AIT from 2007 to present with the exception of a one year tour of duty in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he does recall teaching PFC MANNING and that PFC MANNING attended AIT sometime from the spring of 2008 through the summer of 2008. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he does not recall PFC MANNING having any problems with the course materials, but did seem to have problems interacting with the other students. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as a loner and recounted an incident where several of his classmates brought in a box of Lucky Charms where they'd replaced the face of the leprechaun with PFC MANNING's face. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related it appeared the joke was intended to make fun of PFC MANNING's height. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did recall an incident while PFC MANNING was attending AIT where PFC MANNING was posting videos related to course materials to YouTube. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related nothing PFC MANNING posted to YouTube was classified, but could be considered sensitive, as it was related to unclassified course materials and the class schedule. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was concerned about the videos PFC MANNING was posting on the web and reported the incident to the school house warrant officer Chief (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI). Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was told because none of the information PFC MANNING posted to the web was classified it wasn't a serious issue and no formal action would be taken against PFC MANNING. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was aware PFC MANNING was required to provide remedial OPSEC training. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related it was actually his idea to have PFC MANNING conduct the block of instruction as a disciplinary measure for the videos PFC MANNING posted to YouTube. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the training was supposed to be a 5 to 7 minute presentation regarding security violations in military history and the repercussions associated with those violations. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related INFOSEC and OPSEC are standard blocks of instruction built into the 35F AIT curriculum. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he could not recall exactly what the format was when PFC MANNING went through AIT. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related at one point classes would spend roughly 3 days on INFOSEC and OPSEC, they would take a test and then move onto the rest of the 35F curriculum. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related at some point during his tenure the security training in the 35F AIT was condensed from 3 days to 1 day. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related it was still testable material but he wasn't sure which block of instruction PFC MANNING received. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related in addition to receiving formal training as part of the AIT curriculum, students were also required to sign a Classified Information Non-Disclosure Agreement (SF-312), which should be posted to their respective accounts in the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) system. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related students were allowed to miss 7 hours of class during any single block of instruction or 15 hours of class throughout the entire course. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he could not recall PFC MANNING missing any blocks of instruction during the course. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related in addition to the standard block of INFOSEC and OPSEC training built into the course curriculum he would regularly comment about the importance of security measures during the course. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembered the movie Breach with (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was released not

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

SIG

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

27 Feb 12

EXHIBIT

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

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## DETAILS

long before PFC MANNING's AIT class. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he would regularly make references to the movie during the class and thought it was particularly important to emphasize because the students were issued laptop computers as part of their basic issue for class. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related any production of course related materials, including the blocks of instruction related to INFOSEC and OPSEC would have to be approved through CW3 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI).

AGENT'S COMMENT: The movie Breach was released in 2007 and detailed the true story of FBI Special Agent Robert HANSSEN who was convicted of selling secrets to the Soviet Union.

About 1000, 10 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Contractor, General Dynamics, Fort Huachuca, AZ. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she served in the Army as an All Source Intelligence Analyst from 2000 to 2004. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she served as an instructor for the 35F AIT from Aug 05 through Oct 09. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she is still a contract employee for General Dynamics, but is no longer an instructor for AIT students. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she currently serves on a contract in the New Systems Training and Integration Division (NSTID) on Fort Huachuca. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she was an instructor in PFC MANNING's AIT class for the first half of the class. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related sometime around Jun or Jul 08, she left her position teaching the 35F AIT and took a position teaching a G2X class. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she did not enjoy the position as a G2X instructor and returned to teaching the 35F AIT after PFC MANNING's class graduated. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she remembers PFC MANNING as being a "bit odd." Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was always talking about gaming and didn't seem to integrate well with the other students. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she also remembers PFC MANNING because at one point she and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) attempted to have PFC MANNING removed from the course because he'd demonstrated a propensity to share sensitive information, which she believed was a "red flag." Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING posted several videos to YouTube. Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she never personally viewed any of the videos posted to YouTube, but it was her understanding they contained information such as the 35F AIT class schedule (dates and times), information from the unclassified 35F courseware, and videos of the barracks and MI Village. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related as members of the intelligence community the most important part of their job was their ability to keep secrets. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she was very concerned about PFC MANNING's actions because she believed it demonstrated an inability to keep information secret. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she and Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) informed their contract team chief Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) and the schoolhouse warrant officer Chief (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) about PFC MANNING's conduct. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related they were told because the information PFC MANNING posted wasn't classified he would not be removed from class. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related despite the fact the information was not classified it was sensitive. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she does recall PFC MANNING was required to provide remedial training for OPSEC, however, Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not recall if she was present for PFC MANNING's presentation. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she may have been gone prior to PFC MANNING giving the OPSEC briefing. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related all 35F students received an INFOSEC class on their first day of training. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the INFOSEC materials were testable and the students take an INFOSEC exam the day after their first day of training. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related the students are exposed to a variety of security protocols throughout the course. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the students are required to classify documents, they spend

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA, Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

DATE

27 Feb 12

EXHIBIT

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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## DETAILS

time at the end of the course in a Sensitive Compartmentalized Information Facility (SCIF), and all the students are required to sign non-disclosure agreements. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related all the students had interim Secret clearances before starting class and students were not allowed to miss more than 8 hours of instruction in any one block or 16 hours of training throughout the length of the course. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she did not recall PFC MANNING missing any training so he would have been present for the INFOSEC block of instruction the first day of class. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there was no additional, formal, security training as part of the 35F courseware. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she knows for a fact the importance of security was reiterated numerous times in PFC MANNING's class, including the importance of computer security and OPSEC. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the Drill Sergeants were removed from MI Village around the end of 2007 and there was an immediate and noticeable difference in the level of discipline with the initial entry Soldiers. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related MI Village basically became like the University of Arizona. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related each class was supposed to be assigned one Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) who was supposed to assist the contract instructors with disciplinary issues with the Soldiers. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related these NCO's were often unavailable because they were tasked with a variety of other additional duties or were assisting with more than one class. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the contract instructors were not authorized to discipline the Soldiers and there appeared to be no accountability. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related contract instructors were not allowed to even tell Soldiers to leave the classroom if they were being disruptive or to comment about a Soldier's poor personal hygiene. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related Chief (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) "had a really low attrition rate." SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) asked Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) if she was suggesting Chief (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (NFI) would not remove Soldiers from training for poor conduct. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she is stating, unequivocally, that instructors stopped trying to have Soldiers recycled (sent back to repeat portions of the class) or to pursue disciplinary actions against Soldiers because it was known no action would be taken. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she was not surprised PFC MANNING was allowed to continue his training and graduate because the culture at the time was that Soldiers were not going to fail out of training. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related 35F was a critically short MOS and the Command culture was to just find a way to get the Soldiers through the training. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related when she heard PFC MANNING was arrested and the nature of the charges against him she felt as though they'd made an enormous mistake at the schoolhouse. Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she felt like PFC MANNING demonstrated he was a security risk while attending AIT, but they failed to take the necessary steps to take care of the problem when they had a chance.

About 1330, 10 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 800<sup>th</sup> MP BDE, Fort Drum NY. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he is an Army reservist and is not currently on active duty orders. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related before he joined the Army he served in the Marine Corp from Feb 02 to Feb 06 as an Infantryman. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he joined the Army Reserves in 2007 and chose to join the Army in order to retrain as an Intelligence Analyst. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he attended 35F AIT around Apr 08, and remembers he and PFC MANNING were in the same class. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related toward the end of AIT the class had a Field Training Exercise (FTX). SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related during the FTX the class was broken down into small groups or "cells." SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated he and PFC MANNING worked in the same cell during the FTX. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembers PFC MANNING was really bright with computers and was good at putting things together such as power point presentations. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related because he was a

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SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

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## DETAILS

prior service Soldier he was kind of separated from the Initial Entry Training (IET) Soldiers in that they didn't live in the same barracks so he was only around PFC MANNING in class. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembers PFC MANNING seemed a little odd and would generally keep to himself. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembers an incident involving PFC MANNING that occurred during their FTX. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he'd tasked PFC MANNING to provide a briefing to the instructors about the weather. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related after the briefing PFC MANNING was receiving constructive criticism from the instructors, which was not going well, when PFC MANNING appeared to collapse. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he initially thought PFC MANNING was lunging at the instructors because of the way he was falling and because the criticism with respect to his briefing had been pretty harsh. But after PFC MANNING fell down SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) realized he'd simply collapsed. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING stated the incident occurred due to lack of sleep and he seemed to recover almost immediately after the incident. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated PFC MANNING may have locked his knees while providing the briefing, which may have also contributed to the collapse. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembers PFC MANNING was required to provide remedial training related to OPSEC because he'd posted videos about the class on the internet. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he can't recall if he was present for the OPSEC briefing PFC MANNING was required to provide. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the first blocks of instruction in the 35F AIT were security related and covered OPSEC and INFOSEC. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the information was testable and the class took a test at the end of the security block of instruction. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he is certain PFC MANNING was present for the blocks of instruction related to OPSEC and INFOSEC and does not recall PFC MANNING missing any training. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the class instructors repeatedly mentioned how the enemy can exploit the internet, Facebook pages, and other social networking websites to gain information. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he believes the incident where PFC MANNING posted information to the internet in AIT was mishandled. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related despite the nature of the training they were attending, the classes on INFOSEC/OPSEC, the repeated attempts by the instructors to emphasize the importance of Operational and Information security PFC MANNING still chose to post sensitive class information to the internet. SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he felt PFC MANNING should have been removed from the training, but it seemed like they were just graduating people because they needed analysts out in the field.

About 1100, 14 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 4<sup>th</sup> Sustainment BDE, Fort Hood, TX 76544. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he is scheduled to conduct a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move to Korea around 12 Mar 12. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he served in the Marine Corp and the Army reserves prior to coming onto active duty in the Army in 2008. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he served as a mechanic in the Army Reserve prior to coming on active duty in 2008. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he began 35F AIT around Apr 08, and ended around Mar 09. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was recycled into another class about half way through AIT around Jun or Jul 08. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he doesn't really remember PFC MANNING. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated he's familiar with the Wikileaks case and has seen PFC MANNING's face in the paper and on television, but just doesn't really remember PFC MANNING from AIT. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the prior service Soldiers were separated from the IET Soldiers and the only time they really saw each other was in the classroom. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the prior service Soldiers lived

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SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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in different barracks/housing and didn't really associate with the IET Soldiers outside of the classroom. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he doesn't recall anything specific about PFC MANNING's study habits or if PFC MANNING was a good or bad student. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he could not recall an incident where a student was reprimanded or punished for posting class information on the internet. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related he does not recall any remedial training provided by a student pertaining to OPSEC. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there was a formal block of instruction related to OPSEC and INFOSEC, which was one of the first blocks of instruction in the course. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related the block of instruction covering OPSEC and INFOSEC was a testable portion of the course materials. SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the instructors would regularly mention the importance of security protocols and would often tell stories related to spillage incidents and other security violations, although the aforementioned security classes were the only formal blocks of instruction in the course.

AGENT'S COMMENT: Its possible SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was recycled into another class prior to PFC MANNING providing the remedial OPSEC briefing, which could be why he does not recall the presentation.

About 1500, 16 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received a copy of the Student Evaluation Plan (SEP) for the 35F10 AIT course from SGT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). The SEP depicts the various blocks of instruction included in the 35F10 course. A review of the SEP revealed on page 2 the very first module of instruction in the 35F AIT was INFOSEC. The performance objectives for this block were as follows:

- A. Annotate Classification Markings to Documents/Media
- B. Apply Procedures for Protecting Classified Information

The INFOSEC block of instruction was a testable portion of the course material and a passing score of 80% or higher was required on the exam. (See SEP)

About 1000, 17 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHC, 558<sup>th</sup> Transportation BN, Tampa, FL. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he is a reservist and is not currently on active duty orders. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related he works for BAE Corporation as a DoD contractor, and works at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) as an Information Technology (IT) project manager. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he joined the Army in 2008 as an Intelligence Analyst/35F and attended AIT around Apr 08. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembers PFC MANNING from AIT and recalls PFC MANNING was not well liked by the other Soldiers. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING seemed extremely arrogant throughout AIT and characterized PFC MANNING's behavior as that of a "temperamental child." 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated PFC MANNING would regularly have emotional outbursts and throw little fits during class. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING would frequently indicate he was going to "beat someone's ass". 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated it was amusing when PFC MANNING would suggest he was going to get violent because of his small stature. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he recalls PFC MANNING was a pretty good student and does not recall PFC MANNING having any problems with the 35F course materials. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related

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SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

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PFC MANNING was extremely proficient with computers. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he is an IT professional as a civilian and recalls having a few conversations with PFC MANNING wherein PFC MANNING talked about his proficiency with computers and computer networks. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he couldn't recall exactly what PFC MANNING said but remembered thinking it was evident PFC MANNING knew what he was talking about. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING was required to provide remedial training related to OPSEC due to the YouTube videos he posted on the internet. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he doesn't remember seeing the videos but thinks they were of the barracks in MI Village. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related "the writing was on the wall" regarding what PFC MANNING was capable of. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the incident regarding the videos PFC MANNING posted to YouTube should have been a huge warning sign, but all he got was a slap on the wrist and was allowed to graduate with the rest of the class. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related it seemed like they were just pushing people through schoolhouse. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the incident with the YouTube videos occurred sometime during the first half of class in the first 4 to 8 weeks of training. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was present for the class PFC MANNING was required to provide but doesn't remember much about the class itself. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there was a formal block of instruction on INFOSEC that was part of the 35F AIT curriculum. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) could not recall if the INFOSEC portion was testable material and indicated other than that there weren't any other formal blocks of security training. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the course instructor Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was very big on OPSEC and frequently mentioned the importance of OPSEC during class. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) regularly mentioned the importance of social media outlets such as Facebook and indicated it was very important to be aware of the type of information being posted to social media outlets because the enemy uses social media to gather information. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he does not recall PFC MANNING missing any blocks of instruction aside from being absent for a short period right around the time the school discovered he'd been posting videos to YouTube. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING missed some time after the video incident and he assumed PFC MANNING was being "called on the carpet" or reprimanded. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he believes the Army allowed this incident to happen. 1LT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated after PFC MANNING was arrested he felt very strongly all the warning signs were there, but the Army needed analysts so badly they just allowed PFC MANNING to be pushed through despite the red flags.

About 1330, 21 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) HHD, 475<sup>th</sup> CHEM BN, Fort Lewis, WA, 98433. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he graduated from basic training around Mar 08, and reported to AIT around Apr 08. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he arrived at Fort Huachuca around three weeks before his class started and was a holdover waiting for the next iteration of the 35F class to start. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated he did remember PFC MANNING from class and further related PFC MANNING was one of the most memorable characters from the class. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as being very socially awkward and indicated it seemed like PFC MANNING might suffer from Asperger Syndrome. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING had an extremely short temper and was frequently ridiculed by the other students. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING as the student in class who just didn't know when to stop talking. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated PFC MANNING would volunteer to speak in class and would just drone on and on off topic into a series of tangents that had little to do with the course materials. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related

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SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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## DETAILS

PFC MANNING was extremely arrogant and acted like he knew everything. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated several of the other students found PFC MANNING's behavior and attitude annoying. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING also had really strange civilian clothes and would frequently wear pink. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated PFC MANNING had an extremely short temper and would often become enraged about homosexual jokes or comments made by the other students. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated PFC MANNING's bad temper was kind of funny because he was so small. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) suggested PFC MANNING seemed to have a bit of a "short mans complex." SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING was a very strong student academically and didn't seem to have any problems with the course materials. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did recall an OPSEC briefing PFC MANNING was required to provide during AIT. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING was required to provide the briefing as a punishment for posting a video to YouTube that contained sensitive information about their AIT class including building numbers, class schedule, etc. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he is pretty sure he saw the video at the time, but doesn't really remember much about it now. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he believes the incident where PFC MANNING posted the video to the internet occurred sometime during the first half of the course. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he doesn't remember the presentation PFC MANNING gave in the classroom with PowerPoint slides regarding OPSEC, but does remember PFC MANNING was required to stand on a platform in the company area in front of the entire company and give a five minute speech about the importance of OPSEC. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the presentation in the company area seemed to be as much about humiliation as it was about providing remedial training. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there was a formal block of instruction pertaining to security practices built into the 35F AIT. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated they spent the first week of class going over INFOSEC, which primarily dealt with the different classification levels and the possible damage that could be done if the information was ever leaked. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the INFOSEC block of instruction was testable material and that everyone in class passed the exam. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he does not recall PFC MANNING missing any class. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he couldn't remember if a student was present on a given day but indicated in order to move on to the next block of instruction students had to be present for training and had to pass all their exams. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING passed his INFOSEC exam and moved on to the following block of instruction. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated the importance of classified material was often re-iterated throughout the course by the instructors. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related it's ironic now, but one day in class they had some down time and they watched the movie Breach during class. SPC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related it's ironic he was in class, watching the movie Breach about Robert HANSSEN with PFC Bradley MANNING.

About 1030, 27 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division, J2, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was stationed at Fort Huachuca, AZ, from Aug 05, through Jun 09. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related while he was stationed at Fort Huachuca he held two positions. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was an instructor at the Military Intelligence Captain's Career Course and then took over as the OIC of the 35F AIT course. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained as the OIC of the 35F AIT he was responsible for a committee of instructors, for implementing U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) doctrine, for training instructors, and for student's classroom performance. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) compared serving as a committee OIC to being a department head in a school or university. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated he does not remember PFC MANNING at all. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he's thought about it extensively since the news

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SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

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## DETAILS

broke about PFC MANNING and has seen pictures of PFC MANNING in the news, but doesn't remember him from the 35F AIT. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related he doesn't recall any significant security incidents involving PFC MANNING while he was at AIT. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described the incident wherein PFC MANNING posted videos to YouTube, which may have contained sensitive information related to classroom building numbers and course materials. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated an incident like that "wouldn't even have been a blip on the radar." CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) indicated he was primarily responsible for classroom performance, and the majority of his interaction with students had to do with students who were struggling with the course materials and might need to be recycled (held back to repeat materials with another class) or reclassified into a different Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not recall any security incidents that were briefed up to the BN CDR. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there were so many other things going on that an incident like the one SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described would not have been regarded as a "big deal." CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related none of what was being taught was classified. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained there were constant issues with the trainees and instructors, including trainees committing crimes, trainees videotaping themselves engaging in homosexual acts (this was prior to Don't Ask Don't Tell Repeal when homosexuality was a crime), teachers attacking students in class that a Soldier posting a video on the internet about where he went to class wouldn't have been a big issue. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related his only real contact with the students during AIT is an in brief they receive upon arrival and then he meets individually with students who are having problems with the course materials. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he does not recall PFC MANNING having any problems with the course materials. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) confirmed the students receive a formal block of instruction in the 35F AIT pertaining to OPSEC and INFOSEC. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) explained TRADOC mandates OPSEC and INFOSEC be included in the 35F courseware. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) further related the security block of instruction was testable material. CW4 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) confirmed that keeping attrition low was a tense subject and something that was always being pushed by leadership.

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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Exhibit(s) 382

Page(s) 001949 thru 001961 referred to:

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Fort Huachuca AZ 85613-7004

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DETAILS

**BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:** On 26 Jul 11, this office received a Request for Assistance from the Computer Crimes Investigative Unit, Washington Metro Resident Agency, 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 22134, which requested canvass interviews of all Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility inmates which may have contact with PFC Bradley E. MANNING, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) formerly of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Forward Operating Base Hammer, Iraq, currently detained at the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility as a pretrial inmate.

About 1250, 26 Jul 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), both of this office, conducted canvass interviews of the following individuals:

Post Trial:

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

Pre-Trial:

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

(See Canvass Worksheets)

About 1045, 1 Aug 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) interviewed CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) 500<sup>th</sup> Military Police Detachment, Special Troops Battalion (STB), FLKS. (See Worksheet for details)

About 1325, 1 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) conducted canvass interviews of the following individuals:

Pre-Trial:

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		Fort Leavenworth CID Office 801 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027	
SIG	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE	EXHIBIT
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DETAILS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

(See Canvass Interview Worksheets)

About 1340, 30 Sep 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) conducted canvass interviews of the following individuals:

Pre-trial:

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

(See Canvass Interview Worksheets)

About 1330, 28 Oct 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) conducted canvass interviews of the following individuals:

Pre-trial:

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		Fort Leavenworth CID Office 801 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027	
SIGNATURE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE 28 Feb 12	EXHIBIT 383	



<b>AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT</b> <i>CID Regulation 195-1</i>	ROI NUMBER 0128-11-CID055-
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DETAILS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

(See Canvass Interview Worksheets)

About 1335, 30 Nov 11, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, conducted canvass interviews of the following individuals:

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS.

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(See Canvass Interview Worksheets)

About 0724, 22 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SAC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CCIU, who requested a close out survey be completed as Inmate MANNING had been released from the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility and was taken to the Military District Washington for trial.

About 1330, 28 Feb 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) conducted canvass interviews of the following individuals:

Pre-trial:

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)		Fort Leavenworth CID Office 801 McClellan Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027	
SIGNATURE	(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	DATE	EXHIBIT
		28 Feb 12	383

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AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

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DETAILS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

Inmate (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, FLKS

(See Canvass Interview Worksheets)

///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

ORGANIZATION

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

Fort Leavenworth CID Office  
801 McClellan Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

28 Feb 12

EXHIBIT

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CID FORM 94-E

1 Oct 95

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AUTOMATIC TERMINATION (Para 13, AR 340-16)  
(When Data Is Entered)

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: JRCF

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

I DO NOT WANT TO ANSWER

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

I DO NOT WANT TO ANSWER

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

I DO NOT WANT TO ANSWER

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

I DO NOT WANT TO ANSWER

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

I DO NOT WANT TO ANSWER

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

I DO NOT WANT TO ANSWER

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

I DO NOT WANT TO ANSWER

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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001966

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *like a person in jail, awaiting trial.*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *No, but I only see him at meals.*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *No.*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *don't really know, I only see him at meals or in passing. he is only with other pretrialers.*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *I don't know. I saw a blond haired woman during visitation two months ago - thought it was a sister.*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *IN JAIL TRYING TO ~~escape~~ cope*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *no*

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: A-2-16

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

*He is kind of quite but nothing really unusual*2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *No*

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

*No*

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

*he doesn't talk alot but he probably associates with me the most*

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

*No*

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

*Keeps to himself mostly*

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

*no*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: 601st

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

*Civilized*2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *no*3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *no*

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) *when he was here*

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) *and* (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) *I guess I don't know if he considers them friends*

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

*a normal person*7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *no*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
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Name (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

N/A

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

N/A

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

N/A

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

N/A

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

N/A

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

N/A

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

N/A

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth:

Social Security Number:

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? .....
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth:

Social Security Number:

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

*Fine*

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

*no*

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

*no*

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

*none*

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

*none*

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

*Fine*

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

*no*

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *Fine*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *None*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *None*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *None*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *None*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *Fine*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *NO*

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: ?

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *A little cocky*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *he has gotten more assertive lately*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *have already told CID*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *ML*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *Oh known*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *well kept and getting more assertive*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *yes*

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30 Sep 11

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number:

Unit: 1-7FA

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *normal*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *no*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *no*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *no*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *no*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *normal*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *no*

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Social Security Number (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *Fine*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *NONE*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *NONE*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *Fine*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *NONE*

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30 Sep 11

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *fine*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *none*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *none*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *fine*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *none*

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30 NOV 11

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *Fine*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *NA*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *NA*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *NA*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *NA*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *NA*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *NA*

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

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30 Sep 11

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

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28 Oct 11

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth:

Social Security Number:

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

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30 Sep 11

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number:

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

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(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command is conducting a criminal investigation involving a matter of national security. You have been identified as someone who may have information relevant to this investigation. Please answer all questions to the best of your ability.

Name (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: H/81st

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

Passive

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

NO

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

NO

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

I don't know

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

I don't know

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

Smart, Quiet

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

NO

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: 118<sup>th</sup>

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

No

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

No

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

No

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

No

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

No

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

No

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

No

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30 Sep 11

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

NO

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

NO

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

NO

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

NO

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

NO

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

NO

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

NO

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30 Sep 11

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: A2/32 FA

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

normal

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

no

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

no

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

Everyone

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

no

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

normal

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

no

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28 Oct 11

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: A2/32

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: 128 in DCO Ft. Riley KS

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

*Quietly Doesn't talk to me*2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *NO*3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *NO*

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

*Not me*

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

*NO*

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

*Short*7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *Not at all*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
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28 Oct 11

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

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Name (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: 128th HHC

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

NO

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

NO

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

NO

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

NO

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

NO

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

White

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

NO

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *No*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *No*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *No*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *No*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *No*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *No*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *No*

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: Kilo

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

fine i guess

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

No

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

No

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

I dont know

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

I dont know

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

N/A

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

No

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

~~Q~~ / don't know

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

No

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

No

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

/ don't know

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

/ don't know

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

Quiet

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

No

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001993

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *Fine*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *NO*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *NO*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *don't know*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *NO*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *Small*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *NO*

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *NA*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *NA*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *NA*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *NA*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *NA*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *NA*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *NA*

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *N/A*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?  
*N/A*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?  
*N/A*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?  
*N/A*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *N/A*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *N/A*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?  
*N/A*

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001996

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Unit: ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *gay*

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *He socializes w/ one person at a time*

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

*PTA 40 yrs - He says "NO"*

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *genius*

*Smarter than you may be cause these forms.*

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

*How he travels and when.*

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001997

30 Nov 11  
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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: Dco 1-28<sup>th</sup> ID Fort Riley KS 66442  
4182

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? Quiet, personal, tries to blend in, keeps all info in his head.
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? more interactive.
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?  
None.
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?  
w/ a little of everyone, small conversation
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?  
No.
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?  
Smart, quiet, keeps to him self
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?  
no only what goes on through each day.

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28 Feb 12

0028 10-CID221-10117

0028-10-CID221-10117

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The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command is conducting a criminal investigation involving a matter of national security. You have been identified as someone who may have information relevant to this investigation. Please answer all questions to the best of your ability.

Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth:

Social Security Number:

Unit:

3 N/A

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

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EXHIBIT 384  
001999

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

0028 10-CID221-10117

30 Nov 11

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Name:

Date of Birth:

Social Security Number:

Unit:

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number:

Unit: B Btry 1/5 FA

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

*I haven't met him*2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *Same as above*

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

*Same as above*

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

*Same as above*

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

*Same as above*

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

*Same as above*

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

*Same as above*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
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002001

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Name (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number:

Unit: 4-4 CAV 1st BDE 1st Inf Div

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

Normal

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

No

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

No

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

By himself

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

No

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

Quiet

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

No

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EXHIBIT 384

002002

28 Feb 12.

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: 77th Eng Co. 94th Eng BN

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?

*Pretty Normal I guess*

2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?

*NO*

3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?

*NO*

4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?

*Pre-trial (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) mostly. When he was here*

5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?

*Don't know*

6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?

*quiet and pretty friendly.*

7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?

*Not that I recall*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
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002003



28 Feb 12

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number:

Unit: B 1-S FA...

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *OK, I guess (I don't really pay attention)*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *No*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *No*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *Himself*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *I don't know*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *White male with glasses in his early Twenties*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *No*

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002004

28 Feb 12

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)  
Unit: 50<sup>th</sup> Engr Co.

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving?  
*Like someone who is in Prison facing serious charges.*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior?  
*Nope*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)?  
*Nope*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate?  
*All Kilo pre-trials*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends?  
*there are no "friends" in this facility.*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning?  
*Small*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information?  
*Nope*

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002005

0128-11-CID0255

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Name: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Social Security Number: (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Unit: 500<sup>th</sup> MP DET

1. How is Pre-trial Manning behaving? *Calm and compliant*
2. Have you noticed any unusual behavior by Pre-trial Manning? If so, what type(s) of behavior? *None*
3. Have you noticed any unusual conversations in which Pre-trial Manning has participated? If so, what was the nature of the conversation(s)? *No*
4. With whom does Pre-trial Manning normally associate? *Unknown*
5. Does Pre-trial Manning have any friends? If so, who are his friends? *Unknown*
6. How would you describe Pre-trial Manning? *See question one*
7. Have you ever heard Pre-trial Manning discuss or mention anything you might think is classified or sensitive information? *No*

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002006

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NU.....?

0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 0900, 28 Mar 12, Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Evidence Custodian, this office, coordinated with CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Assistant S-2, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division (MNT DIV), Building 10200 North Riva Ridge Loop, Fort Drum, NY 13602, for access to the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).

About 1115, 28 Mar 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and Mrs. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) searched the contents of a Tuff Box, green in color, plastic type construction, which was secured with a American Lock Series 5200 and keyed S/N 25431, banded with a metallic band, seal identification number: N907386, with tamper resistant seals on the locking clasps signed by SSG (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) NFI) and dated 16 DEC 2011, all seals intact, for the 13 hard disk drives (HDD) identified by the trial counsel. The search resulted with the seizure of the following 13 HDDs:

BRAND	SIZE	MODEL	SERIAL NUMBER
Hitachi	100GB	HTS5721010G9SA00	MPCZN7Y0J9JMJL
Hitachi	40GB	DK23FB-40	BBEH4A1AH903
Hitachi	40GB	DK23FB-40	3TU528
Hitachi	unknown	unknown	KCG46XTP
Hitachi	40GB	DK23FB-40	BBEH4A12T145
Toshiba	40GB	MK4025GAS	Z5FX1417S
Hitachi	60GB	DK23EA-60	MCE55AN84638
Hitachi	60GB	IC25N060ATMR04-0	K3GVGAYK
Hitachi	60GB	IC25N060ATMR04-0	KCJ3TKNH
Hitachi	60GB	IC25N060ATMR04-0	K3HLNLSH
Fujitsu	unknown	MHV2080AH	NT9AT63281DY
Hitachi	40GB	DK23EA-40	MCE65APG8189
Hitachi	60GB	IC25N060ATMR04-0	K3HA9WHH

About 1210, 28 Mar 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) collected as evidence 13 HDDs from SFC (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Special Security Representative, 2nd BCT, 10th MNT DIV, Fort Drum, NY 13602, which was documented on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 036-12.

////////////////////LAST ENTRY////////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Washington Metro RA Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

DATE

28 Mar 12

EXHIBIT

385

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

CID FORM 34

1 FEB 77

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002007

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361

ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

## DETAILS

## Imaging:

About 0154, 29 Mar 12, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) created an EnCase digital forensic image of the Department of Army Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), as Document Number (DN) 036-12, Item #1.

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	MPCZN7Y0J9MJL
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: 38CAE7BB0F9218119CEBF005EA26BF19 SHA1: B1F7DFCD00B0DD281F5D3EC70247557671AD5D3C
Verification Hashes	MD5: 38CAE7BB0F9218119CEBF005EA26BF19 SHA1: B1F7DFCD00B0DD281F5D3EC70247557671AD5D3C

About 0243, 29 Mar 12, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) created an EnCase digital forensic image of the Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 162-10, Item #2. It was noted the hard drive appeared to have been partially wiped.

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	BBEH4A1AH903
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: D0033E4CC41625DD62FB264FC0010CA1 SHA1: 710FB0A9C9757F496FFD17109E015C7EE679F666
Verification Hashes	MD5: D0033E4CC41625DD62FB264FC0010CA1 SHA1: 710FB0A9C9757F496FFD17109E015C7EE679F666

About 0400, 29 Mar 12, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) created an EnCase digital forensic image of the Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #4. It was noted the hard drive appeared to have been wiped. The hex character 69 was written on each sector.

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	BE0828613591D
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: c0022df1ef1fa8bc8453f00ba02fe547 SHA1: 846d21b9cce8e517954e4623bcacebbb95a1cf98
Verification Hashes	MD5: c0022df1ef1fa8bc8453f00ba02fe547 SHA1: 846d21b9cce8e517954e4623bcacebbb95a1cf98

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

18 Apr 12

EXHIBIT

386

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361

ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 0453, 29 Mar 12, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) created an EnCase digital forensic image of the Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 162-10, Item #6. It was noted the hard drive appeared to have been wiped. The hex character 30 was written on each sector.

Hard Disk Drive	TOSHIBA
Serial Number	Z5FX1417S
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: 79D256CC61048D961974A82D96BCC1F1 SHA1: 8C5340B7690BDDF7B1990F699409C46D67944440
Verification Hashes	MD5: 79D256CC61048D961974A82D96BCC1F1 SHA1: 8C5340B7690BDDF7B1990F699409C46D67944440

About 0545, 29 Mar 12, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) created an EnCase digital forensic image of the Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #7. It was noted the hard drive appeared to have been wiped. The hex character 30 was written on each sector.

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	MCE55AN84638
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: 99E7446F77F2E535EC5F569CE741A868 SHA1: C378392E68406B9B5E6DA1EE45F8DA11CBBD4E8A
Verification Hashes	MD5: 99E7446F77F2E535EC5F569CE741A868 SHA1: C378392E68406B9B5E6DA1EE45F8DA11CBBD4E8A

About 0641, 29 Mar 12, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) created a digital forensic image of the Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #8. It was noted the hard drive appeared to have been wiped. The hex character 30 was written on each sector.

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

18 Apr 12

EXHIBIT

386

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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Law Enforcement Sensitive

Approved 002009

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361

ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

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## DETAILS

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	K3GVGAYK
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: 99E7446F77F2E535EC5F569CE741A868 SHA1: C378392E68406B9B5E6DA1EE45F8DA11CBBD4E8A
Verification Hashes	MD5: 99E7446F77F2E535EC5F569CE741A868 SHA1: C378392E68406B9B5E6DA1EE45F8DA11CBBD4E8A

About 0737, 29 Mar 12, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) created a digital forensic image of the Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #9. It was noted the hard drive appeared to have been wiped. The hex character 30 was written on each sector.

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	KCJ3TKNH
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: 99E7446F77F2E535EC5F569CE741A868 SHA1: C378392E68406B9B5E6DA1EE45F8DA11CBBD4E8A
Verification Hashes	MD5: 99E7446F77F2E535EC5F569CE741A868 SHA1: C378392E68406B9B5E6DA1EE45F8DA11CBBD4E8A

About 0856, 29 Mar 12, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) created a digital forensic image of the Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #11.

Hard Disk Drive	FUJITSU
Serial Number	NT9AT63281DY
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: ED1DDC1910D59F377A50B3FA1CE73A51 SHA1:ACAE9E946223AFC4E5354F678AF60F90D6B57100
Verification Hashes	MD5: ED1DDC1910D59F377A50B3FA1CE73A51 SHA1:ACAE9E946223AFC4E5354F678AF60F90D6B57100

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

SIGN (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060DATE  
18 Apr 12

EXHIBIT

386

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361

ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

## DETAILS

Between 0154 and 1100, 29 Mar 12, SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) attempted to create a digital forensic image of the Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Items #3,5,10,12,13. However the hard drives in question appeared to have been damaged and no image was taken.

About 1330, 30 Mar 12, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Forensic Examiner, this office, ran a HDD diagnostic using an Atola DiskSense hardware media analyzer (write-block switch engaged) and Atola Insight v2.3 software on the HDD documented on Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #3 reported as damaged. The HDD was not accessible to the Atola device and did not appear to be powering up. Drive could not be imaged.

About 1350, 30 Mar 12, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ran a HDD diagnostic using an Atola DiskSense hardware media analyzer (write-block switch engaged) and Atola Insight v2.3 software on the HDD documented on Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #5 reported as damaged. The Atola confirmed read errors. Using the Atola in multipass imaging mode (set for moderate damage), created a RAW (DD) format image with unreadable sectors replaced with 0's. Following creation of the image, the RAW image was reacquired to convert to EnCase (E01) format using EnCase v6.19.

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	BBEH4A12T145
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: 22ba0f94004fbbe5d513e90175e778ea
Verification Hashes	MD5: 22ba0f94004fbbe5d513e90175e778ea

About 1850, 30 Mar 12, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ran a HDD diagnostic using an Atola DiskSense hardware media analyzer (write-block switch engaged) and Atola Insight v2.3 software on the HDD documented on Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #10 reported as damaged. The Atola confirmed head damage. Using the Atola in multipass imaging mode (set for heavy damage), created a RAW (DD) format image with unreadable sectors replaced with 0's. Following creation of the image, the RAW image reacquired to convert to EnCase (E01) format using EnCase v6.19. It was noted that all sectors drive contained hex character 00, no usable data is contained on this drive.

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	K3HLNLISH
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: 99e7446f77f2e535ec5f569ce741a868
Verification Hashes	MD5: 99e7446f77f2e535ec5f569ce741a868

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

18 Apr 12

EXHIBIT

386

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361

ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1130, 2 Apr 12, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ran a HDD diagnostic using an Atola DiskSense hardware media analyzer (write-block switch engaged) and Atola Insight v2.3 software on the HDD documented on Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #12 reported as damaged. The Atola confirmed read errors. Using the Atola in multipass imaging mode (set for moderate damage), created a RAW (DD) format image with unreadable sectors replaced with 0's. Following creation of the image, the RAW image was reacquired to convert to EnCase (E01) format using EnCase v6.19.

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	MCE65APG8189
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: 48ead945f377f45e2ff4078cbde370c9
Verification Hashes	MD5: 48ead945f377f45e2ff4078cbde370c9

About 1340, 30 Mar 12, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ran a HDD diagnostic using an Atola DiskSense hardware media analyzer (write-block switch engaged) and Atola Insight v2.3 software on the HDD documented on Department of Army Form 4137, EPCD, as DN 036-12, Item #13 reported as damaged. The Atola confirmed head damage. Using the Atola in multipass imaging mode (set for heavy damage), created a RAW (DD) format image with unreadable sectors replaced with 0's. Following creation of the image, the RAW image was converted to EnCase (E01) format using EnCase v6.19. It was noted that all sectors drive contained hex character 00, no usable data is contained on this drive.

Hard Disk Drive	HITACHI
Serial Number	K3HA9WHH
Image Type	EnCase
Acquisition Hashes	MD5: ff54cbf63353d21727dc33ff11991f32
Verification Hashes	MD5: ff54cbf63353d21727dc33ff11991f32

/////////////////////////////////LAST ENTRY/////////////////////////////////

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b)(7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIG

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

18 Apr 12

EXHIBIT

386

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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Approved 002012

Exhibit(s) 387

Page(s) 002013 and 2013a withheld:

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)

Permits withholding information that  
is classified for  
National Security purposes

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361  
ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

**Basis for Investigation:**

On 27 Jul 12, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) forensic examiner, this office received a forensic request from MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Trial Counsel, National Capital Region/Military District of Washington (NCR/MDW), NORTHCOM, Fort McNair, DC by way of SSA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Special Agent in Charge, Washington Metro Residence Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, US Army CID, Quantico, VA. It was requested that this examiner compare files identified on Evidence Custody Property Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 164-10 for matching or similar content contained on a DVD disk obtained from the FBI.

**Pertinent Information:**

On 31 Jul 12, Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) received a DVD disk obtained from the FBI via SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit, US Army CID, Quantico, VA. The FBI disk was identified by the FBI Case Number WF-242460 and Lab No. 120725254 BY. Contained on this disk was a 7-Zip format archive file named "afghan-war-diary.html[1814].7z" found to contain a collection of HTML documents.

EPCD 164-10 was reported to have been obtained from the IRTF. Contained in DVDs was a 7-Zip format archive with a similar file name, "afg-war-diary.html.7z" containing a collection of HTML documents. The MD5 hash values for the two 7-Zip files do not match but a manual review of the contents indicate they contain identical file folder structures and contain the same number of files and folders (88094).




Figure 1 - Folder Structures from 7-Zip archives (IRTF on left, FBI on right)

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

ORGANIZATION

CCIU-Digital Forensics and Research Branch  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22136

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

2 August 2012

EXHIBIT

388

## AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

ROI NUMBER

CAF: 0028-10-CID361  
ROI: 0028-10-CID221-10117

CID Regulation 195-1

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

Exporting the contents of each 7-Zip archive and calculating the MD5 hash values for all files contained from both archives revealed that all files located in the /afg/sort and /static hierarchies from the FBI provided 7-Zip archive (afghan-war-diary.html[1814].7z) were also contained on the IRTF 7-Zip Archive ("afg-war-diary.html.7z") by matching MD5 hash values.

The file folder hierarchies within under the /afg/events root in both archives match by folder names and contain the same number of files (76989). Comparing the filenames within the /afg/events structures show they match on both archives. Files contained within the /afg/events hierarchies in both 7-Zip archives do not match by MD5 hash values, indicating different file content. A review of a subset of the files contained within the IRTF version of /afg/events hierarchy with its counterpart in the FBI version shows that the content is largely the same but with what appear to be editorial changes. A sample is shown below in Figure 2. By review of the contextual changes, it appears that the FBI version of files may have been an earlier draft than those shown in the IRTF version.

Figure 2 -- Sample content from file in events folder (IRTF on left, FBI on right)

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER		ORGANIZATION	
Mr. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		CCIU-Digital Forensics and Research Branch U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22136	
SIGNATURE		DATE	EXHIBIT
(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)		2 August 2012	388

Exhibit(s) 389

Page(s) 002016 and 2016a withheld:

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)

Permits withholding information that  
is classified for  
National Security purposes

Exhibit(s) 390

Page(s) 002017 thru 2017p withheld:

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)

Permits withholding information that  
is classified for  
National Security purposes

Exhibit(s) 391

Page(s) 002018 thru 2018f withheld:

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)

Permits withholding information that  
is classified for  
National Security purposes

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

ROI NUMBER

0028-10-CID221-10117  
0084-12-CID609

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

**BASIS FOR INVESTIGATION:** This investigation was initiated upon receipt of a Request For Assistance from the Washington Metro Resident Agency, Computer Crime Investigative Unit (CCIU), Quantico, VA 22134, to coordinate with the Theater Field Confinement Facility (TFCF), Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO AE 09366 (CAKU), and collect a or several pieces of evidence which the command element of that facility has recently discovered which are germane to their investigation. This office is further requested to coordinate with the current command staff and attempt to determine what personnel originally collected the evidence in 2010.

About 1000, 6 Sep 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) this office, coordinated with MA1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) TFCF, CAKU, who provided a sworn statement in which she stated details surrounding her discovery of two plastic bags containing what she believed to be evidence pertaining to the attempted suicide of a previous inmate. MA1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she provided the bags to MCPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) TFCF, CAKU. MA1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related she collected the property which was documented on an Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD). MA1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also provided copies of the Inmate Observation Logs and other documents pertaining to the actions and observed activities of the inmate associated with room Echo-3 (PFC Bradley MANNING's room) during the time when the property appears to have originally been collected. (see documents for details)

About 1015, 6 Sep 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) requested all personnel who handled the evidence at any time provide investigator's statements pertaining to their knowledge of the discovery, handling, and storage of the pieces of evidence.

About 1030, 6 Sep 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with LCDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) TFCF, CAKU, who provided access to the safe inside of which the discovered evidence was maintained, and signed the evidence to this Agent on the original EPCD.

**AGENT'S COMMENT:** The EPCD was subsequently processed into the evidence room under EPCD Document Number (DN) 921-12.

About 1430, 6 Sep 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with LCDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and MCPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who provided investigator's statements written by themselves as well as CDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Commander, TFCF, CAKU.

About 0915, 13 Sep 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) coordinated with SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CCIU, who related that no further investigative activity was required of this office.///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Camp Arifjan CID Office  
Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO AE 09366

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

13 Sep 12

EXHIBIT

392

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002019

ENCL 1



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION <i>TFCF Camp Arifjan, Kuwait</i>	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) <i>20120906</i>	3. TIME <i>1017</i>	4. FILE NUMBER <i>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</i>
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME <i>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</i>	6. SSN <i>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</i>	7. GRADE/STATUS <i>MAJ/E6/AD</i>	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS <i>TFCF Camp Arifjan, Kuwait APO AE 09366</i>			

*(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)*, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 20120904, at approximately 1000 hours, I, MAJ *(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)*  
*(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)* LPO Prisoner Services Branch, found two (2) plastic bags  
 marked evidence. I was straightening out my DNA Kits, which  
 are stored in my office, in a five (5) drawer filing cabinet in the  
 bottom drawer, when I discovered the two (2) clear plastic bags.  
 One (1) containing a pale orange in color sheet, used as bedding  
 by prisoners and one (1) containing what appeared to be boot  
 laces. I immediately removed these bags from the drawer and  
 turned them over to my Command Master Chief, STSCM *(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)*  
*(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)*

*No Further Entries*

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON <i>(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)</i> ELEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <i>2</i> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

TAKEN AT TFCE, Camp Arifan DATED 2012 09 06

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

0028 10-CID221-10117

NOT USED

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

## AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6 day of SEP 2012 at TFCE, Camp Arifan, KAWAIT

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

10 WSC 936

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT 0084 12 CID609

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT 0028 10 CID221-10117

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
 PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
 ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
 DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION THEATER FIELD CONFINEMENT FACILITY-KUWAIT	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20120906	3. TIME 1020	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	6. SSN (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	7. GRADE/STATUS O-5/USN AD	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS TFCF, APO AE 09366			

9. I, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

At Approximately 1030 hrs on 04 SEP 2012, my MASTER CHIEF (semi Enlisted officer) brought to me 2 plastic bags with numerous items and photographs inside the sealed bags. I had the bags immediately placed with the controlled access safe located at our facility and contacted SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) The items resembled ones that were being searched for by the office the SA works in. I also contacted CID located here at Camp Arifjan to take custody of the above mentioned articles/bags.

NEET  
 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

## SWORN STATEMENT 0084 12 CID609

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

## PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
 PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
 ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
 DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION THEATER FIELD CONFINEMENT FACILITY, KUWAIT	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20120906	3. TIME 1018	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	6. SSN (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	7. GRADE/STATUS E-9	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS TFCF APO AE 09366			

9. I, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON 04 SEPTEMBER 2012 AT ABOUT 1000 MA1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) BROUGHT TO MY OFFICE 2 CLEAR PLASTIC ZIPLOC BAGS THAT APPEARED TO CONTAIN ITEMS THAT PERTAIN TO PRISONER MANNINGS STAY AT TFCF. ONE BAG CONTAINED WHAT APPEARS TO BE A PINK COLORED SHEET AND THE OTHER SOME SORT OF STRING OR LACES AND HEAVY GAUGE WIRE AND PHOTOS OF THE ITEMS.

MA1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) INFORMED ME, SHE HAD FOUND THE BAGS IN THE BOTTOM DRAWER OF A 5 DRAWER FILE CABINET UNDER A STACK OF DNA COLLECTION KITS.

I ASSUMED CUSTODY OF THE TWO BAGS. WHEN THE OIC/CDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) ARRIVED I BROUGHT THEM TO HIS OFFICE.

FROM THERE THEY WERE GIVEN TO LCDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) AND PLACED IN THE SAFE IN HIS OFFICE.

AT THAT TIME CDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CONTACTED CID FOR GUIDANCE.

Q. SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

A. MCPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Q. SINCE THE DISCOVERY OF THE BAGS, WERE EITHER OF THE BAGS OPENED FOR ANY REASON?

A. NO, NEITHER BAG HAS BEEN OPENED SINCE THEY WERE FOUND.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WISH TO ADD TO THIS STATEMENT?

A. NO NOTHING TO ADD // END OF STATEMENT //

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" WHEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

0084 12 CID609

STATEMENT OF (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT TFCF DATED 06 Sep 12

0028 10-CID221-10117

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

NOT USED

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6 day of Sep, 2012 at TFCF, APO AE 09366

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

10 USC 956

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

OR ADDRESS

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

**SWORN STATEMENT 0084 12 CID609**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is QDCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION TRCF Bldg T-740 RM 107 CAMP ARIFAN, KU	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20120906	3. TIME 1045	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	6. SSN (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	7. GRADE/STATUS LCDR /O-4 USNActive	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS TRCF ASG-KU APO AE 09366 CAMP ARIFAN, KUWAIT			

9. I, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:  
 ON THE MORNING OF 4 SEP 2012, MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) DISCOVERED TWO ZIP LOCK CLEAR BAGS OF EVIDENCE. ONE BAG WAS LABELED "EVIDENCE 01 SEP 2010 ECHO-3" CONTAINING A BERSHET OF ORANGISH COLOR. SECOND BAG WAS LABELED "EVIDENCE 29 JUNE 10 ECHO-3" CONTAINING 2 GREEN WIRKS AND WHAT APPEARS TO BE TWO PLASTIC STRINGS USED TO TIE UP/CLOSE UP SACK BAGS. THE TWO ZIP LOCK BAGS WERE DISCOVERED IN THE BACK OF A DRAWER IN HER OFFICE DESK. MAJ (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) REMOVED THE ITEMS AND TOOK ITEMS (2) FROM HER OFFICE TO STSCM (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) AND NOTIFIED HIM OF WHAT SHE DISCOVERED. MASTER CHIEF (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) TOOK CUSTODY OF ITEMS AND TURNED THEM OVER TO THE OIC CDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) CDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) THEN BROUGHT THE TWO ITEMS TO ME FOR STORAGE IN MY OFFICE IN A ONE DOOR COMBINATION LOCKED SAFE AT APPROXIMATELY 1100 ON 4 SEP 2012.

AT APPROXIMATE 1035 ON 6 SEP 2012 I TURNED ITEMS OVER TO CID REPRESENTATIVE (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

ENTRIES  
LCDR USN

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

0028 12 CID609

STATEMENT OF (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) TAKEN AT TFCE DATED 2012 Sep 06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

0028 10-CID221-10117

NOT USED

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

## AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Taking Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6 day of Sep, 2012 at TFCE, Camp Arifjan, APO AE 09366

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

10 USC 936

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

IN (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

EXHIBIT(s) 397 thru 406

Page(s) 002027 thru 002040 referred to:

SECNAV/CNO FOIA Office  
Chief of Naval Operations (DNS-36)  
2000 Navy Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20350-2000



# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

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0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1035, 12 Sep 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) telephonically interviewed CAPT(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who confirmed he was assigned to the Theater Confinement Facility (TCF) at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and he remembered PFC MANNING. CAPT(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he was the Mental Health Officer at the TCF and spoke to PFC MANNING on numerous occasions. CAPT(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he remembered the incident where a noose was found in PFC MANNING's cell, but he stated he did not remember seeing the noose himself. CAPT(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also stated he did not know who actually found the noose or what happened to it.

About 1355, 12 Sep 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) telephonically interviewed LCDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who confirmed he was the Executive Officer of the TCF, when PFC MANNING was confined there. LCDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) stated he did remember the incident when the noose was found but did not know which individual(s) from the "cadre" (TCF guard force) found it. LCDR (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not know what happened to the noose.

About 1245, 1 Oct 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) telephonically interviewed PO1(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who related he was deployed to Kuwait in 2010 and was working at the TCF while PFC MANNING was there. PO1(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembered the incident with the noose, but he did not discover the noose, nor did he have custody of the noose. PO1(R) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was the supervisor for the guard force, and would likely have additional information on the noose.

About 1342, 1 Oct 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) telephonically interviewed PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who related he was deployed to Kuwait in 2010 and was working at the TCF while PFC MANNING was there. PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was working as a guard in the TCF when he noticed a noose in PFC MANNING's cell. He described the noose as a full bed sheet that was twisted into the shape of a noose and was hanging off of the fence of PFC MANNING's cell. PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related PFC MANNING was lying on his bunk at this time. When PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) initiated verbal contact with PFC MANNING, he became "quite theatrical" and started screaming. PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) described PFC MANNING's screaming as sounds but not actual words and he related this was a common activity for PFC MANNING. PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) entered the cell and removed the noose. PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was not sure what happened to the noose and thought it might have been put into the laundry for reuse. PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the supervisor of the guards was CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) and he might have additional information as to what happened to the noose.

About 1232, 15 Oct 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) telephonically interviewed CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who related he was deployed to Kuwait in 2010 and was working at the TCF while PFC MANNING was there. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was working as the supervisor for the guard force when he was alerted by PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) of a noose in PFC MANNING's cell. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) arrived at the cell and viewed the noose in the cell with PFC MANNING. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related once he was present PO2 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) entered PFC MANNING's cell and removed the noose, which he immediately gave to CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C).

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Nov 12

EXHIBIT

407

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

EXHIBIT 407 002041

Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

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0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

## DETAILS

CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) took the noose directly to the administrative trailer, where he turned it over to CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was in charge of administrative and legal issues dealing with the confined personnel and as part of these duties he took custody of all contraband. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related contraband was secured in CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) office and he believed the noose was secured there throughout the time he worked at the TCF. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) thought he saw the noose a second time when CID agents came to the TCF to talk to various personnel about issues concerning PFC MANNING, and he seemed to recall seeing the noose in a plastic bag at that time.

About 1446, 25 Oct 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) telephonically interviewed CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who confirmed he was deployed to Kuwait from approximately 31 May 09 to either Jul or Aug 11. During the deployment CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) was assigned to the TCF, where he dealt with administrative issues concerning personnel detained in the TCF. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not remember receiving a noose, but stated it was possible he did and just didn't remember it. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he did not remember receiving any contraband related to PFC MANNING. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related if he did take in any contraband/evidence it would have been annotated on an evidence custody document, but he could not remember what the name or number of the form they used at that time was. CPO

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related it was rare to get contraband and he could only remember a few occasions where there was contraband turned in. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there was a four drawer cabinet style safe with a spindle type of combination lock in the administrative trailer where contraband/evidence was stored. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the only other person who might have taken the noose in from the guard force was his assistant, PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) did not remember whether PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) had access to the safe and stated he never trained PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) on how to process in contraband/evidence, so if he did receive it, he probably would have simply held on to it and given it to CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) upon his return to the office. CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there was no type of changeover inventory done of the evidence/contraband, with the personnel who replaced them.

About 1620, 6 Nov 12, SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) telephonically interviewed PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) who confirmed he had been deployed to Kuwait and had been assigned to the TCF as an assistant to CPO (b)(6)(b)(7)(C). PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related the noose was not turned in to him. PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he remembered a long thin black item, possibly bootlaces, or strings from a sandbag that may have been a noose. When advised by SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) that the noose in question was made out of a bed sheet, PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related that sounded familiar but he was not sure. PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related he was sure he had seen pictures of the noose made out of the bed sheet at some point, but was unsure of when that was. PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) also stated there was no type of changeover inventory done of the evidence/contraband, with the personnel who replaced them. PO1 (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) related there were no periodic inventories of evidence/contraband either.///LAST ENTRY///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

SA (b)(6)(b)(7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

SIGNATURE

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

DATE

6 Nov 12

EXHIBIT

407

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1 FEB 77

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EXHIBIT 407 002042

Approved

# AGENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

CID Regulation 195-1

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0028-10-CID221-10117

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

## DETAILS

About 1250, 15 Jan 13, Ms. (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Evidence Custodian, this office, collected as evidence one green mattress; one blue mattress; one pillow; one suicide smock; and one blanket, from CPT (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)(b)(7)(C) Trial Counsel, PFC MANNING prosecution team, which was documented on Evidence/Property Custody Document (EPCD), Document Number (DN) 012-13.///Last Entry///

TYPED AGENT'S NAME AND SEQUENCE NUMBER

ORGANIZATION

Computer Crime Investigative Unit  
U.S. Army CID, Quantico, VA 22134

DATE

15 Jan 13

EXHIBIT

408

CID FORM 94

1 FEB 77

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EXHIBIT 408 002043  
Approved

(b)(6)(b)(7)(C)

Exhibit 409 and 410

Page(s) 002044 thru 002129 referred to:

Office of the Clerk of the Court  
US Army Judiciary  
ATTN: JALS-CCO  
9275 Gunston Road  
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5546